Uberti 1873 Cattleman Review

The muffled beat of our horse’s hooves on frozen sand sounded steadily into the crisp desert air; air still frosty with dawn’s coming. Buffalo tracks lay on the ground before us, fresh in leftover snow where the afternoon sun doesn’t reach its fingers. We were hunting the buffalo, following their trail in a once-in-a-lifetime effort to put bison meat in the freezer and a buffalo robe on the floor.
My buddy Dan had drawn a cow bison tag for Utah’s legendary Henry Mountains. It was mid-December, we’d found buff after three days of hunting, and our lust to close with the herd was palpable on the air. We followed the tracks, Dan riding loose in the saddle with his buffalo rifle in hand.

BUFFALO RIFLE
Dan opted to hunt his buffalo with a lever-action Winchester 1886 chambered in 45-70; one of the most influential repeating rifles in early American history. It was the first lever-action repeater strong enough to be chambered for the big bore “buffalo” cartridges of the day. Designed by John Moses Browning and produced by Winchester from 1886 to 1935, the rifles were originally chambered in .45-70 Springfield and .45-90 WCF, among others.
Black Powder was the standard propellant of the day, but the ’86 action was so strong that it made the transition to smokeless powder with ease, being chambered for the smokeless powder .33 WCF cartridge just after the turn of the century. The largest round it was originally chambered in was, to my knowledge, the massive .50-110 Winchester. Rifles were produced in a variety of configurations and with barrel lengths ranging from twenty to twenty-eight inches.

Today, original Winchester ’86 rifles are hard to find and very expensive, especially if they are in even reasonably good condition. If you’re fortunate enough to find an original, the old rifle may be aged or worn to the point that it’s not functional, but taking it to a regular gunsmith for renovation will significantly decrease its value. But if you’re anything like me you love shooting and using vintage firearms, and owning one that is non-functional is, well, just not much fun. Enter Doug Turnbull.

Doug grew up and worked in the Creek Side Gun Shop; the largest firearm shop in upstate New York at the time. In 1983 Turnbull started a firearms restoration business, focusing on matching and restoring original finishes on vintage firearms – particularly color-casehardening.
Today he is known as one of the finest restoration artists in North America, and perhaps the only one who can actually make your vintage lever-gun more valuable. Typically, when a vintage firearm is refinished it looses much of its value. Not so when worked on by Turnbull Restoration.

For those of us not fortunate enough to own a vintage Winchester rifle, Turnbull also offers contemporary lever-action rifles that have been “Turnbull Finished”. Essentially, they take recent production rifles, polish the metal to match the work of the late 1800s, and then refinish everything with Turnbull’s legendary bone charcoal color casehardening, bluing, and vintage-type wood finish. Dan’s buffalo gun was one of these. It sports simple but nicely grained walnut, a 26-inch blued barrel, shotgun butt plate, and spectacular color casehardening over most of the metalwork.

Dan ordered his rifle chambered in .45-70 Springfield, mainly because a wide variety of ammunition is readily available in that caliber.
Buffalo hunting on the Henry Mountains is notoriously tough, so we opted to forego traditional ammunition in favor of a load that would offer a bit more velocity and reach when used with the rifle’s simple iron barrel sights. I ordered some of Hornady’s excellent LEVERevolution ammo in 250-grain MonoFlex and 325-grain FTX iterations, and also some Black Hills ammo stoked with their 325-grain solid copper fluted-point HoneyBadger projectiles.
I didn’t keep records of accuracy averages and velocities during testing, so you’ll have to take my word for it; each of these loads shot consistently and grouped well.

All three loads grouped high though, in fact, the 250-grain MonoFlex load (the fastest of the three) grouped almost eleven inches high at 100 yards. I didn’t want to remove the front sight and replace it with a taller one (who wants to mess with a Turnbull rifle!) to bring the point of impact down. Black Hills’ 325-grain HoneyBadger ammo impacted about four inches high at 100 yards, which would work perfectly.
The solid copper bullet should maintain all of its weight upon impact, which combined with the design’s chisel-like frontal “X”, should enable the bullet to drive deep. The flutes create a surprisingly devastating temporary wound cavity when shot into ballistic gelatin, and should be equally devastating on game. I was on pins and needles to see how the projectile would perform on a bison.

I hung a bison vital-sized steel target against a little mesa, and Dan exercised the Winchester at 50-yard intervals. The traditional rear sight sports an adjustable ramp, and Dan was able to use it to make consistently good groups out to 350 yards. The rifle bellows with authority and kicks with enthusiasm when loaded with high-performance loads, but the shotgun-style buttplate rendered recoil tolerable, if not entirely comfortable.

Capacity on the Turnbull Winchester 1886 is eight plus one. The action is very strong and fast but must be worked with authority. In the hands of a good lever-gun man, the rifle is capable of sending a massive amount of lead downrange in very short order. The trigger in Dan’s rifle is quite fair by lever-action standards, breaking at an average of 5 pounds 2.5 ounces. The overall weight of the rifle comes in right at 9 pounds 5.5 ounces.

CONCLUSION
The Turnbull Winchester 1886 rifle we tested is a spectacular firearm. The color casehardening, in particular, is extraordinary. We had zero malfunctions, the rifle shot well, and carried nicely in the hand and in a saddle scabbard. Accuracy was good.

We stepped off our horses and tied them when the bison tracks grew hot. Following carefully, Dan spotted a horn flashing in the sun amongst a hilltop copse of Junipers. A circuitous stalk put us within range, but the buffalo were still out of sight in the thick desert timber. Then the breeze stroked us across the back of our necks, and the herd erupted in a wave of pounding hooves.
When they paused 175 yards distant Dan placed a HoneyBadger bullet through a big cow. She had started to move just as his trigger broke, and she departed in the shadow of the herd’s dust. Following, we jumped the cow and Daniel finished her. The Black Hills bullets performed admirably, each one passing completely through the bison.

We processed the buffalo, loaded the meat onto our horses, and slid the long Turnbull rifle into its saddle scabbard. Swinging into our saddles, we pointed our horses toward the trailhead, eight miles distant. It had been a great hunt, with a great rifle, for one of America’s most iconic animals.
Gun owners permitted to carry concealed weapons in the state of South Carolina are soon likely to join residents in 45 other states who can carry their hand guns openly in public — a proposal that has frustrated gun-control advocates, doctors and top law enforcement leaders but was a resounding win for many Republican lawmakers.
With three days left on the legislative calendar, the Senate voted 28-16 mostly down party lines after a more than 12-hour debate to pass H. 3094, a House-sponsored bill that would allow only concealed weapons permit holders the right to carry their hand gun in the open.
Charleston Sen. Sandy Senn was the lone Republican to vote against the legislation.
The Republican-controlled Senate made a handful of changes to the bill. They ranged from removing the $50 cost of the permit application fee, to limiting the federal government’s intervention and to requiring clerks to report pertinent information to the State Law Enforcement Division within five, not 30, days that would prohibit someone from buying or owning a gun.
But senators also rejected dozens of amendments that included a Republican-pushed attempt to expand the measure by eliminating the law’s existing permit and background check requirement entirely, and also Democrat-led efforts to enhance background checks.
“I’d be lying to you if I said I wasn’t a little bit disappointed, but I actually, I have absolutely no regrets,” said state Sen. Shane Martin, R-Spartanburg, who pushed but lost 25-21 his effort to remove the permit requirement. “I won’t give up advocating for it. I was so close.”
Obviously, Martin said, “the Senate’s not ready for it yet.”The bill goes back to the House, likely to reject the changes, triggering a six-member joint panel to hammer out differences.
Congratulations to senators Massey and Martin. Shane Massey was the S.C. senator who successfully got the bill pulled from the SC senate judiciary committee where they intended to stall it until dead this calendar year, aided by turncoat SC senator Luke Rankin.
Actually, the attempt to remove the permitting requirement entirely, i.e., constitutional carry, was opposed by Shane Massey. I don’t know if the opposition was real, or if the attempt to amend the bill to remove permitting would have been a poison pill for the bill, losing S.C. senators who would have otherwise been in favor of open carry. But at least Mr. Massey did his part to strip the bill from the hands of Mr. Rankin, who needs to be primaried and thrown from office.
Also to senator Martin, who led a valiant effort for constitutional carry this term. As you might expect, I approve of his goals and I hope for the best during the next legislative season.
As I observed before, “The ninnies, frightened and the tepid must see for themselves when the state is let out of its cage that the sky doesn’t fall like law enforcement and “The Karens” said it would. They’re like a frightened, psychologically stunted animal who has been caged its entire life, afraid to leave the confines of its own imprisonment.”
When the world doesn’t end and blood doesn’t run in the streets as predicted by law enforcement and “Karens against Everything,” the time will be ripe for this again soon.
I listened to much of the debate today. Most of it was ridiculous. The ninnies tried everything in the book, from stalling tactics to endless yapping, to poison pill amendments. One awful senator, an obvious law enforcement sycophant, worked hard for an amendment that would have had LEOs confiscating weapons in any encounter for the sake of “officer safety.”
So he would have had men handling others’ weapons, a stupid, awful, terrible idea. I’ve discussed this before. Weapons might be modified, the officer may never have seen that particular weapon before, rounds might be chambered, or they might not be, safeties might be engaged, or they might not be, hammers may be cocked, they may not be, striker fired pistols may be half cocked, or they might not be, trigger jobs may have lightened the pull, or maybe not, the pistol might be single action, or it might be SA/DA, guns could drop if they’re handled (causing people to try to catch them), and all manner of NDs can occur. Some holsters are retention, others not, and on and on the variations could go.
It is a profoundly, terribly, incredibly stupid thing to begin handling weapons just because someone likes authority, walks up and demands it. It’s a great thing that amendment was defeated.
Now. It’s important not to let up. First, the little differences between the House and Senate versions must be hammered out, and that, quickly so. Then finally, the governor’s office must be flooded with mail, email and phone calls to ensure he keeps his word and signs the bills into law.
This has been a long slog, but it’s not over just yet.
Then next session we’ll focus on constitutional carry.
Combat experience with the bazooka rocket launcher in World War Two and its larger versions in the Korean War convinced the US military that a better weapon was needed to give front-line troops a direct-fire way to attack enemy strong points. The bazooka was bulky, not particularly accurate, and created a lot of backlist signature when fired. This led to a multi-part development effort involving design of a small grenade body, reliable but cheap fusing system, and a cartridge design that could launch it.
The result was the 40x46mm grenade. It uses a “high-low” system (originally developed by Rheinmetall during World War Two) in which a powder charge is fired in a small compartment within the cartridge case. The initial pressure in this compartment is some 35,000 psi, which is plenty high to ensure complete and repeatable powder burn. At peak pressure, the internal compartment ruptures, allowing the propellant gasses to expand into the full case volume, which lowers the pressure to about 3,000 psi. This lower pressure is safe to use with an aluminum barrel, and propels the grenade at about 250 fps, giving it a range of about 400 yards without generating excessive recoil.
The M79 proved to be very accurate and reliable. It’s downside was the need for a grenadier to carry a backup sidearm, as the M79 could not be used at close range. Almost as soon as it was introduced, work began on developing a launcher which could be attached to the M16 service rifle. This would first be the XM-148, and then ultimately the M203 that would replace the M79 in service. M79 launchers can still be found all over the world, however, as they are robust and reliable.
The Lessons of Force Z by Chris Kolakowski
The destruction of Prince of Wales and Repulse was the first time major capital ships had been sunk solely by aircraft in the open seas while actively defending themselves. Their loss shocked the world and psychologically crippled the British Empire in the Far East. Aside from the historical importance, their sinking also offers lessons relevant to today – especially how these large ships were overtaken by a swarm of small aircraft.
Major capital ships, such as World War II battleships or modern aircraft carriers, are large systems, made up of several interlocking elements that together answer the commands of the leadership. Their large crew sizes and complexities rival the size of corporations, large computer networks, or government agencies. These systems function very well on a large scale, but can be vulnerable to small disruptions in key areas. Alternately, a swarm of small actors moving in coordination can overwhelm and pressure the systems until they crack.
Today, technology and social media increasingly enables small actors to affect large systems. Social media creates “flash mobs” and can quickly mass a group to move toward a common goal, such as the street protests in Cairo that ultimately brought down Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 2012. Alternately, a single motivated and skillful hacker can compromise key systems and render serious damage to a large system – much like the Target data compromise in December 2013.
The fate of Force Z is a metaphor to help understand how small actors can destroy larger foes. It also offers lessons applicable to both military and corporate leaders.
The Story of Force Z
In the fall of 1941, Singapore and Malaya represented the keystone of the British Empire in Asia. As tensions rose with Japan, Britain strained to enhance the defenses in this area. British strategy hinged on the entire main fleet arriving from England to assist in the defense of Singapore, and a large naval base had been built on Singapore Island capable of handling the bulk of the Royal Navy. This base was central to the entire defense plan; the stated purpose of the 88,000 troops and 141 aircraft in Malaya was to defend the naval base.
These plans ignored the possibility that the fleet might be busy elsewhere when needed, and Britain faced just this problem in the summer of 1941. Battles in the Atlantic and Mediterranean stretched available modern ships to the limit, with little to spare for Singapore.
After much debate with the Admiralty (who wanted to send four older battleships), Prime Minister Winston Churchill dispatched Prince of Wales, one of his newest battleships, and Repulse, one of his best battlecruisers, under the command of Admiral Sir Thomas S. Phillips, former Vice Chief of the Naval Staff. Rounding out Phillips’ little fleet, designated Force Z, were the British destroyers Electra, Express, Encounter, and Jupiter. Force Z had a dual mission, to defend Singapore and also give the Japanese second thoughts about attacking. Churchill said Force Z was to be a “vague menace” but also confidently declared that Prince of Wales could “catch and kill” any like Japanese ship. To increase the political effect, maximum publicity attended Phillips’ movements to Malaya.
[1]
Force Z’s leadership. Admiral Sir Thomas S. Phillips (right) and his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Sir Arthur F. E. Palliser, on the dock at Singapore, 2 December 1941. (Imperial War Museum)
Force Z arrived in Singapore on 2 December 1941 to much fanfare. While his men and ships refitted and acclimated to Southeast Asia, Admiral Phillips flew to Manila to confer with his U.S. counterparts about combined operations. He returned on 7 December 1941 (6 December in Hawaii). The war started the next day in Malaya with the bombing of Singapore and landings at Singora on the Thailand coast.
After consultation with his staff and ship captains, Admiral Phillips decided to sortie and engage the Japanese invasion fleet. Royal Air Force commanders promised reconnaissance on the 9th and 10th, but stated that fighter cover would be unavailable. “We must get on without it,” said Phillips. Prince of Wales and Repulse sailed in company with the destroyers Electra, Express, HMAS Vampire, and HMS Tenedos at twilight on 8 December 1941.[2]
Without air cover, Phillips depended on surprise for success. He sailed northward, hiding in weather as much as possible. Japanese aircraft and submarines detected Force Z the evening of the 9th, and Phillips reluctantly turned for home. Japanese aircraft in Saigon launched a strike, but missed the fleet entirely.
That night Phillips received a report of enemy landings at Kuantan on the Malay coast, and diverted to investigate. A Japanese sub reported Force Z’s location;in response a new airstrike took off at dawn from Saigon. At daybreak on 10 December Force Z scouted Kuantan but found nothing, and Phillips turned east to investigate some suspicious trawlers. At this point the first raiders found Force Z.
At 1107 Repulse‘s Captain William G. Tennant ordered, “Enemy aircraft approaching. Action stations!” Captain John C. Leach gave a similar order on Prince of Wales, as did his counterparts in the destroyers. All ships sped up to 25 knots, opened antiaircraft fire, and began evasive maneuvers. The first group of planes bombed Repulse from 12,000 feet, scoring one minor hit on the boat deck and several near misses. Repulse remained in action, accompanied by cheers from Electra.[3]
The first bombing attack against Force Z, 10 December 1941, seen from a Japanese plane. Repulse (left) has been bombed and taken one hit, while Prince of Wales is maneuvering to starboard. Note the calm sea. (U.S. Navy)
Shortly after the bombers departed, a wave of torpedo planes swarmed. Splitting their effort against both ships, they flew in at 400 feet and launched their torpedoes. On Repulse, Captain Tennant calmly ordered the helm about, deftly maneuvering the battlecruiser out of the way of all torpedoes. After the attack concluded, he proudly signaled Phillips: “We have dodged 19 torpedoes so far, thanks to Providence.”[4]
The flagship was not so lucky. One torpedo hit Prince of Wales’ port side aft at 1144, wrecking both port side screw shafts, flooding much of the port side engineering spaces, and knocking out power to much of the ship. Her speed slowed to 15 knots and she developed an immediate 11-degree list to port. The power loss cut most internal and external communications, and froze many turrets in place; between that and the list, most antiaircraft guns were no longer effective. Pumps stopped working, and the ship’s electric steering failed. Leach hoisted the “Not Under Control” signal. As a 2012 analysis put it, “it had taken just one torpedo and less than half an hour to turn the pride of the British Navy into an unresponsive, indefensible wreck of a ship.”[5]
Captain John C. Leach, HMS Prince of Wales. (Imperial War Museum)
Over in Repulse, Captain Tennant received no messages from the flagship. After reporting the attacks to Singapore, he deliberately slowed Repulse and maneuvered her close to Prince of Wales to render assistance. At this point, more Japanese planes struck from the east. Three torpedoes slammed into Prince of Wales’ starboard side, while Repulse took one hit amidships after dodging attacks from several directions. Another wave of nine aircraft swept in, making a coordinated torpedo attack on Repulse from several directions at once. Repulse took four hits that collectively spelled her doom. Tennant ordered his crew to abandon ship. At 1233 Repulse rolled over and sank.[6]
Prince of Wales meanwhile continued to struggle. The Japanese bombed her again, scoring one hit. All damage after the first torpedo only hastened the inevitable end. Admiral Phillips signaled for Express to take off the wounded and unneeded men. In the midst of this process, Prince of Wales rolled over to port and sank at 1320.
It had taken 85 Japanese planes less than three hours to sink two of Britain’s most powerful ships, at a cost of just three planes destroyed. Destroyers saved 2,081 men from both ships, but 840 perished. Phillips and Leach on Prince of Wales made no effort to save themselves. Tennant of Repulse had the same idea, but his staff physically pulled him away from his post and tossed him into the sea. Most of Phillips’ staff drowned. At a stroke, British naval power in the Far East had been broken.[7]
The Lessons of Force Z
Force Z’s destruction offers much for leaders to study and consider. Both military and organizational leaders can find significant lessons applicable today. This section will examine each in turn.
Military Lessons. Force Z’s fate is a warning to modern naval leaders. Large capital ships require considerable protection at all times, and past performance is no guarantee of future results. Despite several tries, the Germans and Italians had failed to sink British capital ships from the air before December 1941. This record inspired overconfidence; Churchill’s belief in his ships’ ability to defeat the Japanese trickled down to the British wardrooms, affecting strategy and tactics. The sinking’s’ psychological blow was therefore greater.[8]
Today the aircraft carrier is the preeminent capital ship in the world. Possessing one is an expression of naval power, and number of carriers is the yardstick by which major navies are compared – much like battleships had been counted before 1942. The United States Navy has not lost an aircraft carrier sunk or knocked out of combat by enemy action since 1945. Except for the USS Cole (DDG-67) attack in 2000, it has been 25 years since a cruiser or frigate was knocked out – even longer since one was sunk by enemy action. The Navy must be careful that this track record does not create overconfidence and affect strategy and tactical decision making.
Much like Japan fielded an air fleet to help counter British capital ships in 1941, Iran, North Korea, and China are perfecting missiles, submarines, and other countermeasures to neutralize U.S. capital ships. The tactic is not necessarily to sink the enemy, but simply knock them out of action – a “mission kill” or “mobility kill.” The Japanese achieved that with one torpedo hitting the right spot on Prince of Wales, as did terrorists with a single boat against the Cole. Today’s naval thinkers should ponder the implications of those events.
Prince of Wales arriving in Singapore, 2 December 1941. (Imperial War Museum)
A final lesson for military leaders is the effect of peacetime budgeting on the fleet. Because of prewar austerity, Britain did not have enough modern capital ships to answer all the crises it faced during World War II. The Royal Navy’s Captain Russell Grenfell explained: “The people of Britain set their face against spending money on armaments between the wars. They were prepared to back any policy, expedient, or nostrum that offered reduction of such expenditure.” Global conflict stretched the Royal Navy to the breaking point, forcing reuse of many obsolescent World War I-era battleships. These were the ones Churchill rejected sending to Singapore in favor of the more modern Prince of Wales – a gamble of modern quality over older quantity.[9]
Organizational Lessons. Writers like Thomas Friedman and Malcolm Gladwell have pointed out that today’s technology increasingly enables large systems to be taken down by small actors who target key areas or overwhelm by attacks from all directions. The destruction of Force Z shows that this trend is not new.
The modern equivalent of a plane torpedoing Prince of Wales’ engineering is a lone hacker (or small group) exploiting vulnerabilities in critical parts of large networks to gain access and do major damage. To cite just one recent case, the Heartbleed hack in April 2014 did not directly target main systems or databases, but rather the OpenSSL library that encrypts communications between networks and websites. Hacking OpenSSL thus provided access to sites and personal information across a wide spectrum. The result of this one hit on a key system rippled across the Internet, causing major disruption. Russian hackers did something similar when raiding the bitcoin market server in early 2014. The information technology managers working to contain the damage in both cases would understand Prince of Wales’ ordeal.
Computers and social media also enable mass gatherings (real or virtual) to move in a common purpose against a single target – much like how the Japanese attacked Repulse. Viral posts show how quickly information (and misinformation) can spread, creating a mob effect. Social media’s ability to mobilize masses of people has been demonstrated in protests around the world over the past three years, several of which have changed governments.
This mass generation of effort also shows up in the stock market, as smaller traders detect vulnerable corporations and attack them in a mass fashion from all directions. In 2008, short sellers used these methods to target and spiral the stock prices of both Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers; as their prices fell, other investors began pulling out their money, which overwhelmed those companies to the point of collapse. Morgan Stanley barely survived a similar attack. “Shorts are destroying great companies,” observed CNBC’s Jim Cramer at the time.[10]
The Force Z Solution
The story of Force Z also offers a solution as to how large systems can survive against smaller actors, be they planes, hackers, short sellers, or something else. Passive defense alone does not work; it is impossible to close all vulnerabilities or to anticipate all threats in terms of timing or direction.
The answer is to stay agile and vigilant. HMS Repulse dodged 19 torpedoes due to her maneuverability and the alertness of her bridge crew in spotting the incoming planes. Just as the Japanese released their weapons, Captain Tennant made a hard turn and avoided incoming torpedoes. Prompt and disciplined damage control kept the ship in action after hits. Repulse only succumbed after she voluntarily restricted her mobility to stay by the stricken Prince of Wales.
William G. Tennant of Repulse, shown later as a Vice Admiral. (Imperial War Museum)
In the corporate world, an example of this concept is the famed “fortress balance sheet” strategy, advocated most prominently by JPMorgan Chase’s chief executive, Jamie Dimon. “The fortress balance sheet demands nothing less than full attention to the reality of the situation and a constant focus on the risks,” described one of Dimon’s biographers. It is structurally designed to anticipate threats, operate with discipline, and preserve flexibility through good times and bad. This vigilance enabled JPMorgan Chase to weather the financial hurricane of 2008, while having the ability to acquire several major companies and exploit opportunities to move forward.[11]
Force Z’s Legacy
The sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse shocked the world and reverberates today. Psychologically, Britain and her regional allies never fully recovered from this blow. Force Z’s destruction “marked, in fact, the end of an epoch; that of British pre-eminence as a sea power,” according to Captain Grenfell. Militarily, the loss of this fleet knocked out the centerpiece of British defense in the Far East.
Suddenly vulnerable, Australia and New Zealand turned to the United States for defense assistance, planting the seeds of today’s alliance. Grenfell explained, “The . . . resultant passing of the command of the south-west Pacific to the Japanese was never redeemed, at least by the British. When redemption came, it was the achievement of the Americans.”[12] This fact continues to influence Asian geopolitics.
Today Prince of Wales and Repulse rest on the floor of the Gulf of Thailand, with naval ensigns attached to each. Passing Royal Navy ships pay their respects. Aside from periodic visits by divers, they and their men sleep undisturbed. These wrecks are monuments to the twilight of the British Empire, but also symbolize much more than that. Leaders should ponder their stories and lessons, for they have much to teach, even from the deep.
Repulse leaving Singapore on the evening of 8 December 1941. (Imperial War Museum)

