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Category: War
As with many military innovations, the Huey Hog came to be during war. In Vietnam, U.S. forces were using the UH-1 Iroquois for a variety of missions. It didn’t take long for the troops to request a dedicated attack platform. Until it arrived, UH-1 variants acted as gunships. They were known as Huey Hogs.
The UH-1 Huey helicopter first deployed to Vietnam as a medevac platform in 1962. It soon became obvious that this versatile aircraft was capable of so much more than just extracting wounded troops from the combat zone. More than any other single war machine of its era, the Huey revolutionized modern combat.
Modern war turns on a variety of attributes: firepower, intelligence and doctrine are indeed undeniably important. However, arguably the most critical aspect of modern battle calculus is mobility. In 1784, Ben Franklin opined, “And where is the Prince who can afford so to cover his Country with Troops for its Defense, as that Ten Thousand Men descending from the Clouds, might not in many Places do an infinite deal of Mischief, before a Force could be brought together to repel them?” That guy was indeed a visionary. More so than cumbersome airborne forces delivered via parachute, the Huey helicopter made old Ben’s vision a reality.
Once somebody realized you could pack troops into utility helicopters and land them behind an entrenched enemy force, warfare would never be the same. However, it was simultaneously appreciated that those same troops would be exceptionally vulnerable during the insertion phase of the operation.
Fast mover jets could bring the pain on a massive scale, but they lacked the requisite precision to protect a complex combat helicopter assault. To help suppress enemy forces during this most critical time, a handful of U.S. Army visionaries created the world’s first operational helicopter gunships. They used UH-1 Huey helicopters as a foundation.
Details
Most dedicated Huey gunships were either B, C or M-model aircraft. These machines sported the early stubby fuselage architecture. D and H-models had a stretched fuselage optimized for carrying troops and cargo. The primary differences among the three variants were in the engines and powertrains. C and M-model Hueys featured a wide-chord rotor system and redesigned tail boom to help manage the extra weight of the ordnance they carried.
In Vietnam, these heavily armed aircraft were called Hogs. Of the 16,000 Hueys produced since 1956, roughly 1,000 of them were used as gunships. These early pioneers figured it out as they went along, so there was a great deal of variation concerning weapons, equipment and fire-control systems. However, the archetype was the UH-1M Heavy Scout.
The UH-1 M-model Heavy Scout sported four 7.62x51mm M-60CA1 machine guns mounted in pairs on each side of the aircraft in an XM16 mount. These guns were fired remotely via solenoids and pivoted to allow the pilot to control elevation. The guns fed from big ammo cans mounted in the crew compartment via flexible ammo chutes.
Alongside these guns was typically one M157 seven-shot rocket pod on each side. There were nineteen-shot pods available as well, but these early Hueys typically lacked the horsepower to lift them. The 2.75-inch FFAR (folding fin aerial rocket) was originally called the “Mighty Mouse.” These unguided rockets could carry a variety of warheads.
A typical 2.75-inch rocket was four feet long, weighed about 20 pounds, and packed a roughly 6-pound HE warhead. These rockets could also carry a white phosphorus payload for incendiary or marking purposes. Anti-tank variants had both high-explosive antitank and high-explosive dual-purpose effects. Additionally, these rockets could fire flechette warheads that packed thousands of little pressed steel darts.
Flechettes were called nails in military parlance, and they were extra-special nasty. The WDU-4/A warheads that carried them each packed 2,200 darts that weighed 20 grains apiece. These rockets could be programmed to fly a certain distance and then explode, sending a dense cloud of pointy steel chaos to saturate a target area. When the flechette rounds detonated they gave off a distinctive puff of red smoke.
The Heavy Hog also frequently mounted a 40mm automatic grenade launcher in the nose. The Mini-Hog sported an XM21 armament subsystem. This loadout included the same seven-shot rocket pods as the XM16 but substituted a single M134 minigun on each side in place of the paired M-60s. Each of these armament subsystems rode on the XM-156 multi-armament pylon mount. This mount was slaved to an XM-60 reflex sight that allowed the pilot in command to direct and elevate the weapons in flight. This sight rode on a folding mount that collapsed out of the way when not in use.
With a typical cyclic rate of around 4,000 rounds per minute apiece, the M134 minigun consumed ammunition at a simply breathtaking clip. As a result, each gun was fed by two rows of three ammo boxes interconnected and routed through holes in the cabin floor. Electric motors built into the ammunition boxes helped pull the heavy belts along so that the guns could feed them reliably.
Dependent upon the flying conditions, these heavily-armed gunships might also include door gunners each wielding an M-60 machinegun on a bungee cord or pintle mount. Sometimes these were standard ground -60s. However, a lot of aerial gunners modified their guns with chopped barrels or ancillary forward handgrips to enhance control. These grips were frequently improvised out of a standard M-60 fire control group secured in place on the forearm with pipe clamps. Mounting a C-ration can to the left side of the feed tray would improve reliability as well.
The latest M-model gunships used the same 1,400-shaft horsepower Lycoming engine of the larger H-model Hueys and had the same 9,500-pound max gross weight. These aircraft were at times fitted with .50-caliber guns and crazy-powerful spotlights for night operations. All of this, while effective, simply served as a stepping stone to better things to come.
Ruminations
Lessons learned with the development of the B, C and M-model Huey gunships were folded into the AH-1G Cobra, the world’s first effective mass-produced dedicated attack helicopter. Once rendered obsolete, these old Huey gunships were seconded to National Guard units, gifted to civilian government agencies, or simply scrapped. When I was training at Hanchey Army Heliport at Fort Rucker back in the 1990s, there were a couple of these old M-model Hueys on the flight line. I have no idea what they were used for.
Huey gunships have seen action in brushfire wars worldwide, particularly in El Salvador back in the 1980s. Powerful, effective, vicious and mean, those early Huey gunships helped write the book on attack helicopter operations. For American troops in contact in Vietnam, the arrival of the Hogs quite frequently carried the day.
Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks to China’s President Xi Jinping during the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) leaders’ summit in Samarkand on September 16, 2022. (Sergei Bobylov/SPUTNIK/AFP via Getty Images)
March 20, 2023Updated: March 20, 2023
Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin is aimed at furthering the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) designs against the United States, according to analysts.
Xi’s March 20 to March 23 visit to Moscow is his first to the country since Putin’s February 2022 invasion and comes on the heels of Beijing’s brokering a resumption of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Xi and Putin declared a “no limits” partnership, and ties between the two countries have only deepened since then.
The meeting was announced on Friday, incidentally not long after the International Court of Justice issued an arrest warrant for Putin for war crimes.
The timing of the visit is critical for both Xi and Putin, experts say.
“I think that Beijing—like most of the rest of the world—is worried that the conflict might escalate to nuclear warfare that would harm their own plans as much as anyone else,” said Brandon Weichert, a U.S.-based geopolitical analyst and author of the book “Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower.”
“At the same time, though, Beijing doesn’t mind seeing their two biggest competitors, Russia and the U.S., bleeding each other in Europe while China has free reign in the Indo-Pacific,” he told The Epoch Times.
Timing
The meeting comes as Russia slowly makes advances in its monthslong operation to capture the eastern Ukraine city of Bakhmut. The bloody battle has led to massive losses on both sides, especially the Russians.
Madhav Nalapat, a strategic affairs analyst and vice chair of the India-based Manipal Advanced Research Group said that Xi and Putin are meeting at a time when the war in Ukraine is entering a stage where it can either end conclusively or can drag out into a stalemate.
“Putin is under pressure from his commanders to unleash the full fury of Russian weapons against Ukraine rather than have the war get prolonged,” Nalapat told The Epoch Times. “Xi clearly wants to know whether Putin will go all out or continue with the present tactics.”
To Frank Lehberger, a Germany-based Sinologist, Xi and Putin’s “hasty arrangement” and secret get together” on Monday is because the Russian military is on the “brink of collapse” in Ukraine.
“Xi Jinping, who is since last week the sole autocrat of China, is anxious not to let this happen, because a military rout of Russian armies in Ukraine would be the end of Putin’s autocratic and anti-Western regime of Russia,” Lehberger told The Epoch Times in an email.
The Russian army has lost nearly 200,000 soldiers in the war, according to Western officials, and at least 500,000 Russians have fled the country since the war started. Lehberger said that Russian elites and nationalist hardliners are angry with Putin and hold him responsible for the situation, wanting an end to Putin’s dream to recreate a Russian empire in Europe.
“Putin desperately needs Xi to come now and pledge his help, or it will be too late for Putin and his dreams of an autocratic empire,” said Lehberger.
“Xi knows all this, and he also desperately needs Russia to fight on ….not only against Ukrainians but by association against the entire democratic West or NATO, which are the CCP’s existential enemies.”
Nalapat said that Russia losing a war to Ukraine would weaken China’s position significantly in the international order and the timing of the meeting is mindful of that.
Lethal Arms for Russia
There has been rising apprehension about China supplying military assistance to Russia. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said last month that China is already providing “non-lethal” weapons to Russia during the war and is considering supplying lethal ones. Beijing denies these claims.
While much has been made of Xi’s purported role as peacemaker in the conflict, experts said that this is just a smokescreen, pointing to Beijing’s supply of “dual-use” equipment to Moscow that aids its military efforts.
Weichert said that China has long been providing “vital support and supplies” to Russia.
“The Biden administration knows full well that there are Chinese ‘technicians’ working alongside Wagner Group units in Bakhmut, helping them to maintain the drone fleets that Chinese drone makers have sold to the Russians,” he said, referring to the private mercenary group.
The Wagner Group purchased more than 2,500 Chinese drones in a deal between the mercenary group and Russian and Chinese intelligence, British media outlet Daily Mirror reported, citing a UK intelligence report.
Nalapat said that misleading the enemy is a “standard operating procedure” for the CCP, noting that the regime is supplying arms to Russia through discrete channels.
“Do you believe that the flood of weapons, many sophisticated, coming to Russia from North Korea and Iran have all been made in those two countries?” he said.
According to a recent Politico report citing customs data, Chinese firms have exported 1,000 assault rifles and other equipment to Moscow that could be used in the conflict.
In June 2022, for example, Russian firm Tekhkrim imported rifles from China North Industries Group Corporation Limited, a large state-owned defense contractor. The data also showed that Russian companies received 12 shipments of drone parts and over 12 tons of body armor from China via Turkey in late 2022.
In response to this report, White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby told The Epoch Times that the administration couldn’t confirm that China has in fact provided lethal aid to Russia.
Lehberger said that “All these activities are in contravention of current international sanctions,” adding that the reported efforts are only the tip of the iceberg.
In addition to Iran and North Korea, China is also sending arms to Russia through other countries like Myanmar, Serbia, Turkey, and Russia’s staunch ally in Europe, Belarus, according to Lehberger.
After his summit with Putin, Xi will talk via satellite link to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for the first time since the invasion. Lehberger termed this as Xi’s “make-believe peace mission.”
According to the expert, Xi will aim at a temporary cease-fire to earn recovery time for Putin’s depleted army and Russia will “at a later time” attack Ukraine more fiercely.
Lehberger said that the CCP will continue to supply arms to Russia for at least another two years, because he believes that Xi has plans to take over Taiwan in 2025 and would thus wish to use prolonged Ukraine-Russian conflict to stun or weaken the United States and other Western powers.
China’s Economic Stake
Experts said that China has long-term economic agendas vis-a-vis the Russia-Ukraine war and its economic goals over the next decades are linked with Beijing’s subjugation of the Russian economy.
“Russia is squarely in the camp of China’s new empire; the vast Russian wilderness will become protein for which the dragon can feed on as it rises over the next decade, and Putin will become a powerful vassal prince under Xi Jinping,” said Weichert, adding that fusing the Chinese and Russian economies would be a major victory for Xi and for that, it would need Russia to be ensnared in a protracted conflict with Ukraine.
Nalapat said that Russia has become China’s most important supplier of industrial raw materials at discounted prices. The two countries want to work together to topple the U.S. dollar as the global reserve currency.
“A weakened U.S. dollar would in their view boost their own currencies, especially the RMB [Chinese yuan]. For some time, much of U.S. deficit funding has come from increases in overseas purchases of USD as a reserve currency, and a dollar reset would significantly crimp the ability to spend of the U.S. government,” he said.
Xi wants the United States to not only be weakened but also be deprived of reliable and functioning allies within Europe, according to Lehberger who sees the Ukraine war as vital to Beijing’s economic game plan against Washington.
“A weak E.U. will then be earmarked to become an economic dependency of China,” Lehberger said.
Clausewitz tells us to measure society’s strength by whether we achieve victory on the battlefield. Victory entails not just destroying the enemy’s fighting capability or claiming his territory, but achieving certain political objectives. American politicians have shown a willingness to end wars without achieving their objectives. In other words, they have shown a willingness to lose.
Precedent was set with the 1953 ceasefire in Korea and upheld when America withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021. It remains unclear whether politicians intended to lose those wars (and others) or merely accepted that the price of victory had become too high, that victory was no longer worth the time or effort required.
Whatever the case, our troops care about winning. Desire for victory is one reason young Americans leave their homes and families to enlist. They join to gain a mission, to make a difference, and to win on the battlefield. Desire for victory was part of the reason our troops performed so well in the fight against terrorism. Ask anyone who served whether they believed their combat deployments were making a difference. Odds are they answer ‘yes’, but acknowledge the overarching policy was misguided if not destined to fail.
No one blames the troops for our failures in Korea, Vietnam, or Afghanistan. Rather, it is “the political leaders who have forgotten that victory matters,” historian and Clausewitz scholar Donald Stoker told me recently over the phone. And since the politicians do not believe that victory matters, our troops have found themselves trapped in endless wars that lead to defeat or stalemate, a doom loop of poor planning-leads-to-poor results, where the pursuit of war itself becomes more important than defeat or victory.
In his book Why America Loses Wars (Cambridge, 2019), Stoker argues that flawed thinking about war, especially limited war, has led to flawed war policy and poor results. And, Stoker anticipates more of the same unless our political leaders clearly define their political objectives and apply the necessary military strategies and resources to achieve those objectives. The following is our conversation on war and politics.
Can you first define “war” for our readers?
War is the use of military force to achieve a political aim. The violence (force) element is pivotal. What you will see argued is that you can have war without violence. That’s wrong. You have rivalry and competition, but war must have politically directed violence, directed at an adversary for a political end.
Your writing is concerned with winning on the battlefield. Define victory.
Achieving your political aim. That’s the one that shines through. When you get what you want, and have the strength or ability to convince the other side to agree to your terms. This is where the complexity of the book comes into play. The most difficult chapter to write was on how to end wars, particularly those wars fought for a limited aim where often you’re not able to impose your will on the enemy. In such situations, it’s difficult to force the other side to come to your point of view, as was the case in the Korean War and the Gulf War, to name a couple of examples. It was too difficult to get the agreements to end those wars on the terms we wanted.
I’ll add that we almost never plan for the ending of a war, which is one reason for our failure to achieve victory in some of our wars since 1945. This is not just a problem for the United States—most countries never plan for the end of a war. The Russo-Japanese War [1904-05] is one of those very few examples where a nation-state (Japan) contemplated in advance exactly how to end the war. Japan thought through the negotiation steps needed to end the conflict on favorable terms. In contrast, the H.W. Bush Administration had thought about the need for a plan to end the Gulf War but didn’t create one. Instead, it had General Schwarzkopf negotiate in a very ad hoc way, and he was criticized for the settlement even though everything he did was approved by the administration.
You are opposed to loose usage of “war” in academia, government, and journalism. The term “limited war” is particularly bothersome. “Hybrid war” as well. To borrow a line from the Smiths: What difference does it make?
I get criticisms sometimes that I’m worrying about nothing, but as you dig into the arguments, you discover that we don’t even agree on basic definitions for “war” and “peace.”
For instance, there’s this constant drumbeat that we’re at war with Russia, that we’re at war with China. I think many terms we use confuse “subversion” and “crime” with actual war. Now, the “gray zone” is a big one used to denote actions occurring in this supposed realm between peace and war, but my point is that people are again misunderstanding “subversion” and elements of Great Power Competition. I think we’re creating new terminology and imaginary complexity that amounts to sloppy thinking. This affects our ability to plan and make war.
Let’s apply these terms. Was the Iraq War a failure?
That depends. You can look at the question several different ways.
First, what were the political aims being sought in the Iraq War? The political aims were to (a) overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime; and (b) build a democratic Iraq. You can make a good argument that we achieved both aims, but that we did not understand that achieving these aims required different things. Building a democratic Iraq is a completely different political aim and, when the aims are different, usually the ways must be different. The Iraq War certainly killed more people and cost more than it was expected to, but you could argue that the war was a success.
All that said, I don’t like the question. You could certainly argue that we helped create a situation in Iraq that allowed Iran to obtain a dominant position in the country, that this probably would not have happened without overthrowing Saddam Hussein.
Okay. How about the War in Afghanistan. Was it a failure?
Obviously.
We wanted to (a) overthrow the regime; and (b) build a democratic Afghanistan. Then, late last year [2021], we decided we didn’t want to support the regime we created. What we did in Afghanistan failed to achieve the aim. In Iraq, we got our aim but was it worth it? I’m iffy on that. In Afghanistan, we didn’t accomplish our political aim.
But is it a problem of thinking or a problem of will? We knew the political objective of the war: to create security conditions for peace and the development of a new government and military. We also understood the problem: accomplishing the objective would take 100 years.
Both. Loose terminology is a problem of thinking. But it always boils down to will, too.
Clausewitz would say it always comes down to one side’s ability to hold. People would argue that the North Vietnamese or the Afghans were just willing to do it longer.
What if it’s impossible to achieve the aim? I think it’s a fair question to put forward in the context of Afghanistan. I’ve seen it in a couple of books. When Mullah Omar and Karzai cut a deal in early 2002, the administration wouldn’t accept the deal because it was very much an Afghan deal. It was rejected by the administration. Just think if they had taken the deal – what would have happened? It’s a fascinating one to think about.
It’s really tough if you’re in the political decision-making role. You may have to make the decision that you’re willing to lose. That’s the criticism leveled by Peter Bergen at the Biden Administration in Afghanistan, that they decided to lose. But did they really think they were losing the war?
Harry Summers’ book on Vietnam says there was no clear political aim in Vietnam. But it’s very clear from the Kennedy and early Johnson administration documents that these administrations wanted a non-Communist Vietnam. The interesting thing from Summers’ argument is that there are all these flag officers he interviewed who did not know the political aim. It’s as if it was not pushed down the chain. There’s a broken link in the chain.
When you look at the political aims for the Iraq War, it’s very clear that the administration wanted to overthrow the regime and establish a democratic Iraq. But then you have Rumsfeld writing in his correspondence that the goal was not to establish a democratic Iraq. Moreover, the political aim given to the war planners was to overthrow the regime, not to plan for creation of a democratic Iraq. The disconnect between the WH – DoD – ground commanders was huge in the Bush Administration. I think it was very different in the Obama Administration. As far as communicating the political aim, I think there was some improvement in the Obama administration but there was also a real tightening of control at the WH in the Obama administration. Consequently, there was a real loss of strategy in favor of tactical planning. In Ash Carter’s memoir, he writes that the Administration was slow to figure out a strategy to fight the Iraq War in 2014 and beyond. I think there was a lack of emphasis on winning during the Obama Administration.
I’ll add that it’s very weird to see flag officers say that the point of fighting a war is not to win. You’ll see evidence of that dating back to the Korean War. It’s very odd. The class I taught at the Naval War College was essentially on “how to win wars,” but now you’ll see from military officers and politicians and others that the point is not to win the war. If you’re not trying to win the war, how will you ever get to peace? Fighting the war becomes an end. There’s a phenomenon where the war becomes more tactical the longer it goes on, and planners and decision-makers lose sight of the strategic picture.
There is a divergence between the academic’s answer and the participant’s answer. Many veterans believe we won tactically but lost strategically. There is a sense that the people most out-of-touch with war—politicians, bureaucrats, other “experts” in war policy—are the people most responsible for our failure. Can people who never served in war fully understand war?
I think at some levels “yes” and some levels “no.” There’s a friend of mine who spent a year in Iraq and a year in Afghanistan. His father had been an infantryman in Vietnam. He said when he came back from Iraq, his father finally talked to him about Vietnam and the wounds he suffered. He never spoke about the Vietnam War beforehand, maybe because it was too personal and he feared he wouldn’t be understood. Another colleague had a similar experience with a student who had a grandfather who served in World War II. The reason why is because they had someone they knew—someone they knew would understand.
So, yes, I think it’s difficult to really understand the violence and chaos of war unless you’ve experienced it.
You mentioned Clausewitz. I’ve not given you any preparation, but can you apply his “ends,” “ways,” and “means” analysis to the engagement in Ukraine?
I’m probably wrong on this because I’m guessing, but here it goes, from the Ukrainian side:
ENDS – I don’t know. Ukraine wants to secure its independence. Do the Ukrainians also want to retake land they lost in 2014? Some would argue “yes” but we don’t know.
WAYS – depends how you want to slice it. Probably defensive. Attrite the Russians and give ground until Ukraine can mount an offensive. [Which has happened since the interview was conducted]
MEANS – an effort to mobilize the entire country. Zelensky tried to revive the levée on masse at the beginning of the war, from ages 16 to 60. I’m uncertain how well this has worked.
That seems right. Thanks for doing the analysis on the fly.
Sure. And one further note on Clausewitz, if I may.
Of course.
He was first and foremost an infantryman, a soldier. We have this misperception that he was just a staff officer. He was in at least 36 battles. There were weeks where they would fight every day. He was at the Battle of Borodino. He once took a bayonet to the side of the head. He experienced nearly everything about war, from being wounded to being a prisoner of war, to leading in combat. But he also sat in meetings with the Czar. He had vast experience and vast education on war—he built his theoretical approach on all these different things. Bad theory will get you killed, he believed. And so, I’ve taken up that last point by writing this book, an attempt to encourage better thinking about why and how we wage war.
John Waters is a writer in Nebraska.
Ukraine has demoted a top battlefield commander after he admitted his unit had been decimated in fighting around the city of Bakhmut.
Battalion commander, known by his call sign Kupol, gave an unusually frank assessment of Ukrainian losses in an interview – The Washington Post© The Washington Post
The battalion commander, known by his call sign Kupol, gave an unusually frank assessment of Ukrainian losses in an interview from the front lines earlier this week.
He revealed that all of the original 500 soldiers in his unit had either been killed or injured, a rare acknowledgement from inside the Ukrainian ranks, where losses are kept strictly confidential.
The Ukrainian high command is at pains to present a positive spin on the increasingly bloody defence of the east of the country. US officials have estimated that the Ukrainian army may have taken 120,000 casualties compared with 200,000 by the Russian army.
Kupol told the Washington Post this week that the Ukrainian army training was often poor and that some of the rookie replacements didn’t know how to throw a hand grenade or fire a rifle.
Others had abandoned their positions shortly after arriving at the front line, he said.
Members of a Ukrainian army tank crew check the vehicle at a military base in Zaporizhzhia – Kateryna Klochko/PA© Provided by The Telegraph
“I get 100 new soldiers,” he said. “They don’t give me any time to prepare them. They say, ‘Take them into the battle.’ They just drop everything and run. That’s it. Do you understand why? Because the soldier doesn’t shoot. I ask him why, and he says, ‘I’m afraid of the sound of the shot.’ And for some reason, he has never thrown a grenade. … We need Nato instructors in all our training centres, and our instructors need to be sent over there into the trenches. Because they failed in their task.”
Kupol said what was left of his unit was also facing ammunition shortages.
“You’re on the front line,” he said. “They’re coming toward you, and there’s nothing to shoot with.”
Thousands of Ukrainian soldiers are being trained by the British Army and other Nato countries but thousands more receive more rudimentary training in Ukraine.
Kupol said that he had been motivated to speak out to try to improve training levels but furious Ukrainian generals instead demoted him. The Washington Post said he had consented to have his picture taken but admitted he could face “personal blowback” for his honest assessment.
Kupol told the Washington Post this week that the Ukrainian army training was often poor – The Washington Post© Provided by The Telegraph
Valentin Shevchenko, a spokesman for the Ukrainian military, accused Kupol of “disseminating false information”. “The losses announced in the unit of which he had command are significantly overestimated,” she told Ukrainian media.
Shortly after his demotion, Kupol quit the Ukrainian army.
Within hours of his reassignment to a training camp, dozens of Ukrainian soldiers, politicians and journalists had voiced their support for the battalion commander.
“One of the armed forces finest commanders has just been removed,” Yuriy Butusov, a well-known Ukrainian war correspondent, wrote on Facebook.
“Instead of analysing mistakes that will defeat the Russian army, honest comments are suppressed and those who make them are punished.”
The leak on casualty numbers will be deeply embarrassing for the Ukrainian military which has diligently built up a narrative of its outnumbered but highly motivated and well-trained army taking on hordes of Russian soldiers and convicts.
It also undermines confidence in its much-talked-up counteroffensive planned for spring.
The attritional nature of the war in Ukraine has killed and injured hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Both sides have admitted that they are running out of artillery shells and ammunition.
Ukraine and Russia guard their casualty numbers closely, believing that they could undermine morale, although military commanders still hint at the high death tolls at their evening briefings when they boast of killing hundreds of enemy soldiers.
On Sunday, Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, said that Ukrainian forces had killed more than 1,100 Russian soldiers in the past week. Russia’s ministry of defence said that day that it had killed 220 Ukrainian soldiers in the past 24 hours.
It is not possible to independently verify these numbers. Thousands of Ukrainian civilians have also been killed.
On the battlefield, the British ministry of defence has said that Russian fighters led by Wagner mercenaries have broken over the river in the centre of Bakhmut, in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, but that their advance had stalled because they were exhausted.
Oleksiy Danilov, secretary of Ukraine’s Security Council, said that Mr Zelensky was determined to defend the city despite growing pressure to withdraw.
“This is our land, and we have no right not to defend it,” he told Radio Free Europe.
Both battles and wars are characterized by curious tipping points. It’s weird. Such stuff seems to take on a spirit of its own. Through the lens of history, it all looks so clear. At the time it must have been absolutely terrifying.
Military history is rife with such stuff. In 405 BC the Spartans and the Athenians faced off in a naval conflict that was epic for its era. The resulting Battle of Aegospotami during the Peloponnesian War determined the trajectory of Western civilization.
The Athenians and Spartans were fairly evenly matched. The fight could have gone either way. However, The Spartans under Lysander took advantage of some poorly-timed leadership mistakes and ultimately either seized or sank 170 of the 180 available Athenian Men-o-War. Lysander subsequently decreed the death penalty against anyone caught taking grain to Athens.
Faced with the prospect of starvation, the Athenians capitulated in 404 BC. Had Athens been victorious, then Greek democracy would likely have been the driving force behind the development of modern civilization. As it was the Romans filled that void, so here we are. That’s no doubt an oversimplification, but it is nonetheless thought-provoking.
The Battle of Gettysburg was precipitated by Confederate forces searching for shoes. The subsequent fight for Little Round Top came down to the desperate actions of a few desperate men. While the war dragged on as wars are wont to do, the Confederacy never really regained the initiative after that seminal moment.
Similarly, the Battle of Midway represented the turning point in the Pacific War. The Japanese were a most formidable power in that particular pond. Their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, represented a watershed moment in the annals of modern warfare. It seemed the Imperial Japanese Naval (IJN) was unstoppable. Then AF grew short on water.
Unbeknownst to the Japanese, American codebreakers were reading their mail. The IJN had been using the term AF to describe the objective for their next major conquest. The American leadership was not certain what AF might be. Captain Wilfred Holmes suggested they send a message in the clear that Midway’s water purification facility was on the fritz. 24 hours later the Japanese transmitted that “AF was short on water,” and the Americans knew they were coming.
It cost the attacking American Task Force 34 of 41 deployed torpedo bombers and most of their crews, but the Zero fighters all dropped down to the deck where the hunting was good. At the same time, Commander Wade McClusky’s SBD Dauntless dive bombers rolled hot from altitude and sent three of the four Japanese fleet carriers to the bottom. The remaining flattop Hiryu joined them soon thereafter. Though the war ground on for three more years, the Japanese were doomed after Midway.
Similarly, the war in Ukraine seems to have had a turning point. As I type these words the Russians and Ukrainians are busy slugging it out in the east. Though everybody seems to be an expert, nobody really has any idea how it will turn out. However, Russia’s best hope for success evaporated at the Antonov Airport on February 25, 2022. This was D+1 after the initial invasion. That was the day Vladimir Putin quite likely lost his Special Military Operation.
The Setting
Bear with me here. It’s tough to get the details straight on a war before the historians have moved in as an army of literary occupation to dissect everything about it. If I miss a bit in the ongoing fog please forgive me. I used the most reliable sources I could find.
Putin expected the world in general and Ukraine in particular to just roll over and die. In the leadup to their Special Military Operation, the Russians hallucinated up their standard load of steaming crap to justify their efforts. Political maneuverings, a few pitifully staged propaganda videos that looked like they were produced by teenagers, and some epic lies about the Nazi leanings of Ukrainian leadership served to fuel these fever dreams. The fact that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is Jewish and had lost relatives in the Holocaust was an inconvenient spot of reality in the otherwise schizophrenic Russian narrative.
The original Russian war plan, such as it was, envisioned a rapid decapitation strike led by Russian Spetsnaz and VDV airborne forces to eliminate the Ukrainian leadership and pave the way for their replacement by Russian stooges. Alas, the American intelligence apparatus is the most well-financed and capable in human history. The CIA uncovered the Russians’ intentions and communicated them to the Ukrainians in plenty of time for them to prepare. Regardless, it was still a very iffy thing.
The Objective
Antonov Airport is situated a mere 10 km outside the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv. Seizure of this strategic objective would allow Russian airborne forces to establish an air bridge and subsequent lodgment from which to neutralize the government and take the city. Taking Kyiv was the key to taking Ukraine. Taking the Antonov Airport was the key to taking Kyiv. Everything turned on this.
The Antonov Airport was also known as the Hostomel Airport. It was home to the world’s only An-225 Mriya cargo plane, the largest such aircraft on the planet. The CIA had provided details of the Russian war plans and the part that Antonov Airport played in them to the Ukrainians the month before. When the Russians attacked, the Ukrainians were ready and responded with overwhelming force.
The Russians led with a massive air assault consisting of either 20 or 34 (depending upon what you read) heavily-loaded Mi-8 Hip helicopters escorted by Ka-52 gunships. Current intel indicates that the troops involved were drawn from the 11th and 31st Guards Air Assault Brigades. As the Russian airborne task force came in low over the Dnieper River, Ukrainian defenders opened up with machine guns and MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defense Systems). An indeterminate number of Mi-8s were hit, several of which crashed into the river. At least one Ka-52 was brought down as well. In a surreal take on modern war, this engagement was streamed in real-time. You can watch it on YouTube. It is indeed captivating.
The concept of the operation had these heliborne troops seizing the airport for a follow-on force in eighteen Ilyushin Il-76 fixed-wing transports. However, before they could secure the airfield the Russians were attacked by a mixed force of Ukrainian National Guard troops, Ukrainian special operators, and some seriously tooled-up heavily-armed Ukrainian private citizens. Several Russian Su-25 ground attack aircraft flew in support, while the Ukrainians answered with at least two Su-24s and a MiG-29.
The resulting damage to the runway left the airfield unable to support the Il-76s, so they turned back. Along the way, at least one or potentially two of these massive heavily-laden aircraft were shot down. One of these lumbering cargo planes was purportedly downed by a Ukrainian Su-27 fighter, though this has not been independently verified. As a former paratrooper myself I’d sooner not dwell too long on what that looked like up close. Depending upon its configuration the Il-76 will accommodate between 125 and 140 combat troops. That would have been a mess.
After a vicious fight, the Russian paratroopers were pushed off of the airfield and into the surrounding woods. One of the defending Ukrainian units was the Georgian Legion. The Legion’s commander, Mamuka Mamulashvili, later claimed that his men had expended all of their ammunition during the battle. In response, Mamulashvili commandeered a car and proceeded to run down retreating Russians with it. Their 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade later posted images on their Facebook page of some of their members proudly holding a Ukrainian flag liberally perforated with bullet holes.
The Flow of War
A lot of stuff happened fairly quickly after that. Russian armor pushed south from Belarus, while airborne and air assault forces struggled mightily to gain a toehold. The Russian Ministry of Defence claimed the operation involved more than 200 combat helicopters, but these guys are bad to lie about stuff. While the Russians did indeed ultimately gain control of the airfield and surrounding areas, it was not before the Ukrainians had thoroughly cratered the runway.
No matter how you slice it, the Battle of Antonov Airport was a bloodbath for all involved and an unqualified disaster for the Russians. By all accounts, the initial assault wave was essentially obliterated. The Ukrainians fought back with BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems, Mi-24 attack helicopters, and copious tube artillery. By 27 February, two days into the invasion, intercepted Russian radio transmissions revealed requests for evacuation. The Hostomel debacle is what eventually spawned that infamous 40-mile armored column that stalled heading toward Kyiv. These troops did eventually make it to the airport, but they were so depleted by then as to be unable to move effectively on the Ukrainian capital.
Within a month Russian forces were gone from the area. The Russians announced that they had just been kidding when they spent their finest combat formations on a failed effort to take Kyiv and that they had really only cared about the Donbas all along. In their haste to depart the Hostomel area, the Russians destroyed or abandoned large quantities of equipment. When the Ukrainians regained the airport they found the remains of seven tanks, twenty-three BMP’s, three APC’s, one anti-aircraft system, three helicopters, two field artillery guns, and sixty-seven trucks, jeeps, and sundry military vehicles.
Only time will tell the ultimate outcome of this ghastly fight. If the West stays the course, the Ukrainians keep being awesome, and Putin doesn’t completely lose his mind and toss a nuke in the mix then the Ukrainians have a real shot at winning this thing. Sadly, there remains a lot of blood and heartache standing between now and such a favorable outcome. I just hope humanity learns something from all this. At some point, we really should evolve to the point where one psychotic dictator’s hubris is insufficient to initiate and sustain war between nations.
Addendum–What follows is my opinion alone. Perhaps it will spark some spirited discussion in the comments. I wrote this article some time last year. A lot has happened since then.
Supporting Ukraine with weapons is the one solitary thing Joe Biden’s administration has done that I agree with. This seems to me like a once-in-a-century opportunity to drive a stake through the heart of our perennial nemesis without shedding American blood in the process. I came of age during the Cold War in a world dirty with megalomaniacal dictators like Putin. This insanity has gone on for 78 years.
The weapons we are sending Ukraine are, in large part, drawn from our old stocks. Much of that stuff is already bought and paid for. When Biden announces another zillion dollars’ worth of equipment heading to Ukraine, that’s often money we spent a long time ago. We built that gear to fight the Russians in the first place, not to just sit in the desert and rot.
The Ukrainians are willing and enthusiastic to do the fighting and dying, but they must have the tools. Yes, they have their warts. Yes, they have a legacy of corruption, but so do we. How much Chinese money do you figure passed through the Biden family in the past decade? If nothing else the Ukrainians are striving mightily to stamp out corruption now because they know failure to do so will stop the flow of weapons.
I’m admittedly biased because I know people who are serving over there. They are patriots who are fighting desperately for their freedom just as we would were we invaded by a rampaging conquering army. If the last 20 years have taught us anything it is that Putin will never, ever stop until somebody stops him.
I know Putin feels hemmed in by NATO, but he is a cold-hearted monster. Of course the former Soviet satellite states want to align with the EU and be free. So would we.
The Ukrainians, against all odds and expectations, are humiliating the Russians on the battlefield. No, I don’t want to see American troops committed to battle in Europe. However, if we do go to war then American boots on the ground will be standing alongside those of soldiers from every country in the free world.
There’s admittedly a lot riding on this, and the Internet is forever. I might indeed have to eat these words. However, screw what the media says about the broken state of the American dream. America stands for freedom. We always have, and this is a righteous fight against the dark forces of tyranny and oppression.
We spent tens of thousands of irreplaceable lives pushing back against this darkness in Korea and Vietnam. Putin made a massive mistake, arguably the biggest since Hitler invaded Russia in 1941, and now he is paying for it. Just like World Wars 1 and 2, we didn’t start this. But we have the means of finishing it once and for all. Now that we have somebody else who wants to do the fighting it seems insane not to support them in every way we can. Just my $.02.