FILE – The Supreme Court is seen on Capitol Hill in Washington, July 14, 2022. The Supreme Court ruling expanding gun rights threatens to upend firearms restrictions across the country as activists wage court battles over everything from bans on AR-15-style guns to age limits. (AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite, File)
WASHINGTON (AP) — The Supreme Court ruling expanding gun rights threatens to upend firearms restrictions across the country as activists wage court battles over everything from bans on AR-15-style guns to age limits.
The decision handed down in June already has led one judge to temporarily block a Colorado town from enforcing a ban on the sale and possession of certain semi-automatic weapons.
The first major gun decision in more than a decade, the ruling could dramatically reshape gun laws in the U.S. even as a series of horrific mass shootings pushes the issue back into the headlines.
“The gun rights movement has been given a weapon of mass destruction, and it will annihilate approximately 75% of the gun laws eventually,” said Evan Nappen, a New Jersey gun rights attorney.
The court battles come as the Biden administration and police departments across the U.S. struggle to combat a surge in violent crime and mass shootings, including several high-profile killings carried out by suspects who purchased their guns legally.
And given the sheer number of cases now working through the courts, a lot more time will be spent in courtrooms no matter who wins.
“We will see a lot of tax dollars and government resources that should be used to stop gun crime being used to defend gun laws that are lifesaving and wildly popular,” said Jonathan Lowry, chief counsel and vice president at Brady, the gun control group.
Congress broke through years of deadlock to pass a modest gun violence prevention package weeks ago, and the House voted to renew a ban on high-powered semi-automatic weapons, though that effort is likely doomed in the Senate as Republicans push back on firearms restrictions and say recent spikes in gun violence should be met with a stepped-up police response.
The Supreme Court decision struck down a New York law requiring people to demonstrate a particular need to get a license to carry a concealed gun in public, saying it violates Second Amendment rights. Several other states including California, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Rhode Island have similar laws expected to be directly impacted by the ruling.
In Massachusetts, for example, police chiefs can no longer deny or impose restrictions on licenses just because the applicant doesn’t have a “good reason” to carry a gun. New York quickly passed a new concealed-weapon law, but Republicans there predict it will also end up being overturned.
Judges should no longer consider whether the law serves public interests like enhancing public safety, the opinion authored by Justice Clarence Thomas said. Instead, they should only weigh whether the law is “consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding.”
“Basically, the Supreme Court has given an invitation for the gun lobby to file lawsuits against virtually every gun law in America,” Lowry said.
The Supreme Court has ordered lower courts to take another look at several other cases under the court’s new test. Among them: laws in California and New Jersey that limit the amount of ammunition a gun magazine can hold and a 2013 ban on “assault weapons” in Maryland.
Gun rights groups are also challenging similar bans in California, New York, New Jersey and Delaware.
“The rifles at issue in this case are the sorts of bearable arms in common use for lawful purposes that responsible and peaceable people across the United States possess by the millions. And they are, moreover, exactly what they would bring to service in militia duty, should such be necessary,” a New Jersey lawsuit brought in June by the Firearms Policy Coalition says, referencing the language of the Second Amendment.
The ruling also has come up in challenges to restrictions on gun possession for 18- to 20-year-olds in Texas and Pennsylvania. And it has been cited in a case challenging a federal ban on gun possession for people convicted of nonviolent crimes punishable by more than a year behind bars, as well as a prohibition on concealed guns on the subway in Washington, D.C.
In addition, a gun rights group is suing Colorado over the state’s 2013 ban on magazines that hold more than 15 rounds, saying the high court ruling reinforces the group’s argument that it infringes on Second Amendment rights. And the ruling has public defenders in New York City asking judges to drop gun possession cases.
Not all those lawsuits will necessarily be successful. The Texas attorney general, for example, argues the Supreme Court ruling doesn’t affect the state’s age limit law, and more state and local governments can certainly defend their gun laws as being in line with U.S. history.
Adam Skaggs, chief counsel and policy director at the Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, predicted that when the dust settles, only laws “along the margins” will eventually be struck down.
“Most judges are going to see these for what they are, which is overreaching and lacking in any merit,” he said.
Backers of gun restrictions can also look to a concurring opinion from Justice Brett Kavanaugh.
Joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, Kavanaugh stressed that the Second Amendment does allow for a “variety” of gun regulations. He cited the use of background checks and mental health records as part of a licensing process to carry a gun and noted that states can forbid the carrying of firearms in “sensitive places” such as schools and government buildings.
But the Colorado decision handed down last month, while still early in the process, was a rosy sign for gun rights groups.
U.S. District Court Judge Raymond Moore, who was nominated by President Barack Obama, said he was sympathetic to the town’s goal of preventing mass shootings like the one that killed 10 people at a grocery store in nearby Boulder last year. But Moore said he didn’t know of “historical precedent” for a law banning “a type of weapon that is commonly used by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes,” so the gun rights groups have a strong case against the ordinance.
Encouraged by that decision, Taylor D. Rhodes, the executive director of the Rocky Mountain Gun Owners, told The Associated Press that his group was considering going after other gun measures in Colorado, where Democrats hold the majority in the state legislature and the governor’s office.
Referring to the Supreme Court’s ruling, Rhodes said: “The Bruen decision gave us a 4-ton wrecking ball.”
U.S. Representative Steve Cohen (D-TN-09) voted to advance legislation banning “assault weapons.” He touted his vote during House Judiciary Committee debate last week.
Cohen, a senior member of the Judiciary Committee, voted on July 20 to advance an “assault weapons ban” to the full House of Representatives.
During debate on the legislation, Cohen castigated Republican colleagues for opposing the ban, “arguing their defense of such weapons involves the anticipation of a civil war.”
In his remarks, he referred to House Judiciary Committee members Greg Steube (R-FL-17) and Chip Roy (R-TX-21).
“It was quite interesting what we heard from Mr. Steube about first accusing Democrats, wrongly, about being for de-funding the police, then they give all of the reasons why we don’t need the police because everybody in their districts has a gun and is saving somebody every other day. Who needs police when you’ve got Steube’s constituents?” he said.
“Mr. Chip Roy really put out what this is about: Many people on that side, and their constituents, sincerely think they need a gun to protect themselves against the government. They are ready for civil war … and when it almost came, they were on the wrong side,” Cohen later added.
The Tennessee Star previously reported that Cohen had been pushing for an “assault weapons ban” since June and promoted the idea that he is working with fellow Democrats to pass one.
Cohen’s office issued a press statement in June, discussing how he urged his colleagues to advance the Protect Our Kids Act and advocated a ban on “assault weapons.”
“Assault weapons were banned from 1994 to 2004. It was constitutionally permissible. It wasn’t until 2008 in the Heller decision when Justice Scalia said people have the right, based on the Second Amendment, to protect their homes with reasonable weapons. … The Second Amendment, like the First, is not absolute. … There are limits to the Second Amendment and assault weapons are one of those limits that we had for 10 years and during that time we had less mass killings in this country, and we should have it again,” he said during a meeting of the House Judiciary Committee.
He also tweeted about the issue, saying, “We need to ban assault weapons and I look forward to working with @RepCicilline to pass it.”
“There is something gun-crazed about our country that we need to deal with,” he additionally said in another tweet.
Not to generalize, but I would expect a man named “Eugene” to be an accounting savant, not a world-class weapons designer. Yet Eugene Stoner, the kind-faced bespectacled genius behind the AR-15 would influence American Military doctrine for decades to come.
I believe it is safe to say that almost everybody is familiar with both the AR-15 and the M16. Firearms and military aficionados know them from their study of every US military action since Vietnam, and younger people in that demographic might recognize it from Call of Duty, Battlefield, or any game or movie that features the modern US military. People who may not be as keen on firearms ownership are familiar with the AR-15 from unsympathetic news stories that portray the weapon as an instrument of swift death.
Although this article is primarily about the Colt M16, it needs to be noted that one cannot discuss the history of the platform without discussing the AR platform. To quote the fantastically hilarious movie ‘The Interview’, the M16 and AR-15 are “Same-same, but different”.
ArmaLite History
First thing’s first. “AR” does not stand for “Assault Rifle” or “Automatic Rifle” or whatever else some guy in an office in New York calls it in his opinion piece. It stands for “ArmaLite Rifle” which is rooted in the corporate origin of its design. Born out of various aerospace backgrounds, ArmaLite designed weapons principally intended for the civilian market.
Early production Howa/Armalite AR-180 semi-automatic rifle with scope. Available this May.
With Mr. Stoner as their chief designer, they saw early success with the AR-5, a take-down survival rifle that caught the attention of the US Airforce in 1956 for use by downed pilots. This variety of design was not limited to military applications, as ArmaLite soon released the AR-7 to the civilian market. This early success set the stage for ArmaLite to become a major player in the arms market, both civilian and military. But it was just a precursor to the company’s future success in this realm.
A documented U.S. Springfield Armory M1C/1952 MC-1 Garand with the U.S.M.C. contract MC-1 Kollmorgen Sniper Scope. The Garand was a workhorse, but by 1955 the US Military was looking for its replacement. Available this May.
The tried-and-true M1 Garand was the principal service rifle for quite some time, beloved by troops during WWII and Korea despite its weight and low magazine capacity. A true workhorse of a rifle, the march of progress demanded updates. In 1955, the US Military began searching for a design to replace the Garand. ArmaLite’s entry was known as the AR-10, a design that would set the stage for the eventual birth of the AR-15.
The AR-10
Using the now-infamous direct impingement system, lightweight aluminum alloys for the receiver, and the 7.62 NATO cartridge, the AR-10 was truly a groundbreaking weapon. However, new innovations rarely prove perfect the first time. The AR-10 did not perform as well as desired during 1956 military endurance tests, and the platform was denied as the Garand’s replacement. That honor was given to the bulky, 7.62 NATO chambered M14 instead.
Harrington & Richardson M14 selective fire battle rifle with bayonet. Available this May.
The most significant failure of the AR-10 was the rupturing of the barrel, which was made of a steel-aluminum alloy. Thankfully, the innovative nature of the platform could not be ignored, and after remedying its barrel issues, the rifle would end up being produced under a Dutch contract, as well as small orders by countries such as Portugal, Sudan, and even Cuba. Despite the lackluster reaction to the AR-10, the next phase of AR platform development would be much more of a crowd-pleaser.
Exceptional original Portuguese contract Armalite AR10 rifle previously sold by RIAC for $34,500.
In 1956, ArmaLite began experimenting with a new rifle that utilized a .22 caliber round and the same direct impingement operating system as their previous AR-10 design. This weapon would be designated the AR-15. Thus, well over 65 years prior to this article being written, an icon was officially born. At this point, the US Military primarily chambered rifles in larger calibers such as .30-06 and 7.62 NATO.
Birth of the Colt M16
The proposed use of a small cartridge was a novel shift in doctrine and one that did not sit well with the fuddy-duddies at the Ordnance Department. Their mentality was one of “bigger=better”, and they were adamant that the M14 and its .30 caliber round would see service with America’s troops. Sales material stated that the smaller bullet would tumble on impact, providing much more damage in a small package. Also, the smaller size of the round, and the usage of 20 round magazines meant that each soldier could carry more ammunition into the field. The new design caught the attention of US arms titan, Colt, who purchased production rights for both the AR-15 and the AR-10 in 1960.
Eugene Stoner would himself become a consultant for Colt in 1961. This apparent perfect storm of design genius and manufacturing capability were all positive signs for the future of Stoner’s design, and it soon caught the attention of the US Air Force.
1961, General Curtis LeMay, much to the Ordnance Departments dismay, placed an order for 80,000 AR-15s to be produced for the US Air Force. As well, 1962 saw 1,000 AR’s sent to ARVN units and American “Advisors,” – troops working in a hush-hush fashion before a large US presence was present in the Vietnam region.
Reports were favorable, the new .223 caliber round saw devastating results against Vietcong combatants, and the fully-automatic capability of the rifle meant a squad could lay down an astounding concentration of accurate fire. Thus, in 1963, with the rifle officially in military hands, it would receive its official military designation: the M16.
M16 Early Issues
As promising as this novel design was, and as loved as it was by some, the M16 was initially plagued by problems. As early as 1965, there was a noted issue of the rifles jamming, and rounds would not extract. Colt marketed the rifle as “self-cleaning”, thus the Army in all its wisdom did not issue cleaning rods/kits with the rifle, nor insist on the recommended chrome-lined barrel, but did insist on a “forward assist” to help push a bolt into battery. Some believed (Stoner included) that the forward assist was nothing more than a cop-out. In their eyes, adding that wasn’t going to fix the underlying problem of severe fouling inside the rifle.
Stoner had no intention of adding a mechanism to manually push the round into the breach, nor was it asked for by those in the field. This proposed design addition was spearheaded by the Ordnance Department, a bureaucratic agency that at the time handled weapons approval and procurement for the military. Their rationale was what one might expect from a group of bureaucrats, and I imagine the conversation went something like: “well…we’ve always made it so the bolt can be manually closed. Do it again”.
The result of this oversight was catastrophic, as troops would sometimes have to tear down the weapon while under fire: a recipe for disaster. A congressional committee (the Ichord Committee) began looking into the epidemic of M16 failures in 1967. Their findings showed that it was not the rifle itself, but the gunpowder used in the ammunition. In 1964, the Department of Defense had changed from the extruded (cylindrical) IMR 4475 propellant, used by Stoner in development, to Olin Mathieson’s WC 846 ball (spherical) powder. It produced the same pressure as IMR 4475 and was already in use with the 7.62 NATO cartridges used by the M14. It didn’t hurt that Olin had enjoyed a long relationship with some members of the Army.
An original very early Colt/Armalite manufactured,”Model 01″ fully automatic commercial M16 rifle, previously sold by RIAC For $34,500.
Unfortunately, Olin’s ball powder reaches peak pressure much faster and produced higher levels of carbon fouling, especially within the receiver. Those high pressures increased the cyclical rate, resulting in the bolt opening prematurely. The result: numerous malfunctions, unnecessary fatalities among U.S troops, and devastating press coverage.
The M16A1 Rifle
Just four years after the official birth of the M16, its first redesign would result in the M16A1. It included a “forward assist”, which was nothing more than a button on the right side of the receiver that would ensure rounds could seat if conditions required.
The results of the congressional committee led to the discontinuing of Olin-made powder, as well as the inside addition of a chrome lining in the receiver to make field cleaning much easier. The timing of this decision could not have come sooner, as the Tet Offensive loomed on the horizon, and the reliability of the rifle improved before the ensuing chaos of 1968.
The CAR-15
This is the perfect time to sneak in a shout-out to possibly my favorite weapon ever devised: the CAR-15. During the Vietnam War, the “Studies and Observations Group”, or SOG, were fighting a secret war deep behind enemy lines. Operating behind the borders of Laos and Cambodia, SOG operations were fast, furious, and almost always ended in a firefight. Utilizing sabotage and ambush, the SOG struck fear into the North Vietnamese, viewed as a dangerous specter hell-bent on disrupting their operations on their home turf.
The CAR-15 rifle in Vietnam.
In 1967, Colt produced 510 “shorty” M16s to be sent to SOG units. With just an 11.5 inch barrel, telescoping stock, and a redesigned flash hider, the CAR-15 would become beloved by the SOG “hatchet forces” with whom it was issued. Since many of their operations occurred in the thick of the Southeast Asian jungles, the compact size of the CAR-15 was perfect for their purposes.
These units were allowed to use pretty much whatever weapons they could procure (some stories tell of a SOG trooper utilizing an MBA Gyrojet pistol) and they often chose small platforms like the MAC 10 (God bless Mitchell WerBell) or sawed-off shotguns. These weapons required ammunition to be sourced elsewhere, but the CAR-15 used the standard issue .223 round, which could be found through regular Army supply chains. The CAR-15 did not see widespread use, but as a weapon tailored for a very specific purpose, it deserves a bit of recognition.
The M16A2 and Beyond
After Vietnam, the M16 maintained its place in the hands of American service members, and its modern iterations continue to be much loved to this day. There have been a number of changes made to the platform since the early addition of the forward assist. The M16A2 was the next stage of upgrades made to the platform introduced in the mid-1980s and first adopted by the USMC. New additions to the platform included an updated handguard, a case deflector, adjustable rear sights, and a heavier barrel.
A decade or so later would see the introduction of the M16A3 and A4, which really brought the platform into the modern age. The iconic top-mounted carry handle would become removable, attached via a flat “rail” upon which various optics could be mounted, making the rifle much more modular and ready to handle whatever the mission might require. Pictured below is me at the range firing my Armalite (just a little flex) which is built on the A4 design.
A well-fed gun is a happy gun. The author fires his Armalite M-15 National Match.
Future of the M16
The last big change would result in a new designation entirely: the M4 carbine. While an M16 in principle, the M4 borrowed heavily from the design theory of the CAR-15 mentioned earlier. Initially conceived for use by Special Forces troops, the M4 can now be found in the hands of many US troops. Its adjustable stock is as iconic as the carry handle seen on the M16. As well, the handguard now includes rail space for the mounting of accessories such as flashlights or IR illuminators. It’s a workhorse of a rifle and in a conveniently compact package.
The US military in recent years has made numerous attempts to find a suitable replacement for the M16 platform, yet it remains. It isn’t a perfect platform, but no weapons designer yet can say that they’ve designed the “perfect” platform. Some deride the direct impingement system, yet it has been in use for decades. Granted, it helps that cleaning kits are now given out by Uncle Sam to our troops, remedying a lot of the issues seen with the platform during Vietnam.
The AR-15 Platform Today
I, like many Americans, have a fair amount of experience with AR-style rifles. They are just so common in stateside gun safes and people love shooting them. My AR just devours whatever ammo I feed it (except steel-cased, because I’m a brass loving patrician) with very few instances of failure to feed or jams of any kind. Part of that might be my borderline obsessive fixation on cleaning the rifle after EVERY range trip, but I believe it’s more than that. It might be a dirty system, but it is reliable as can be.
Beyond the reliability of the system, the ergonomic side of the design is also intuitive by nature. The bolt release is on the left side of the magazine well, so a practiced shooter can load a fresh magazine, and with a swift movement of their left thumb slam the bolt release button resulting in the bolt slamming forward and putting a round into the battery. The speed with which some can manipulate their AR can be astounding. Obviously, that takes practice, but the design of the rifle makes it easy to understand even for a first-time shooter. The biggest gripe I’ve heard about the AR is “it isn’t as durable as the AK-47” which is, in my opinion, apples to oranges. It is a different weapon, designed with different doctrine in mind. Yet, my response, jokingly or not depending on who I’m talking to is, “Well, get good”.
Pre-Ban Poly Technologies AK-47S semi-automatic rifle with bayonet and box. Available this May.
Buying and Selling an M16
If you’re looking to acquire an AR or M16 of your own: RIAC has you covered as always. We’ve sold quite a few Class III M16s over the years, and almost all of our A&A Day Auctions contain AR-15’s in some capacity.
Luckily for the shooters out there, 5.56 is available again, making range days with your friends a reality again after a year or two of ammo shortages. To be fair, it’s been mighty cold lately in the Midwest, so I ask my friends in warmer places to let off some rounds in my honor. I can’t stand when my toes get cold.
A couple of weeks ago, I was smoking a cigarette outside my hotel in Kharkiv when a Ukrainian man, hearing me speak English, came over to show me a photo on his phone. It was of his 21-year-old son who he had just buried that day, killed fighting as part of a volunteer battalion outside Izyum. “He was my only son,” the man told me, “I still can’t believe my line has died out. I keep calling his phone and then remembering. Tomorrow I will join his unit and take his place.”
Though just a sad anecdote, this brief exchange highlights two opposing truths about the war in Ukraine. Firstly, that the Ukrainians possess an indomitable will to win, to beat the Russian invaders and reclaim control of their country in its entirety, whatever the sacrifices involved. But the other hard truth is that the human cost to Ukraine of the nation’s resistance to foreign occupation is very steep indeed. Almost everyone you speak to asserts that the official death announcements, currently standing at 200 soldiers killed daily, are understated. “A whole generation of boys is being wiped out,” the man told me. Reporting from the ground now emphasises the losses Ukraine is suffering, as outgunned troops struggle to hold their positions under constant shelling.
It now relies on artillery to grind down defensive positions along with the Ukrainian army’s ability to resist, and then masses infantry and armour in localised spearheads to seize the ruins with overwhelming force, currently outnumbering the Ukrainian defenders seven to one.
This allows “Russian forces to make greater progress in urban fighting, with casualty rates among Russian and Ukrainian units currently approaching parity, despite the Russians usually being on the offensive”. As one Ukrainian commander on the frontline told me, “all we can do here is slow down the Russian advance”.
Instead of sweeping pincer movements, enclosing Ukrainian positions in their armoured jaws, the Russians have adopted a “bite and hold” strategy, nibbling away at small, localised targets with the seeming confidence that time is on Moscow’s side. As the RUSI paper observes, “although Ukrainian troops are much better motivated, Russian numerical superiority and the ability to kill Ukrainian forces with artillery as they manoeuvre mean that Ukrainian units continue to cede ground and to pay disproportionately on the offensive”.
At the heart of Russia’s local successes in the Donbas lie Moscow’s vast advantages in artillery firepower, making up for the lacklustre quality of its infantry, which won such mockery — and perhaps stoked a dangerous over-confidence — from Western observers earlier in the war. Man for man, the Ukrainians remain better soldiers, but they’re now being killed in unsustainable numbers without ever seeing the enemy.
Striking an urgent note of warning, the report cautions that “several Russian advantages and Ukrainian weaknesses are leading to an attritional conflict that risks a protracted war, eventually favouring Russia”. Firstly, Russia’s artillery firepower is effective not only at reducing Ukrainian strongpoints but also in preventing Ukrainian forces from massing for counterattacks. Russia “fires approximately 20,000 152-mm artillery shells per day compared with Ukraine’s 6,000”, drawing not only from new production but from Soviet stocks, of which “by some estimates, several years’ worth still remains”. Adding to the disparity, long-range Russian missile strikes are destroying Ukraine’s defence infrastructure, eroding the country’s capacity to sustain what may become a years-long war.
Secondly, the supply of replacement materiel from Western stocks has enabled the Ukrainians to survive, but is inadequate to procure a strategic victory. Furthermore, the mash-mash of donated vehicles and weapons systems from Nato’s diverse stocks has left the Ukrainians with a complex and unwieldy supply and maintenance train.
Thirdly, Ukraine’s vast mobilisation of fighting men is providing the necessary mass to fight a high-intensity war at such scale, but at the cost of experience, so that “a shortage of skilled infantry and armoured operators is limiting Ukraine’s offensive combat power”, while “limited staff capacity is limiting Ukraine’s ability to plan and execute combined operations at scale”. As the report’s authors warn, “Ukrainian victory is possible, but only with international support.”
It all makes for sobering reading: a necessary dose of clarity in an information space muddied by the dopamine-fuelled boosterism of each side’s social media supporters, all proclaiming their own faction’s tactical victories to be decisive, and their own defeats cunning strategic masterstrokes. But as Churchill cautioned after Dunkirk: “Wars are not won on evacuations” — and nor are they won by retweets. Indeed, perhaps the over-confident emphasis on Ukraine’s victories earlier in the war, by feeding complacency in the West and lessening the sense of urgency and threat the country still faced, helped lay the groundwork for the difficult position Ukraine now finds itself in. The hard truth is that to achieve a strategic victory, Ukraine will need to recapture and hold its lost territory, and this goal now seems to be stretching beyond the country’s capabilities.
Yet this does not mean, as Russia’s increasingly self-satisfied online supporters now boast, that Putin has won the war. The Russians too have been suffering heavy losses, and are throwing conscript levies from the separatist republics into the Donbas meatgrinder. CNA’s Michael Kofman has asserted that the “long-term trends still favour Ukraine”, though he hedges that this prediction is “conditional on sustained Western military assistance, and is not necessarily predictive of outcomes”.
In truth, the war’s final outcome is unknown. Yet the fundamental dynamics that persuaded many commentators, including me, to predict an easy Russian victory before the war began have not yet altered enough for confidence in Ukraine’s eventual victory to be absolute. Despite its heavily-publicised, staggering losses, Russia retains the comparative advantage in materiel with which it began the war. Just as dangerous for Ukraine, the country’s support from Western nations remains as piecemeal and wavering as it was from the start.
Having abandoned illusions of a swift victory, Russia seems to have settled on a strategy of grinding Ukraine down over the long haul, banking on the weariness of the country’s Western allies to make them slowly taper down their support. As so often, Europe’s weakest link is Germany, utterly dependent on Russian energy thanks to Merkel’s willful naivety. With the German economy seemingly entering a death spiral, German politicians warning of energy rationing, and ordinary Germans causing a shortage of woodburning stoves and firewood as they stockpile for the hard winter ahead, Berlin’s already paper-thin resolve to sacrifice its own comfort for Ukraine’s security represents a major hazard for Kyiv. A united Western determination to face down Russia’s aggression is unlikely to survive the winter: to win the war decisively, the Ukrainians will need to claw back ground this summer, or face a grinding war of attrition in which the odds will become increasingly stacked against them.
Certainly, some of the Western supplies trickling into Ukraine have enabled the defenders to hold their ground and make the Russians pay as heavily as possible for the ground they take. In the south, around Kherson, the Ukrainians have been able to launch a counteroffensive, making slow but meaningful gains, an operation on which optimistic narratives of Ukrainian victory are now centring their hopes. The long-range artillery systems for which the Ukrainian government spent early summer pleading have begun to arrive, and are enabling Ukrainian forces to strike Russian munitions stockpiles far behind the front lines, somewhat denting Moscow’s advantage in artillery. Similarly, artillery platforms like the French CAESAR system have lessened the threat of an amphibious assault on Odessa, guaranteeing the survival of at least some of Ukraine’s hold on its Black Sea coastline for the foreseeable future, and forcing Russia’s retreat from the strategically — and symbolically — significant outpost on Snake Island.
But as the RUSI report’s authors caution, “the scale and longevity of support that Ukraine requires is significant and will stretch many Western allies. These requirements cannot be met through the donation of existing stocks but will instead require the production of new munitions.” This is precisely what our new Chief of General Staff was urging when he warned last week that, due to “ammunition expenditure rates that would exhaust the combined stockpiles of several Nato countries in a matter of days”, Britain and other European nations must begin an urgent programme of wartime-scale munitions production, not just for Ukraine’s sake, but also for our own. As he warned: “We can’t be lighting the factory furnaces across the nation on the eve of war; this effort must start now if we want to prevent [a wider European] war from happening.”
But as always with Johnson, fine words were not matched by the necessary deeds. There is no point involving Britain in a proxy conflict with Russia unless we are prepared to win it. But like other Western nations, Britain is providing Ukraine with enough materiel to fight, but not enough to win. Johnson has staked the remnants of his political reputation on Ukraine yet is unwilling to do what is necessary to either stave off a Russian victory, or to rebuild our own armed forces to meet the grave demands of the moment. Who will replace Johnson, and what their Ukraine policy will be are absolute mysteries. All the high-flown symbolic diplomacy and all the publicity stunts in Kyiv are not enough to stave off the sense that we are sleepwalking into disaster.
Without a massive European rearmament programme, only the United States possesses anything approaching the spare armaments and munitions in sufficient quantities to build a Ukrainian force capable of regaining the initiative on the battlefield. Yet even here the prognosis is grim: the Biden administration, which perhaps foolishly has openly linked rising petrol prices to its support for Ukraine, is plumbing historic lows as it stumbles towards what will likely be catastrophic midterm elections. The ascendant wing of the Republican party is more or less openly supportive of Putin, projecting its distaste for its domestic enemies onto Ukraine, and prominent foreign policy realists in the American defence establishment urge a winnowing of American support for Europe to focus on the greater strategic threat posed by China in the Pacific.
Back in Kharkiv, a month and a half ago, I sat in the back of an SUV with two Territorial Defence volunteers, both middle-aged businessmen from Kyiv, as we waited for an Explosive Ordnance Disposal team to detonate the unexploded Russian ordnance ahead of us and clear the road to their positions. Russian forces, back then, had just been pushed back from the positions on the city ring road from which they pummeled the battered Saltivka district with artillery fire, and Ukrainian forces were cautiously optimistic while worrying about the winter ahead. “Will it be a problem, petrol prices in America?” Avden, the platoon commander asked me suddenly. “I hear all over America they are paying $5 for petrol. Putin knows this. That’s why we need to win the war quickly, before summer is over.”
But we are halfway through the summer now, and the war is nowhere near over. On my return to Kharkiv, a couple of weeks ago, the bombardments were back every night, as the Russians deployed longer-range artillery to fire randomly on the city. Even if Ukraine conducts a fighting withdrawal from the Donbas over the course of the summer, it is not clear that Russia will pause its slow but accelerating advance, or that border cities such as Kharkiv will not once again come under direct assault. The Ukrainian state responded to the invasion with greater competence and cohesion than anyone expected, and the Ukrainian people have displayed a determination to win against all odds that will go down in history.
But as the RUSI report makes clear, a strategic victory in this war ultimately depends on the will and determination of Western leaders. Fuelled by victories in the Donbas, a Russian narrative will develop that Moscow’s final victory is certain, and support for Ukraine is a doomed and pointless effort. This is not the case. A Russian victory in Ukraine is not inevitable, but preventing this outcome will require a pan-Western effort not far short of full wartime mobilisation, an effort which is so far not taking place. The relentless optimism of Ukraine’s online supporters, though understandable, does not accurately reflect the strategic picture, and may instead be hindering a popular understanding of the grave challenges that lie ahead. Ukrainians are doing everything in their power to win this war, and suffering terribly in the process: but unless their sacrifice and solidarity is matched in Western capitals, it may still not be enough.
