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Soldiering War

Adelbert F. Waldron III: Most Decorated Vietnam War Sniper by Daniel Ramos

From Ewell and Hunt, Sharpening the Combat Edge, 1995, pg. 124

“Many GIs in Vietnam thought the night belonged to the enemy, but in the Mekong Delta, darkness belonged to Bert Waldron.” Major John Plaster

Staff Sergeant Adelbert Francis Waldron III scored the most confirmed kills by an American sniper during his eight-month tour of duty in Vietnam. He went on to become the most highly decorated sniper of the war. Then he disappeared. As is often the case when a high-profile figure falls into obscurity, the silent void would give rise to hearsay and speculation. Lots of it.

From the Beginning 

Adelbert “Bert” Francis Waldron III was born in Syracuse, New York, on March 14, 1933, to Virginia (née Forderkonz) of Baldwinsville, New York, and Adelbert F. Waldron, Jr. of Phoenix Village, Oswego, New York.1 Waldron’s parents had married in their teens and divorced when Adelbert was seven years old. His father then married Adeline Baxter, with whom he lived until his death at age fifty-six.2 His mother returned to her parents’ home with her son and worked as a waitress and cook at a local diner.Bert was nine years old when Virginia married Ernest J. Searle, a WW II Army infantryman. According to author, Paul Kirchner, who interviewed Bert’s wife, Betty, Bert “despised” his stepfather. Betty revealed to Kirchner that young Bert was an unhappy and lonely child who first honed his marksmanship skills during his hunting forays into the nearby woods. 4 

Waldron’s troubled past marred by family turmoil and loneliness may have been a significant contributor to his erratic and complex personal life. By the time he was twenty-three, Bert had married three times. His third marriage to seventeen-year-old Maude Marie Vincent of Virginia lasted eleven years and produced three children. Marie filed for divorce on grounds of desertion on August 6, 1969, two years after their actual separation.In December, 1969, after a whirlwind courtship, Bert married Betty Wyatt Varner, a divorcee with two children whom he met in Powder Springs, Georgia. Sadly, whatever unresolved emotional issues or post-war trauma he experienced created an irreparable wedge in their marriage. Betty filed for divorce in October, 1980.6

Rise to Glory

Waldron enlisted in the United States Navy on January 3, 1952, and served during the Korean War. He was discharged from the Navy on July 27, 1965, after more than twelve years of service. Despite the fact that America was becoming embroiled in a controversial and increasingly bloody war in Vietnam, thirty-five-year-old Waldron enlisted in the United States Army on May 7, 1968, and was accorded the rank of Staff Sergeant in line with his Navy rank on discharge.7 He attended basic training at Fort Benning, Georgia, and arrived in South Vietnam on November 4, 1968.

Not long after his arrival, Sergeant Waldron was accepted into an eighteen-day sniper training program taught by a team from the Army Marksmanship Unit and led by Major Willis L. Powell, an expert marksman and former instructor at Fort Benning.8 He graduated on January 4, 1969, and was assigned to the 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division commanded by Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell.9

Waldron’s primary weapon was the XM21, a modified version of the M14 Rifle. The semi-automatic, gas-powered XM21 Sniper Weapon System (SWS) incorporated the strengths of the M14 with modifications to improve its efficiency. The newly designed Leatherwood 3X to 9X Adjustable Ranging Telescope (ART) enhanced its range and accuracy. The XM21 could also be fitted with an AN/PVS-2 starlight night-vision scope. Early in 1969, a Sionics suppressor was added to the XM21 which reduced the muzzle blast to such an extent that one could not tell where the shot came from beyond 100 meters. A detachable magazine held 5 or 20 rounds of ammunition. The rifle was 44 inches long, weighed roughly 12 pounds, and had an effective range of 900 yards. It was renamed the M21 in 1972 when the Army approved it as the official standard for sniper weapons.10

xm21 rifle parts labeled
XM21 Sniper Weapon System. Wikepedia

Lethal Sniper in the Mekong Delta

After graduating from the sniper program, Staff Sergeant Waldron found himself in one of the most dangerous areas in Vietnam. The Mekong Delta was a highly populated agrarian plain in south Vietnam with a virtual maze of streams, canals and rice paddies which made foot travel slow and arduous. The area was heavily infested by the Viet Cong, who used the network of waterways to transport weapons, supplies, and insurgents throughout the region. Not only did these soldiers face an inhospitable environment, with malaria-bearing mosquitoes, snakes, leeches, wasps and microbes and fungi which caused debilitating foot diseases, but also deadly mines and booby traps.

A joint Army-Navy task force consisting of elements of the 9th Infantry Division, which included Waldron’s 3/60th Infantry, and the Mobile Riverine Force (also known as Riverines or the Brown Water Navy), were specifically designated to operate from a base deep within the Communist-controlled Delta with the mission of securing the area. As an Army sniper, Waldron often traveled on Armored Troop Carriers (ATC or Tango Boats), searching for an elusive enemy hidden along the canals, in the jungles, and among the civilians.11

The Viet Cong were homegrown communist insurgents who knew the terrain and blended into the civilian population. They were able to gain support from the South Vietnamese people through a combination of political propaganda, intimidation, and violence. Allied troops would launch countless search and destroy operations throughout South Vietnam in an effort to break the insurgency, but the VC would simply melt away into the jungles and villages, seeking to avoid a pitched battle with superior forces. The VC utilized classic guerrilla tactics of ambushes, hit and run attacks, booby traps, bombings, and snipers to gradually inflict losses on Allied troops. While the Americans and their allies roamed openly in the daylight, the VC and NVA owned the night, launching some of their deadliest attacks. But American snipers were determined to even those odds.

On the night of January 19, 1969, Sergeant Adelbert F. Waldron was conducting a reconnaissance mission with a squad from Company B, 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment in Kien Hoa Province, South Vietnam. The group suddenly came under attack by an estimated force of forty heavily armed Viet Cong. As the fighting raged, Waldron made an incredibly bold move by leaving the safety of their defenses to set up a sniper position. Using the starlight night-vision scope on his rifle, he was able to spot the enemy maneuvering in the dark. In the ensuing gunfight, Waldron killed and wounded several VC, inflicting so many casualties that the insurgents broke contact and withdrew. For this action he was awarded the Bronze Star with a “V” for Valor.12

Three days later, while concealed in the sniper position and looking through his night-vision scope, he spotted a large group of Viet Cong moving through the countryside. He carefully maneuvered his way through the rice paddies from one position to another, engaging the VC and making them believe that they were fighting multiple shooters. Waldron single-handedly held off the enemy for over three hours and killed eleven VC before he was forced to withdraw. He earned the Silver Star for “extraordinary heroism in close combat with an armed hostile force.”

On the night of January 30, Sergeant Waldron and a fellow soldier set up a sniper ambush position at a strategic intersection surrounded by a large rice paddy just northeast of Ben Tre. At 8 p.m., Waldron took out a Viet Cong scout maneuvering in the tree line. Forty minutes later, a squad of sixteen VC began moving towards their position. Calls for artillery were denied because of the risk to civilians in a village near their position. Despite the lack of support, Waldron decided to engage the enemy. With eight shots, he took out eight VC during the ensuing firefight at a range of over 500 meters. With half of their men dead, the remaining VC withdrew into the darkness.

Four days later, Sergeant Waldron and his teammate set up a sniper ambush position in a rice paddy just south of Ben Tre. It was just after 9 p.m. when a group of five Viet Cong suddenly appeared from a wooded area at the edge the rice paddy. A nearby ARVN unit was coming under attack and the VC were attempting to outflank their positions. Sergeant Waldron took careful aim and proceeded to pick off the enemy one by one. He killed a sixth VC attempting to gather weapons and equipment from his dead comrades. His actions helped protect the ARVN flank, saving them from further losses. From January 16 to February 4, Waldron had conducted fourteen sniper missions. For his actions in these daring night missions, Sergeant Adelbert F. Waldron III was awarded his first Distinguished Service Cross (DSC).

Waldron was as meticulous and precise as he was unstoppable. On the night of February 14, Waldron was conducting a reconnaissance mission with a squad near Ap Phu Thuan, in Kien Hoa Province. While patrolling the countryside, the team engaged a large force of Viet Cong moving to attack a nearby Allied unit. During the firefight, Sergeant Waldron maneuvered through the brush, firing his rifle from one position to another, killing several VC in the process. Suffering heavy losses, the insurgents were confused over the size and strength of the American unit they had encountered and withdrew. Due to the efforts of Waldron and his squad, the VC were routed, and a major attack was thwarted.13

On February 26, Sergeant Waldron was riding in an ATC with the Mobile Riverine Force through the Mekong Delta. The boat was sailing near Phu Tuc when Waldron noticed something suspicious in the trees along the shoreline. Using his rifle, he spotted a Viet Cong team preparing to fire a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) at their boat. With great skill and accuracy, Waldron eliminated both VC while the Tango Boat was still moving. This was an incredible feat of marksmanship, but it may not have been the only time he accomplished such a shot. According to the commander of the 9th Infantry Division, Major General Julian Ewell:

“One afternoon he was riding along the Mekong River on a Tango boat when an enemy sniper on shore pecked away at the boat. While everyone else on board strained to find the antagonist, who was firing from the shoreline over 900 meters away, Sergeant Waldron took up his sniper rifle and picked off the Viet Cong out of the top of a coconut tree with one shot.” Ewell noted that Tango boats moved at speeds of two to four knots and about 100-150 meters parallel to the shore.14

For numerous acts of heroism in Kien Hoa Province from February 5 to March 29, 1969, Sergeant Adelbert F. Waldron III was awarded his second Distinguished Service Cross. In just a short time, he had developed a reputation as the deadliest sniper in the Mekong Delta, earning him the nickname, Daniel Boone. But Waldron had also gained notoriety among the enemy. To the Viet Cong, he was a major thorn in their side, making him and other snipers priority targets. After serving eight months in the jungles of Vietnam, Sergeant Waldron’s unit returned to the United States in July 1969.15

During his tour of duty in Vietnam, Sergeant Waldron had 109 confirmed kills. To put this into perspective, between December 1968 and May 1969, the 9th Infantry Division snipers were credited with 934 confirmed kills; 12 percent were made by Waldron alone, making him the deadliest American sniper of all time.16 It was a distinction he held for over forty years until his record was surpassed in 2006 by U.S. Navy SEAL Chris Kyle. The most decorated sniper of the Vietnam War, Waldron earned three Bronze Stars, a Silver Star, two Distinguished Service Crosses and a Presidential Unit Citation for actions in the Mekong Delta.17

soldier with wife and children looking at his medal.
Waldron with wife, Betty, and her two children look over Bert’s second Distinguished Service Cross presented at Fort McPherson, September 1970. Columbus Daily Enquirer; Oct 01, 1970; Columbus, GA; 52.

 

Descent into Oblivion

Much of Waldron’s postwar activities read like a Forsyth cloak and dagger saga, some still sealed in classified FBI records.18 Bert returned to Fort Benning where he briefly served as a senior instructor in the U.S. Army Marksmanship Training Unit (USAMTU) from July 1969 until his discharge in March 1970. While there, he was introduced to Mitchell Livingston WerBell III by Col. Robert F. Bayard, a retired commanding officer of the USAMTU, who had gone into business with WerBell.19  Described by Office of Security documents as “an unscrupulous con man,”20 WerBell, an OSS operative during World War II, co-founded the Military Armament Corporation (MAC), producers of MAC-10 and MAC-11 submachine guns and manufacturers of high-quality suppressors designed by WerBell.21 Waldron worked for WerBell as a counter-sniper advisor.22 When MAC went bankrupt in 1975, WerBell formed a successor company, Cobray International, a paramilitary training camp nicknamed “the farm,” on his sixty-acre estate. Waldron was signed on as chief marksmanship instructor and later as director of the training center.23

two soldiers lying on ground with rifles
Waldron (left) instructs a trainee at the Cobray Training Center; Powder Springs, Ga., 1980. Soldier of Fortune

WerBell would become a highly controversial figure for his involvement in covert mercenary activities in the 1970s. He had been investigated for alleged arms smuggling, Castro assassination plots, and the thwarted takeover of Abaco, an island in the Bahamas, for use as a gambling haven.24 On July 3, 1975, Colonel Bayard, Werbell’s business partner and the man who introduced Waldron to him, was found shot to death near an Atlanta mall.25 His murder remains unsolved. It was in this mysterious miasma of corruption that Waldron became enmeshed. There is evidence that in 1971, he testified before the Department of Defense on an investigation of Werbell with “details on U.S. sniper program in Vietnam and dealings with the Thai government.”26

Bert Waldron struggled to adapt as a civilian and his personal life deteriorated as a result. His paramilitary work with Mitchell WerBell gradually took its toll on his marriage. In October 1980, Betty Waldron filed for divorce.27 According to author, Paul Kirchner, in 1983, Waldron became a marksmanship instructor at a counter-terrorism school, the Starlight Training Center, in Idyllwild, California. Allegedly cofounded by Medal of Honor recipient, Lewis L. Millet, Waldron’s employment there only lasted several months.28 To date, I have been unable to confirm this organization’s existence nor does Colonel Millett refer to it in his many interviews where he discusses his postretirement experience.29 It is at this point that Waldron’s tracks vanish; it has been purported that he flitted from job to job in several states, eventually landing in California.  On October 18, 1995, Adelbert F. Waldron III died of a heart attack at the age of sixty-two. His remains are interred at the Riverside National Cemetery in California.30

Adelbert F. Waldron is a relative unknown among those men considered to be the deadliest snipers in American history. He is officially the top-scoring sniper of the Vietnam War and still holds the record for the most confirmed kills by a U.S. Army sniper. There are no monuments to Bert Waldron and few references about his exploits as a soldier in Vietnam. Like many Vietnam War veterans, he was haunted by his own demons and his personal shortcomings may have led him down a path of self-destruction. According to his ex-wife, Betty, “Bert was a wonderful soldier. He loved his country, he would have died for this country, but he had a lot of problems as a human being.”31

Sources

[1] Birth record source: New York State, Birth Index, 1881-1942 [database on-line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2018. Marriage record source: New York, County Marriage Records, 1847-1849, 1907-1936 [database on-line]. Lehi, UT, USA: Ancestry.com Operations, Inc., 2016.

[2] Adelbert F. Waldron Jr. obituary: Syracuse Post Standard, Dec 27, 1966, p. 9.

[3] Year: 1940; Census Place: Baldwinsville, Onondaga, New York; Roll: m-t0627-02704; Page: 7B; Enumeration District: 34-43

[4] Paul Kirchner, More of the Deadliest Men Who Ever Lived (Boulder: Paladin Press, 2009), 398. Virginia and Ernest marriage record: Virginia Department of Health; Richmond, Virginia; Virginia Marriages, 1936-2014; Roll: 101169203

[5] Marriage certificates sources: Virginia Department of Health; Richmond, Virginia; Virginia Marriages, 1936-2014; Rolls: 101168589, 101169629, 101168777. Maude Marie Vincent divorce record: Roll 101254585.

[6] Newspaper legal notice of divorce: Marietta Daily Journal, Friday, Oct 24, 1980; Marietta, GA, page 32.

[7] Korea and Vietnam service dates: Beneficiary Identification Records Locator Subsystem (BIRLS) Death File. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs. Also confirmed via correspondence with the National Personnel Records Center, National Archives; St. Louis, MO.

[8] Lt. Gen. Julian J. Ewell and Maj. Gen. Ira A. Hunt, Sharpening the Combat Edge: The Use of Analysis to Reinforce Military Judgment (Washington D.C.: Gov’t Printing Office, 1974), 120-123. Peter R. Senich, Long-Range War: Sniping in Vietnam (Boulder: Paladin Press, 1994), 34-36.

[9] Ira A. Hunt Jr., The 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam: Unparalleled and Unequaled (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 67-68.

[10] Senich, Long-Range War, 83. J. David Truby, Silencers, Snipers & Assassins: An Overview of Whispering Death (Boulder: Paladin Press, 1972), 98-101. Melvin Ewing, “Hands-on Review: U.S. Army M21 and XM21,” Sniper CentralApril 28, 2016.  Bob Stoner, GMCM (SW) Ret., “XM21 7.62mm NATO Rifle (Sniper’s) with Sionics Suppressor,” Warboats, 2005.

[11] Hunt, 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam, 4-11. Maj. Gen. William B. Fulton, Vietnam Studies: Riverine Operations 1966-1969 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1985), 17-41.

[12] Kirchner, More of the Deadliest Men, quoted Waldron’s Bronze Star citation, 399. However, his Distinguished Service Cross citation, which covered his actions on three dates, including January 19, 1969, stated that “while his company was being resupplied near Ap Hoa, Kien Hoa Province, approximately forty Viet Cong unleashed a heavy barrage of small arms and automatic weapons fire.” Military Times Hall of Valor.

[13] Kirchner, More of the Deadliest Men, after-action reports: 400-403. Military Times Hall of Valor.

[14] Ewell and Hunt, Sharpening the Combat Edge, 122-123.

[15] “9th Infantry Division Unit Histories (Vietnam),” Mobile Riverine Force AssociationAuthor Kirchner (More of the Deadliest Men, 406) claimed Waldron was returned to the U.S. “out of concern for his safety” on July 21, 1969, but this could not be corroborated nor is there a source listed for this information.

[16] Hunt, 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam, 68.

[17] Maj. John Plaster, The History of Sniping and Sharpshooting (Boulder: Paladin Press, 2008), 570. “3d Battalion 60th Infantry Regiment Lineage and Honors Information,” U.S. Army Center of Military History,  Military Times Hall of Valor.

[18] Dept. of Defense, Security Clearance Division, “Security File on Mitchell Livingston Werbell,” Mary Ferrell Foundation22 September 1971. I requested Waldron’s testimony on the sniper program in Vietnam and dealings with the Thai government on June 1, 2019. This article will be updated with pertinent findings when received.

[19] Kirchner, More of the Deadliest Men, 406.

[20] FBI dossier on Mitchell Livingston Werbell; 27 May, 1970; 74-76.  “Incident Report [on Mitchell Werbell],” 14 October 1973, The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection, National Archives.

[21] Andrew St. George, “The Amazing New Country Caper,” Esquire, Feb. 1, 1975, pg. 62. Of interest is that author St. George was under surveillance by the CIA and was compelled to testify on the activities of Mitchell Werbell along with Waldron (see note 18).  Ron Ecker, “Our Man in Powder Springs: Mitch Werbell,” revised November 30, 2009, Ronald Ecker WebpageMr. Ecker’s well-researched article posits a connection between Werbell and the assassination of JFK.

[22] Truby, Silencers, Snipers and Assassins, 102.

[23] Tom Dunkin, “Cobray: Turning the Tables on Terrorists,” Soldier of Fortune MagazineJanuary 1980, 49-50.

[24] FBI dossier on Mitchell Livingston Werbell; 21 May, 1976; 69-70.

[25] UPI, “Mystery of Ex-Colonel’s Death,” San Francisco Chronicle; July 7, 1975; 37.

[26] See item 18.

[27] Marietta Journal; October 24, 1980; Marietta, GA; 32.

[28] Kirchner, More of the Deadliest Men, 410.

[29] United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Crime, Fatal Plane Crash in Gander, Newfoundland, December 12, 1985: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred First Congress, Second Session, December 4 and 5, 1990 (Washington DC: U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1991), 47-48. Millett discusses his experience in detail in this speech.

[30] U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, Nationwide Gravesite Locator.

[31] Kirchner, More of the Deadliest Men, 414.

Categories
This great Nation & Its People War

How one of America’s saltiest Marines wanted to handle the Vietnam War

The United States had a secret weapon at the beginning of the Vietnam War, one it chose to ignore at its own peril: Lt. Gen. Victor “Brute” Krulak.

Krulak had been fighting his whole life. Born short in stature, he was barely tall enough to attend the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. His nickname, “Brute,” was supposed to be an insult hurled at him by an upperclassman, but it was one he adopted as true in spirit.

He was a lifer Marine, a veteran of World War II, where he led a diversionary raid while the main attack came at Bougainville Island. He also fought at the Battle of Okinawa. In the Korean War, he landed at Inchon, helped recapture Seoul from the communists, and distinguished himself at the Chosin Reservoir.

If that weren’t enough to establish Krulak’s vision, consider his biggest contribution to the Allied victory in World War II. Before the war ever kicked off for the Americans, Krulak was in San Diego reviewing potential amphibious landing craft. None of the designs ever worked. High gunwales and exposed propellers left Marines in terrible danger during the potential landings to come.

In 1937, Krulak had been transferred to China in time to see the Japanese invasion in real-time. He watched the Japanese landing craft in Shanghai, looking for potential solutions to all his problems. The fixes he found would later contribute to the creation of Higgins Boats, which helped win the war on both fronts.

How one of America’s saltiest Marines wanted to handle the Vietnam War
A Higgins boat bringing troops to Okinawa, 1945 (U.S. Navy)

Krulak’s biggest battles weren’t with the Japanese or the North Koreans, however. The toughest fight of his life actually came from within the Pentagon: his adversary was Gen. William Westmoreland.

Marine Corps-Army rivalry has always run deep, ever since the Battle of Belleau Wood in World War I saw the Marines not only stop the enemy but push the advancing Germans back. The Army notoriously left the Marines out of its memorialization of the battlefield there, a wrong not righted until 1955.

When it came to Vietnam, however, Westmoreland and Krulak saw the situation two very different ways. Westmoreland was brought up in the large-scale combat of World War II and Korea. He wanted to bury as many Viet Cong and communist troops as possible in a war of attrition that would compel the North Vietnamese to bring out its forces and meet the Americans in a pitched battle.

How one of America’s saltiest Marines wanted to handle the Vietnam War
“For the last time, Bill… no nukes. Not yet.” (maybe) (U.S. Air Force)

Krulak saw Vietnam very differently. The Marine Corps had been fighting homegrown insurgencies for decades, even before World War II, in places like Central America, the Philippines, and the Caribbean islands. He knew when a situation called for counterinsurgency tactics – and Vietnam was just the place if there ever was one.

Winning in Vietnam meant pacifying the villages of the country, improving the quality of life for the people, thereby releasing them from the communist grip. Krulak wanted the Marines to be a shield for the South Vietnamese, to protect them while they did this civil improvement and taught the villagers to defend themselves. In his mind, the Marines would pacify one area, then move on to another, eventually spreading the pacification like an “ink blot.”

Westmoreland preferred sending Marines out on search and destroy missions.

Khe Sanh was particularly annoying to Gen. Krulak. In his mind, Khe Sanh had no strategic value and Westmoreland kept up constant pressure for the Marines to leave their bases and search for the enemy. Westmoreland believed Khe Sanh was the perfect place for the U.S. to bring its full firepower to bear on the communists.

In conversations with President Lyndon B. Johnson, Westmoreland promised a quick end to the war, using that firepower to fill enemy body bags. Krulak told the president the Marines already had a playbook for this kind of operation (they literally did, the Small Wars Manual, first published in 1935). He told Johnson it would take longer but wouldn’t take as much American commitment.

How one of America’s saltiest Marines wanted to handle the Vietnam War
Lt. Gen Krulak in a training exercise at Camp Pendleton, May 7, 1964 (U.S. Marine Corps)

Johnson, wanting out of Vietnam as fast as possible, opted to take Westmoreland’s approach. Krulak’s “I told you so” moment came in 1967 and was captured on camera. The photo shows the Marine pointing a finger at an obviously uncomfortable Johnson. Krulak told the president that the firepower approach was needlessly killing Marines.

The president kicked Krulak out of the Oval Office and when it came time to choose who would become the next Commandant of the Marine Corps, Johnson passed over Krulak, forcing him to retire.

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HUEY HOGS: THE WORLD’S FIRST HELICOPTER GUNSHIP By Will Dabbs, MD

How Vietnam Veterans Are Making a New Home for Old Huey Helicopters

As with many military innovations, the Huey Hog came to be during war. In Vietnam, U.S. forces were using the UH-1 Iroquois for a variety of missions. It didn’t take long for the troops to request a dedicated attack platform. Until it arrived, UH-1 variants acted as gunships. They were known as Huey Hogs.

The UH-1 Huey helicopter first deployed to Vietnam as a medevac platform in 1962. It soon became obvious that this versatile aircraft was capable of so much more than just extracting wounded troops from the combat zone. More than any other single war machine of its era, the Huey revolutionized modern combat.

huey hog in vietnam
Possibly the most versatile helicopter in the world, variants of the UH-1 would be the first U.S. gunship developed during the Vietnam War.

Modern war turns on a variety of attributes: firepower, intelligence and doctrine are indeed undeniably important. However, arguably the most critical aspect of modern battle calculus is mobility. In 1784, Ben Franklin opined, “And where is the Prince who can afford so to cover his Country with Troops for its Defense, as that Ten Thousand Men descending from the Clouds, might not in many Places do an infinite deal of Mischief, before a Force could be brought together to repel them?” That guy was indeed a visionary. More so than cumbersome airborne forces delivered via parachute, the Huey helicopter made old Ben’s vision a reality.

us army uh-1 huey hog escorting marine helicopters
U.S. Army UH-1B gunships escort Marine UH-34Ds over South Vietnam, circa 1964. Photo: U.S.M.C.

Once somebody realized you could pack troops into utility helicopters and land them behind an entrenched enemy force, warfare would never be the same. However, it was simultaneously appreciated that those same troops would be exceptionally vulnerable during the insertion phase of the operation.

Fast mover jets could bring the pain on a massive scale, but they lacked the requisite precision to protect a complex combat helicopter assault. To help suppress enemy forces during this most critical time, a handful of U.S. Army visionaries created the world’s first operational helicopter gunships. They used UH-1 Huey helicopters as a foundation.

Details

Most dedicated Huey gunships were either B, C or M-model aircraft. These machines sported the early stubby fuselage architecture. D and H-models had a stretched fuselage optimized for carrying troops and cargo. The primary differences among the three variants were in the engines and powertrains. C and M-model Hueys featured a wide-chord rotor system and redesigned tail boom to help manage the extra weight of the ordnance they carried.

uh-1 gunship
The Huey gunships were transitional between traditional lift aircraft and future dedicated attack helicopters. Photo: Eddie Maloney/CC By-SA 2.0

In Vietnam, these heavily armed aircraft were called Hogs. Of the 16,000 Hueys produced since 1956, roughly 1,000 of them were used as gunships. These early pioneers figured it out as they went along, so there was a great deal of variation concerning weapons, equipment and fire-control systems. However, the archetype was the UH-1M Heavy Scout.

The UH-1 M-model Heavy Scout sported four 7.62x51mm M-60CA1 machine guns mounted in pairs on each side of the aircraft in an XM16 mount. These guns were fired remotely via solenoids and pivoted to allow the pilot to control elevation. The guns fed from big ammo cans mounted in the crew compartment via flexible ammo chutes.

uh-1c rocket pod
Photograph of an M200 19-tube rocket launcher mounted to the side of a UH-1C Huey Hog. Photo: Bell Helicopter

Alongside these guns was typically one M157 seven-shot rocket pod on each side. There were nineteen-shot pods available as well, but these early Hueys typically lacked the horsepower to lift them. The 2.75-inch FFAR (folding fin aerial rocket) was originally called the “Mighty Mouse.” These unguided rockets could carry a variety of warheads.

us army uh-1c gunship
This U.S. Army gunship was deployed to Vietnam with the 52nd Combat Aviation Battalion “Dragons,” circa 1964. Photo: U.S.M.C.

A typical 2.75-inch rocket was four feet long, weighed about 20 pounds, and packed a roughly 6-pound HE warhead. These rockets could also carry a white phosphorus payload for incendiary or marking purposes. Anti-tank variants had both high-explosive antitank and high-explosive dual-purpose effects. Additionally, these rockets could fire flechette warheads that packed thousands of little pressed steel darts.

loading a rocket pod on a uh-1e
Sgt. D. Padilla checks the correct seating of a rocket pod on a UH-1E gunship. He was a crew chief with Marine Observation Squadron 2. Photo: Gunnery Sgt. Golden Pase

Flechettes were called nails in military parlance, and they were extra-special nasty. The WDU-4/A warheads that carried them each packed 2,200 darts that weighed 20 grains apiece. These rockets could be programmed to fly a certain distance and then explode, sending a dense cloud of pointy steel chaos to saturate a target area. When the flechette rounds detonated they gave off a distinctive puff of red smoke.

The Heavy Hog also frequently mounted a 40mm automatic grenade launcher in the nose. The Mini-Hog sported an XM21 armament subsystem. This loadout included the same seven-shot rocket pods as the XM16 but substituted a single M134 minigun on each side in place of the paired M-60s. Each of these armament subsystems rode on the XM-156 multi-armament pylon mount. This mount was slaved to an XM-60 reflex sight that allowed the pilot in command to direct and elevate the weapons in flight. This sight rode on a folding mount that collapsed out of the way when not in use.

With a typical cyclic rate of around 4,000 rounds per minute apiece, the M134 minigun consumed ammunition at a simply breathtaking clip. As a result, each gun was fed by two rows of three ammo boxes interconnected and routed through holes in the cabin floor. Electric motors built into the ammunition boxes helped pull the heavy belts along so that the guns could feed them reliably.

fixing an m-60 jam during a mission
LCpl. E. M. Donaldson of Marine Observation Squadron 2 practices clearing a jam in one of the external guns on a UH-1E gunship. Photo: Gunnery Sgt. G. Pase/U.S.M.C.

Dependent upon the flying conditions, these heavily-armed gunships might also include door gunners each wielding an M-60 machinegun on a bungee cord or pintle mount. Sometimes these were standard ground -60s. However, a lot of aerial gunners modified their guns with chopped barrels or ancillary forward handgrips to enhance control. These grips were frequently improvised out of a standard M-60 fire control group secured in place on the forearm with pipe clamps. Mounting a C-ration can to the left side of the feed tray would improve reliability as well.

huey hog armament
Cpl. George DeFeo, a UH-1E crew chief, inspects his Huey’s armament before lifting off on another flight during the Vietnam War. Photo: Sgt. Ron A. Zielinski/U.S.M.C.

The latest M-model gunships used the same 1,400-shaft horsepower Lycoming engine of the larger H-model Hueys and had the same 9,500-pound max gross weight. These aircraft were at times fitted with .50-caliber guns and crazy-powerful spotlights for night operations. All of this, while effective, simply served as a stepping stone to better things to come.

Ruminations

Lessons learned with the development of the B, C and M-model Huey gunships were folded into the AH-1G Cobra, the world’s first effective mass-produced dedicated attack helicopter. Once rendered obsolete, these old Huey gunships were seconded to National Guard units, gifted to civilian government agencies, or simply scrapped. When I was training at Hanchey Army Heliport at Fort Rucker back in the 1990s, there were a couple of these old M-model Hueys on the flight line. I have no idea what they were used for.

marine uh-1 huey gunship in vietnam
A U.S. Marine “Huey Hog” gunship escorts two UH-34D helicopters south of Chu Lai in support of the Second “Blue Dragon” Brigade, Republic of Korea Marines. Photo: Sgt. Russ Cowen/U.S.M.C.

Huey gunships have seen action in brushfire wars worldwide, particularly in El Salvador back in the 1980s. Powerful, effective, vicious and mean, those early Huey gunships helped write the book on attack helicopter operations. For American troops in contact in Vietnam, the arrival of the Hogs quite frequently carried the day.

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War

Intense Footage of the Pacific War in Color | Smithsonian Channel

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Some Scary thoughts War You have to be kidding, right!?!

Xi’s Meeting With Putin Covertly Aims to Prolong Ukraine War, Weaken US: Experts

Venus Upadhayaya
March 20, 2023Updated: March 20, 2023

Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin is aimed at furthering the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) designs against the United States, according to analysts.

Xi’s March 20 to March 23 visit to Moscow is his first to the country since Putin’s February 2022 invasion and comes on the heels of Beijing’s brokering a resumption of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Xi and Putin declared a “no limits” partnership, and ties between the two countries have only deepened since then.

The meeting was announced on Friday, incidentally not long after the International Court of Justice issued an arrest warrant for Putin for war crimes.

The timing of the visit is critical for both Xi and Putin, experts say.

“I think that Beijing—like most of the rest of the world—is worried that the conflict might escalate to nuclear warfare that would harm their own plans as much as anyone else,” said Brandon Weichert, a U.S.-based geopolitical analyst and author of the book “Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower.”

“At the same time, though, Beijing doesn’t mind seeing their two biggest competitors, Russia and the U.S., bleeding each other in Europe while China has free reign in the Indo-Pacific,” he told The Epoch Times.

Epoch Times Photo
Ukrainian servicemen fire a M777 howitzer at Russian positions near Bakhmut, eastern Ukraine, on March 17, 2023, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Aris Messinis/AFP via Getty Images)

Timing

The meeting comes as Russia slowly makes advances in its monthslong operation to capture the eastern Ukraine city of Bakhmut. The bloody battle has led to massive losses on both sides, especially the Russians.

Madhav Nalapat, a strategic affairs analyst and vice chair of the India-based Manipal Advanced Research Group said that Xi and Putin are meeting at a time when the war in Ukraine is entering a stage where it can either end conclusively or can drag out into a stalemate.

“Putin is under pressure from his commanders to unleash the full fury of Russian weapons against Ukraine rather than have the war get prolonged,” Nalapat told The Epoch Times. “Xi clearly wants to know whether Putin will go all out or continue with the present tactics.”

To Frank Lehberger, a Germany-based Sinologist, Xi and Putin’s “hasty arrangement” and secret get together” on Monday is because the Russian military is on the “brink of collapse” in Ukraine.

“Xi Jinping, who is since last week the sole autocrat of China, is anxious not to let this happen, because a military rout of Russian armies in Ukraine would be the end of Putin’s autocratic and anti-Western regime of Russia,” Lehberger told The Epoch Times in an email.

Epoch Times Photo
Zhang Jun, Permanent Representative of China, speaks during the U.N. Security Council meeting discussing the Russian and Ukraine conflict at the United Nations Headquarters on March 11, 2022 in New York City. (Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images)

The Russian army has lost nearly 200,000 soldiers in the war, according to Western officials, and at least 500,000 Russians have fled the country since the war started. Lehberger said that Russian elites and nationalist hardliners are angry with Putin and hold him responsible for the situation, wanting an end to Putin’s dream to recreate a Russian empire in Europe.

“Putin desperately needs Xi to come now and pledge his help, or it will be too late for Putin and his dreams of an autocratic empire,” said Lehberger.

“Xi knows all this, and he also desperately needs Russia to fight on ….not only against Ukrainians but by association against the entire democratic West or NATO, which are the CCP’s existential enemies.”

Nalapat said that Russia losing a war to Ukraine would weaken China’s position significantly in the international order and the timing of the meeting is mindful of that.

prez-putin
Russian President Vladimir Putin chairs a meeting with members of the Security Council via video link in Moscow, Russia, on March 17, 2023. (Mikhail Metzel/Sputnik/Kremlin via Reuters)

Lethal Arms for Russia

There has been rising apprehension about China supplying military assistance to Russia. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said last month that China is already providing “non-lethal” weapons to Russia during the war and is considering supplying lethal ones. Beijing denies these claims.

While much has been made of Xi’s purported role as peacemaker in the conflict, experts said that this is just a smokescreen, pointing to Beijing’s supply of “dual-use” equipment to Moscow that aids its military efforts.

Weichert said that China has long been providing “vital support and supplies” to Russia.

“The Biden administration knows full well that there are Chinese ‘technicians’ working alongside Wagner Group units in Bakhmut, helping them to maintain the drone fleets that Chinese drone makers have sold to the Russians,” he said, referring to the private mercenary group.

The Wagner Group purchased more than 2,500 Chinese drones in a deal between the mercenary group and Russian and Chinese intelligence, British media outlet Daily Mirror reported, citing a UK intelligence report.

Nalapat said that misleading the enemy is a “standard operating procedure” for the CCP, noting that the regime is supplying arms to Russia through discrete channels.

“Do you believe that the flood of weapons, many sophisticated, coming to Russia from North Korea and Iran have all been made in those two countries?” he said.

According to a recent Politico report citing customs data, Chinese firms have exported 1,000 assault rifles and other equipment to Moscow that could be used in the conflict.

In June 2022, for example, Russian firm Tekhkrim imported rifles from China North Industries Group Corporation Limited, a large state-owned defense contractor. The data also showed that Russian companies received 12 shipments of drone parts and over 12 tons of body armor from China via Turkey in late 2022.

In response to this report, White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby told The Epoch Times that the administration couldn’t confirm that China has in fact provided lethal aid to Russia.

Lehberger said that “All these activities are in contravention of current international sanctions,” adding that the reported efforts are only the tip of the iceberg.

In addition to Iran and North Korea, China is also sending arms to Russia through other countries like Myanmar, Serbia, Turkey, and Russia’s staunch ally in Europe, Belarus, according to Lehberger.

After his summit with Putin, Xi will talk via satellite link to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for the first time since the invasion. Lehberger termed this as Xi’s “make-believe peace mission.”

According to the expert, Xi will aim at a temporary cease-fire to earn recovery time for Putin’s depleted army and Russia will “at a later time” attack Ukraine more fiercely.

Lehberger said that the CCP will continue to supply arms to Russia for at least another two years, because he believes that Xi has plans to take over Taiwan in 2025 and would thus wish to use prolonged Ukraine-Russian conflict to stun or weaken the United States and other Western powers.

China’s Economic Stake

Experts said that China has long-term economic agendas vis-a-vis the Russia-Ukraine war and its economic goals over the next decades are linked with Beijing’s subjugation of the Russian economy.

“Russia is squarely in the camp of China’s new empire; the vast Russian wilderness will become protein for which the dragon can feed on as it rises over the next decade, and Putin will become a powerful vassal prince under Xi Jinping,” said Weichert, adding that fusing the Chinese and Russian economies would be a major victory for Xi and for that, it would need Russia to be ensnared in a protracted conflict with Ukraine.

Nalapat said that Russia has become China’s most important supplier of industrial raw materials at discounted prices. The two countries want to work together to topple the U.S. dollar as the global reserve currency.

“A weakened U.S. dollar would in their view boost their own currencies, especially the RMB [Chinese yuan]. For some time, much of U.S. deficit funding has come from increases in overseas purchases of USD as a reserve currency, and a dollar reset would significantly crimp the ability to spend of the U.S. government,” he said.

Xi wants the United States to not only be weakened but also be deprived of reliable and functioning allies within Europe, according to Lehberger who sees the Ukraine war as vital to Beijing’s economic game plan against Washington.

“A weak E.U. will then be earmarked to become an economic dependency of China,” Lehberger said.

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The Green Machine This great Nation & Its People War

Why America Loses Wars By John Waters

Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's Terms of Agreement Entered into with Gen.  Robert E. Lee at Appomattox Court House, Virginia, April 9, 1865, and  Supplementary Terms April 10, 1865 | American Battlefield Trust

Clausewitz tells us to measure society’s strength by whether we achieve victory on the battlefield. Victory entails not just destroying the enemy’s fighting capability or claiming his territory, but achieving certain political objectives. American politicians have shown a willingness to end wars without achieving their objectives. In other words, they have shown a willingness to lose.

Precedent was set with the 1953 ceasefire in Korea and upheld when America withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021. It remains unclear whether politicians intended to lose those wars (and others) or merely accepted that the price of victory had become too high, that victory was no longer worth the time or effort required.

Whatever the case, our troops care about winning. Desire for victory is one reason young Americans leave their homes and families to enlist. They join to gain a mission, to make a difference, and to win on the battlefield. Desire for victory was part of the reason our troops performed so well in the fight against terrorism. Ask anyone who served whether they believed their combat deployments were making a difference. Odds are they answer ‘yes’, but acknowledge the overarching policy was misguided if not destined to fail.

No one blames the troops for our failures in Korea, Vietnam, or Afghanistan. Rather, it is “the political leaders who have forgotten that victory matters,” historian and Clausewitz scholar Donald Stoker told me recently over the phone. And since the politicians do not believe that victory matters, our troops have found themselves trapped in endless wars that lead to defeat or stalemate, a doom loop of poor planning-leads-to-poor results, where the pursuit of war itself becomes more important than defeat or victory.

In his book Why America Loses Wars (Cambridge, 2019), Stoker argues that flawed thinking about war, especially limited war, has led to flawed war policy and poor results. And, Stoker anticipates more of the same unless our political leaders clearly define their political objectives and apply the necessary military strategies and resources to achieve those objectives. The following is our conversation on war and politics.

Can you first define “war” for our readers?

War is the use of military force to achieve a political aim. The violence (force) element is pivotal. What you will see argued is that you can have war without violence. That’s wrong. You have rivalry and competition, but war must have politically directed violence, directed at an adversary for a political end.

Your writing is concerned with winning on the battlefield. Define victory.

Achieving your political aim. That’s the one that shines through. When you get what you want, and have the strength or ability to convince the other side to agree to your terms. This is where the complexity of the book comes into play. The most difficult chapter to write was on how to end wars, particularly those wars fought for a limited aim where often you’re not able to impose your will on the enemy. In such situations, it’s difficult to force the other side to come to your point of view, as was the case in the Korean War and the Gulf War, to name a couple of examples. It was too difficult to get the agreements to end those wars on the terms we wanted.

I’ll add that we almost never plan for the ending of a war, which is one reason for our failure to achieve victory in some of our wars since 1945. This is not just a problem for the United States—most countries never plan for the end of a war. The Russo-Japanese War [1904-05] is one of those very few examples where a nation-state (Japan) contemplated in advance exactly how to end the war. Japan thought through the negotiation steps needed to end the conflict on favorable terms. In contrast, the H.W. Bush Administration had thought about the need for a plan to end the Gulf War but didn’t create one. Instead, it had General Schwarzkopf negotiate in a very ad hoc way, and he was criticized for the settlement even though everything he did was approved by the administration.

You are opposed to loose usage of “war” in academia, government, and journalism. The term “limited war” is particularly bothersome. “Hybrid war” as well. To borrow a line from the Smiths: What difference does it make?

I get criticisms sometimes that I’m worrying about nothing, but as you dig into the arguments, you discover that we don’t even agree on basic definitions for “war” and “peace.”

For instance, there’s this constant drumbeat that we’re at war with Russia, that we’re at war with China. I think many terms we use confuse “subversion” and “crime” with actual war. Now, the “gray zone” is a big one used to denote actions occurring in this supposed realm between peace and war, but my point is that people are again misunderstanding “subversion” and elements of Great Power Competition. I think we’re creating new terminology and imaginary complexity that amounts to sloppy thinking. This affects our ability to plan and make war.

Let’s apply these terms. Was the Iraq War a failure?

That depends. You can look at the question several different ways.

First, what were the political aims being sought in the Iraq War? The political aims were to (a) overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime; and (b) build a democratic Iraq. You can make a good argument that we achieved both aims, but that we did not understand that achieving these aims required different things. Building a democratic Iraq is a completely different political aim and, when the aims are different, usually the ways must be different. The Iraq War certainly killed more people and cost more than it was expected to, but you could argue that the war was a success.

All that said, I don’t like the question. You could certainly argue that we helped create a situation in Iraq that allowed Iran to obtain a dominant position in the country, that this probably would not have happened without overthrowing Saddam Hussein.

Okay. How about the War in Afghanistan. Was it a failure?

Obviously.

We wanted to (a) overthrow the regime; and (b) build a democratic Afghanistan. Then, late last year [2021], we decided we didn’t want to support the regime we created. What we did in Afghanistan failed to achieve the aim. In Iraq, we got our aim but was it worth it? I’m iffy on that. In Afghanistan, we didn’t accomplish our political aim.

But is it a problem of thinking or a problem of will? We knew the political objective of the war: to create security conditions for peace and the development of a new government and military. We also understood the problem: accomplishing the objective would take 100 years.

Both. Loose terminology is a problem of thinking. But it always boils down to will, too.

Clausewitz would say it always comes down to one side’s ability to hold. People would argue that the North Vietnamese or the Afghans were just willing to do it longer.

What if it’s impossible to achieve the aim? I think it’s a fair question to put forward in the context of Afghanistan. I’ve seen it in a couple of books. When Mullah Omar and Karzai cut a deal in early 2002, the administration wouldn’t accept the deal because it was very much an Afghan deal. It was rejected by the administration. Just think if they had taken the deal – what would have happened? It’s a fascinating one to think about.

It’s really tough if you’re in the political decision-making role. You may have to make the decision that you’re willing to lose. That’s the criticism leveled by Peter Bergen at the Biden Administration in Afghanistan, that they decided to lose. But did they really think they were losing the war?

Harry Summers’ book on Vietnam says there was no clear political aim in Vietnam. But it’s very clear from the Kennedy and early Johnson administration documents that these administrations wanted a non-Communist Vietnam. The interesting thing from Summers’ argument is that there are all these flag officers he interviewed who did not know the political aim. It’s as if it was not pushed down the chain. There’s a broken link in the chain.

When you look at the political aims for the Iraq War, it’s very clear that the administration wanted to overthrow the regime and establish a democratic Iraq. But then you have Rumsfeld writing in his correspondence that the goal was not to establish a democratic Iraq. Moreover, the political aim given to the war planners was to overthrow the regime, not to plan for creation of a democratic Iraq. The disconnect between the WH – DoD – ground commanders was huge in the Bush Administration. I think it was very different in the Obama Administration. As far as communicating the political aim, I think there was some improvement in the Obama administration but there was also a real tightening of control at the WH in the Obama administration. Consequently, there was a real loss of strategy in favor of tactical planning. In Ash Carter’s memoir, he writes that the Administration was slow to figure out a strategy to fight the Iraq War in 2014 and beyond. I think there was a lack of emphasis on winning during the Obama Administration.

I’ll add that it’s very weird to see flag officers say that the point of fighting a war is not to win. You’ll see evidence of that dating back to the Korean War. It’s very odd. The class I taught at the Naval War College was essentially on “how to win wars,” but now you’ll see from military officers and politicians and others that the point is not to win the war. If you’re not trying to win the war, how will you ever get to peace? Fighting the war becomes an end. There’s a phenomenon where the war becomes more tactical the longer it goes on, and planners and decision-makers lose sight of the strategic picture.

There is a divergence between the academic’s answer and the participant’s answer. Many veterans believe we won tactically but lost strategically. There is a sense that the people most out-of-touch with war—politicians, bureaucrats, other “experts” in war policy—are the people most responsible for our failure. Can people who never served in war fully understand war?

I think at some levels “yes” and some levels “no.” There’s a friend of mine who spent a year in Iraq and a year in Afghanistan. His father had been an infantryman in Vietnam. He said when he came back from Iraq, his father finally talked to him about Vietnam and the wounds he suffered. He never spoke about the Vietnam War beforehand, maybe because it was too personal and he feared he wouldn’t be understood. Another colleague had a similar experience with a student who had a grandfather who served in World War II. The reason why is because they had someone they knew—someone they knew would understand.

So, yes, I think it’s difficult to really understand the violence and chaos of war unless you’ve experienced it.

You mentioned Clausewitz. I’ve not given you any preparation, but can you apply his “ends,” “ways,” and “means” analysis to the engagement in Ukraine?

I’m probably wrong on this because I’m guessing, but here it goes, from the Ukrainian side:

ENDS – I don’t know. Ukraine wants to secure its independence. Do the Ukrainians also want to retake land they lost in 2014? Some would argue “yes” but we don’t know.

WAYS – depends how you want to slice it. Probably defensive. Attrite the Russians and give ground until Ukraine can mount an offensive. [Which has happened since the interview was conducted]

MEANS – an effort to mobilize the entire country. Zelensky tried to revive the levée on masse at the beginning of the war, from ages 16 to 60. I’m uncertain how well this has worked.

That seems right. Thanks for doing the analysis on the fly. 

Sure. And one further note on Clausewitz, if I may.

Of course.

He was first and foremost an infantryman, a soldier. We have this misperception that he was just a staff officer. He was in at least 36 battles. There were weeks where they would fight every day. He was at the Battle of Borodino. He once took a bayonet to the side of the head. He experienced nearly everything about war, from being wounded to being a prisoner of war, to leading in combat. But he also sat in meetings with the Czar. He had vast experience and vast education on war—he built his theoretical approach on all these different things. Bad theory will get you killed, he believed. And so, I’ve taken up that last point by writing this book, an attempt to encourage better thinking about why and how we wage war.

John Waters is a writer in Nebraska.