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HEADQUARTERS, NORTHERN AREA
OCOTAL, NICARAGUA.
CAPTURE OF GENERAL MANUEL MARIA GIRON RUANO AND INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM HIM.
The following excerpt from Lt. Hanneken’s patrol report gives the circumstances under which Jiron was captured:
“I sent 8 men with Cpl. Roy Waddle in charge to the creek in rear of our camp for the purpose of bathing, instructing the Cpl. to put out 4 sentries while the other 4 bathed, Cpl. Waddle placed 1 of these sentries, Pvt. Merle W. Rittenour to guard the trail leading to the creek and toward our camp. Pvt. Rittenour took his post in the bushes off the trail, when at about 1030 he espied a man on a mule coming up the trail, he called to the men who were bathing that someone was coming and “to stand by”. Cpl. Waddle and the men immediately armed themselves. The sentry permitted the man to come along and when opposite him on the trail he covered him with his rifle. Cpl. Waddle and the other men immediately investigated the trail and found that this man was alone. This man wore a red and black hat band, a red neckerchief and was armed with a Colt automatic pistol, (not US Government), a sheathed machete and a belt with 35 rounds of ammunition. He was escorted to camp by the 8 men and turned over to the undersigned. I immediately disarmed him, at the same time he stated that he was a General, General Jiron.”
He was born in Guatemala of a wealthy family, in 1868, being later educated at Guatemala College. At the age of 2k [sic], he inherited 20,000.00 from an aunt, whereupon, he embarked upon a period of riotous living, traveling through various countries and South America for two years and four months, moved only by a spirit of adventure and wanderlust. His money gone, he worked for a short time in the mines, Esmeraldos, near the head of the Amazon, for a small “stake” with which he returned home. Being averse to work he spent the next 17 years in the rather colorless role of a hanger-on around his family. He had no career and no particular ambition. He finally joined the Guatemalan army in 1907, where he served until 1923, attaining the rank of Col. He seems to have struck his stride here.
In 1923, Jiron secured permission from his government to join the Liberal Revolution in Honduras. He fought under Gen. Gregorio Ferrera with the rank of Gen. until captured and imprisoned in La Aiba, after the triumph of the Conservatives. Receiving his release after a short period of imprisonment, he returned to Guatemala and was promoted to rank of Gen. in the army of his own country.
Later, he was appointed Jefe Politico of the department of Peten, Honduras, in which capacity he served for two years, 1925 to 1926. Rumor has it that Jiron wreaked cruel and blood-thirsty vengeance on his enemies while in office, but he denies this, describing this administration as a success. At all events Guatemala swapped Governments again in 1927, and Jiron engaged temporarily in the salt business. He became interested in the Nicaraguan Revolution headed by Dr. Sacasa, but failed to arrive until after the Tipitapa Agreement. Landing at Corinto Dec. 8, 1927, he joined Sandino at Chipote on Jan. 18, 1928 — the same day on which the 11th Regt. arrived in Nicaragua. He became Chief-of-Staff of the bandit forces about Aug. 15, 1928.
It is men of Jiron’s type who constitute the head and front of banditry in Nicaragua. He explains that he joined Sandino because he is furnished a chance to fight. He has no recognized creed nor code, and no ambition except for adventure. Possessed with a likeable personality and well known to a large number of prominent figures in Central America. He is moved by no cause and has no special loyalty to anyone or anything — not even to his wife and children whom he left stranded in poverty.
Jiron was questioned at length by Capt. Geyer, Lt. Hanneken, and R-2 11th Regt., and gave information as set forth below: / p. 2 /
STATUS OF SANDINO’S FORCES AT TIME OF GIRON’S CAPTURE:
Sandino was in camp with his staff, his mistress and a guard of 28 men, a few miles Northeast of Murra, on Feb. 2nd. He has made his headquarters in this general area continuously since he was forced to leave the Coco River after his defeat by Capt. Edson at Llilihuas, on Aug. 7, 1928. By posting lookouts on high peaks, he keeps himself informed on the direction of approach of Marine Patrols sent into the region. With this advantage, he can easily elude his pursuers by using a network of new-cut trails through the dense jungles. His present staff is composed as follows:
(a) Porfirio Sanchez, Honduran, new Chief-of-Staff, recently promoted to General. Is uneducated and barely able to write his name.
(b) Francisco Estrada, Nicaraguan, Assistant Chief-of-Staff.
(c) Simon Gonzalez, Honduran, unable to read or write.
(d) Juan G. Colindres, lives both in Honduras and Nicaragua.
(e) Augustin [Faribundo] Marti, San Salvadoran, a very capable man who serves as Secretary. Is a communist and fanatic, allied with communistic organization in Mexico.
(f) Dr. Mairena Hernandez, Nicaraguan from Leon.
The following are members of the guard whose names are recalled:
Captain Adan Gonzalez, San Salvadoran.
Captain Filadelfia Gomez, Honduran.
Sergeant Lorenzo Blandon, Nicaraguan from Pueblo Nuevo.
Corporal Leopoldo Tellez, Nicaraguan from Matagalpa.
Private Alfonso Hernandez, 20 years old, Nicaraguan, Coco River.
Private Francisco Hernandez, 12 years old, Nicaragua, Coco River.
Private Pupiro, countryman of Sandino from Niquinihomo, Nicaragua, is Sandino’s cook.
Private Vilchez, Nicaraguan.
Captain [Fulgencio] Perez, Nicaraguan, Ocongohas [Ocongoas] area.
Private Marcelino Rugama, Nicaraguan.
The other sixteen he does not remember their names.
Gen. [General Simon Montoya] and his cousin Col. Montoya [Lt. Colonel Julian Montoya] have left for Honduras on Feb. 2, 1929, with a message to President Colindres asking permission for Sandino with 30 men to cross that country going to Mexico, where he intended to buy ammunition. Both Montoya’s stated to Jiron that they would not return, although they might join Sandino on his projected trip to Mexico in case that became possible.
Col. Fernando Quintero and Lt. Col. Carlos Aponte have both quit Sandino. (A letter signed by Sandino on Jan 21, 1929, verifies this report.)
Sandino has the following troops distributed as shown below. This does not include Guardias Civicas of whom there is an unknown number, nor about 30 men with Ortez not yet reported: / p. 3 /
Pedro Altamirano ————————- 30 men
Jose Leon Diaz —————————- 30 men
Carlos Salgado —————————– 30 men
Sandino ————————————— 28 men
[Coronado] Maradiaga ——————- 5 or 6 men
[Miguel Angel] Ortez ——————– 30 men
The units of the Guardia Civica are organized and employed by individual patrol commanders. Reyes Lopez has one such unit of 15 or 20 men in the San Juan de Telpaneca area, and Peralta [Monico Peralta, Crescencio Peralta, or Ismael Peralta] as a similar group around La Constancia.
ARMS AND AMMUNITION
3 Springfields and about 200 Krags and Remingtons. Of these, 160 are in service and others are stored in the vicinity of Chipote by Capt. Rafael Altamirano who lives near Monchones, 2 Lewis machine guns, 2 BAR’s, and 1 Thompson.
Sandino has a third Lewis gun not in working order. (It is also known that Ortez and Salgado each have at least 1 machine gun. Giron states that they have been obtained independently by Ortez and Salgado and have not been reported to Sandino. A bandit group obtained an additional Thompson in the contact at San Antonio on Jan. 21, 1929. This is a total of 4 machine guns, 2 BAR’s, and 2 Thompsons.)
Of the automatic weapons known to Sandino, Altamirano has 1 Lewis and 1 Thompson; Sanchez has 1 Lewis; Sandino has 2 BAR’s with him. It is not known what Jefe will get Sanchez’s machine gun, now that he has become Chief-of-Staff.
Ammunition is very limited for Krags and Remingtons, soldiers being restricted to from 5 to 8 rounds each. Members of Sandino’s personal group have 25 rounds each. There are about 2,000 rounds of Springfield ammunition available for the machine guns. This amount has been accumulated by salvaging ammunition lost along trails by Marines because of broken bandoliers straps, etc. (Ortez and Salgado are such also known to have a supply of machine gun ammunition which was obtained according to Jiron from sources unknown to Sandino.)
Sandino has about 160 pistols and an adequate supply of pistol ammunition, which is secured from Honduras by buying in driblets — a few cartridges at a time mostly from Honduran officers and soldiers.
CLOTHING
Secured mostly by robbing private homes and stores. Saddles, bridles, etc. are obtained in the same manner. Some articles, particularly the shoes, are obtained from Honduras. Ramon Raudales, part owner of the Ula Ranch and who now lives in Danli, is the bandit agent for supplies in Honduras. He is assisted in the work by Col. Quesada now lame from a wound received in the Bramadero fight.
Another bandit agent, who serves more or less as Sandino’s banker lives in Tegucigalpa and Danli — is a German by the name of Rossner. / p. 4 / Sandino sold to him the 28 pounds of gold from the La Luz and Neptune mines, for which Rossner advanced him $12.00 per ounce, the rest he paid when the gold was disposed of abroad. Some of the money is still due Sandino of this account, as a messenger was expected to arrive at the bandit camp from Danli, with $1,000.00, at the time Jiron was captured, Feb. 3rd. From time to time, Rossner has turned over to the bandit agent, Ramon Raudales, sums of money on account for the purchase of supplies.
ARTERIES OF SUPPLY AND COMMUNICATION
Supplies are run from Danli to Las Limones “lemon” from where they are forwarded by 2 men, Ciriaco Shuto (Soto) and his brother whose given name is unknown, other bandit agents in this immediate vicinity who are used on various missions are (1) Emilio Soto of Puntalitos, (2) Felix Soto of San Jose; (3) Juan Soto of Las Limones. These agents move their cargoes at night when using mules. If light loads such as money or medicines, are being carried, they are transported on foot, moving via little-used trails and often going through the jungle a few yards from and parallel to the trail. The route taken from Las Limones to Murra is either direct of via Santa Barbara, depending upon reports of the presence of Marine Patrols. Murra is spy headquarters (area of Murra), and supplies are easily forwarded from there to wherever Sandino may be in the general regions.
A second route is: El Chupon (which is Sandino’s headquarters whenever they may be East of Murra). To Northeast of Bentillo Mountain, across Coco River about midway between Santa Cruz and Cua to house of Zeledon Gutierrez, thence to house of Santos Vasquez in Virgen, then to La Constancia where either Peralta or Abraham Centeno relays messages as far South as Matagalpa. (Messages are said to go via Mrs. Sandino [Blanca Arauz de Sandino] at San Rafael, but Jiron is uncertain about what, if anything, she has to do with the system).
The wife of 2 sons of Pedro Altamirano at present live on Northeast side of Bentillo. They are important in the bandit system of information and supply Southward from El Chipoton.
PLANS OF SANDINO
After the elections on Nov. 4th, Sandino expected President Moncada to summon him to a conference for the purpose of arriving at an agreement whereby the bandit chief would lay down his arms. He is still waiting for the summons. Jiron avers that it is Sandino’s immediate ambition to rule Nueva Segovia, and he will not voluntarily quit banditry with anything less. He has discussed with his Staff various moves in an endeavor to enlist further support, making decisions and then discarding them. Among the plans recently considered by him and mentioned to Jiron are the following:
(a) To go to Mexico City with a guard of 30 men, securing permission for passage of this force through Honduras, Guatemala and San Salvador. His chief foreign support comes from that country, and his brother, Socrates, recently wrote Sandino that he could easily raise money for an expedition if he would come in person to Mexico City. He has sent Jose de Paredes to Mexico with a letter to President Gil, and a commission composed of Gen. and Col. Montoya to Honduras with a letter addressed to President Colindres for this purpose. Paredes left for Mexico on Jan. 28th while the Montoyas left for Tegucigalpa on Feb. 2nd. / p. 5 /
(Jiron left Sandino’s camp with Gen. and Col. Montoya on Feb. 2nd, intending to accompany them into Honduras. He was mule-back while the others were afoot. In crossing a stream which has cut a deep canyon, Jiron was forced to make a detour. He became lost and was captured by a Marine patrol on the following day. Although he denies it, the belief seems justified that Jiron was on a mission to Guatemala similar to the Montoya mission in Honduras.)
(b) To go to Costa Rica with a guard of about 30 men. As a preliminary to this, Sandino considered making a foray into the wealthy Matagalpa area where he could get enough money and supplies, by robbing the finca owners, to sustain his force for a considerable time. He prefers going to Mexico, and his present efforts are directed toward that end. Failing this, Jiron believes that Sandino will go to Costa Rica with whatever he can salvage from the wreck of his “cause” here.
It is significant that the bandit jefe is planning to carry an armed guard with him into whatever country he finally elects to flee to when the time comes. This is for two reasons: (a) To form a nucleus for a new force which he expects to organize and lead back to Nicaragua, once the Marines have been withdrawn. (b) To serve for his personal protection and to give him a certain amount of prestige.
PRESENT ATTITUDE OF CERTAIN JEFES
With the exception of Sanchez, the staff wants to quit. This was made evident upon receipt of the letters of Gen. Feland and Adm. Sellers in Dec. About Dec. 30th, Sandino assembled his various groups at La Luz, a camp on the slope of Bujona Mt., Northeast of Quilali, and informed them of his answer to Gen. Feland. Since then, Gen. Montoya, former Chief-of-Staff, Col. Montoya, and Cols. Quintero and Aponte have quit.
Neither Ortez, Altamirano, nor Sanchez will quit. Ortez has ambitions of supplanting Sandino and does not cooperate very well. He gets his ammunition from Honduras, and has recruited and armed about 30 men which fact he has never reported to his superior. Jiron believes that those jefes who do not fear assassination will soon quit, except the three named above.
METHOD OF AVOIDING MARINE PATROLS
Sandino keeps with him a personal guard of about 30 picked men. As stated elsewhere, he had made his headquarters in the general region East of Murra since about Aug. 15, 1928. He has cut a net-work of trails in this area to assist him in escaping from our patrols, and remains but a relatively short period in any one camp — continually establishing new camps, well hidden from view of our planes. Once a camp is found by a Marine patrol, he never uses it again. In addition to spies who relay reports of approaching hostile patrols from a distance of several miles, lookouts are stationed on near-by mountain peaks and promptly inform him of the direction of march, numbers, etc. of marines in the immediate vicinity. With this advantage, Sandino can slip through the jungle and avoid our patrols, even though they may get to within a few hundred yards of his position. According to Jiron, he has never been forced to flee more than nine miles since coming to this region five months ago. / p. 6 /
Captain Holmes was in contact with Sandino’s guard at Chupon on Oct. 15, 1928. Taking 12 men, he fled Eastward to Oconguas and left Giron behind to fight a delaying action with 12 men. The maneuver succeeded although Capt. Holmes followed him for a number of miles and was within three miles of his camp when the cache was found containing 1 machine gun, 23 rifles, 1 typewriter, etc. Near this spot was a second cache of 90 rifles.
HISTORICAL
BROMADEROS FIGHT
Gen. Montoya was the jefe of the bandit forces, being assisted by Quesada [Colonel Carlos Quesada] and Espinosa [General Luis Espinosa]. Rejada [Lt. Colonel Jose de la Rosa Tejada] and Lagos [Lt. Colonel Jose Lagos] were sub-jefes at that time and handled the two machine guns used in the fight. Montoya had 48 men most of them Honduran, with whom he prefers to fight rather than with Nicaraguans. A contingent of troops came up from Concordia for the fight but Jiron does not know whether or not they were included in the number stated above.
Moises Gonzalez, owner of Daraili was a supporter of Sandino at this time — his son, who has since surrendered, taking part in the battle. (Jiron claims that Gonzalez has broken with Sandino since that time).
At time of fight, Sandino was at San Carlos, a near-by finca belonging to Molina [Blas Miguel Molina] of Yali. One bandit was killed, and two wounded, including Col. Quesada who was shot through right thigh. In the afternoon of the day following the engagement, an airplane killed Col. Espinosa with a bomb dropped on the latter’s house.
Sandino was expecting a loaded ration train to come from the opposite direction from that being traveled by the Marine patrol at time of ambush, and he was much chagrined that the train which he hit was empty.
The general plan of the ambush called for one unit to stake position behind the stone wall running generally parallel to the trail. A similar unit was placed on each flank in a retiring position, from where they might advance and completely surround the Marine patrol.
GUANACASTILLO
Ortez commanded this group. Jiron does not know just how many participated in the ambush, but believes about 60. Officially, Sandino knows only that Ortez has 30 men armed with rifles, although he has private information that this young subordinate has an additional 30 men with possibly some automatic weapons.
Ortez reported to Sandino that he had killed 40 Guardia.
HUNTER CONTACT
At this time, May 13th-14th, Sandino was at Garrobo with the supplies which he had looted from the mines a short time before. Hearing that Capt. Hunter’s column was approaching from the west, he dispatched Sanchez with forty-odd men to meet him. Jiron with about the same number was to support Sanchez while Sandino with a personal guard trailed along in the rear. / p. 7 /
Sanchez attacked the Marine patrol from a small hill — had position , according to Jiron — in the afternoon and was driven off after a short fight. The contact ended about dusk and the Marines camped on the captured position during the night.
Jiron, who had one machine gun, ambushed the trail in one direction from the Marine camp while Sanchez took up position in the opposite direction.
(Note: Capt. Hunter had been fatally wounded in the contact of the previous afternoon, and the Marine patrol was trying to evacuate him. Cpl. Williamson and one Guardia were killed).
The Marine patrol left camp in the direction of Jiron’s ambush, and another short fight ensued. Jiron explained with some feeling that his men were nervous and showed themselves, whereupon, the Marines attacked with automatic weapons and drove them from their positions. Two of his men were killed.
During the two contacts, Sandino was about one mile away. He visited the scene about three days later, and finding two graves, ordered Jiron to disinter the bodies. The graves of Cpl. Williamson and the Guardia were then opened — Sandino finding in a corked bottle the name, rank, and organization of the former.
Sandino ordered that the bodies of both dead men be hung by their necks and pictures made of them. This was done in case of Cpl. Williamson, but the neck of the Guardia had been broken and the state of decomposition was such as to make it impossible.
(At this point in his narrative, Jiron closed his eyes and shuddered, exclaiming: “I didn’t want to do it; Oh, it was awful. I told the General (Sandino) that it was barbarous.”)
Two weeks later, Jiron passed this spot again and saw the skeletons of the two men still there.
LOOTING OF LA LUZ AND NEPTUNE MINES
Sandino designated Jiron as the jefe to make some important raids, about the latter part of March, 1928. He decided to plunder the richest property available to him, and to make a gesture against all foreigners in Nicaragua. Jiron was sent first to the Matagalpa region and then to Pis Pis area. He told Jiron that General Chamorro’s brother owned a finca near Matagalpa where he kept a large amount of money in a safe. This money was to be the first haul of plunder.
There were too many Marine Patrols around the Matagalpa area to admit of raiding the Chamorro finca, so Jiron gave up the attempt. He assembled a column of about 80 men near Coyolar, with Altamirano commanding the point and Sanchez the rear guard, and marched on Pis Pis. Altamirano knows this section better than any other jefe, and therefore was chosen to head the formation. It was a long and difficult trek through the jungle, but they finally arrived at the La Luz mine where they found only a small amount of gold. / p. 8 /
(With characteristic Latin mannerisms, Jiron extended himself on his description of this exploit. Amid dramatic gesticulations, he waxed eloquent about the many hazards encountered, and the masterful way in which he solved all of his problems. His tired soldiers deserved all they could get, and he was frankly disgusted to find such a small amount of well-earned supplies at the La Luz mine. It was even worse at the Star Mine [Lone Star], which was not in operation. However, Altamirano found an American flag in a house at the Star Mine which Jiron later gave to Sandino. After getting the name of the organization to which Col. Williamson was attached, by opening his grave, Sandino gave this flag to Dr. Gustavo Machado, his representative in Mexico, who published a detailed story of how it had been captured by the bandit forces.)
Jiron then moved to the Neptune mines where he seized an important amount of supplies, including 28 lbs. of gold and 32 mule loads of clothing and stores. He had been ordered by Sandino to rob everything of value that could be carried away, and to destroy the rest. Also, he had been instructed to bring back to the outlaw stronghold every foreigner encountered in the mining region — both male and female. Accordingly, he captured Mr. Marshall, the engineer, but refused to molest a German at the Star Mine, because he was “unimportant.”
(This bandit story of how he looted $10,000,000.00 American mine is not important now, except the light which it may shed upon the “cause” of Sandino, and what may be expected of him in the future in case the campaign is abandoned before he is finished. Jiron is a solder of fortune and sees nothing particularly wrong about robbing so long as it is done under the guise of “military operations.” Moreover, a military operation is anything that causes a disturbance among the people. He was not only frank about this looting of the mines, but obviously proud of his accomplishment. He voluntarily related many occurrences during the raid.
“When I arrived,” he went on, “the gold was there in the boxes, but the process wasn’t finished, so I called one of the management and asked him how long to finish it, he said forty hours. I was a little drunk and feeling pretty good, so I says, to him, “I’ll give you twelve hours to finish it; and if you don’t I’ll execute you.” So sure enough, the next morning at eight o’clock — there was the gold!”
He stated that there were between twenty and thirty negro women at the Neptune Mine. Asked if he received any complaints about cases of rape committed by his men, he replied, “O-O-h, they were glad to sleep with my soldiers. You understand, my soldiers gave them combs and silk stockings and things which we got from the store.” Then he added with a meaning shrug, “and if these negroes weren’t glad to see my soldiers — well!”)
Laden with 22 loads of loot — each man carrying an additional bundle of his own — the bandit column started back to Santa Cruz, where Jiron was to receive instructions regarding place of storage. It was to go somewhere in the region East of Chipote. Upon arriving at a point on the trail about opposite Garrobo, Jiron met a messenger who informed him that the Marines had combed the area East of Chipote and destroyed all supplies. Further, that Sandino was gone to parts unknown. With this, the bandit pack train was turned Northward and carried to Garrobo, where Sandino later arrived. The Hunter contact, elsewhere described, followed only a short time afterwards. / p. 9 /
(Our operations East of Chipote, to which reference is made above, began on Apr. 4, 1928. It is interesting to recall now that these operations were originally planned for execution on a date later than Apr. 4th, the time being moved up. Had the original plan been adhered to, it is probable that the bulk of Sandino’s loot from the mines would have been captured or destroyed.)
EDSON CONTACT
About two weeks after the Hunter contact at Zapote, on May 13th, Sandino moved his headquarters to Wamblan. He established an outpost under Jiron about two miles East (down stream) from Llilihuas (LLILIHUAS), with a second outpost still further down stream under Montoya.
When information was received that a Marine patrol was moving up the river, Montoya’s outpost was withdrawn except a few care-takers for the camp. Jiron was ordered tdo withdraw to Llilihuas where he was to give battle. He then had 30 men with rifles and one Lewis machine gun. Sandino was to support Jiron with about 30 men, equipped with rifles, one sub-Thompson and two BAR’s. Altamirano, with a force of about equal size, was ordered to block the trail on North side of Coco River which branches off down stream from Llilihuas and runs parallel to river. This was planned to prevent the Marines from out-flanking the bandit defensive position.
Jiron wanted to place his troops on the South side of the river where, he claims, there was better cover, better observation and where the river current was too swift to admit of landing from small boats on that side. He had a report that the Marines were pulling up stream in five open boats, and he planned to dispose his men in five groups, permit the boats to slightly pass the respective positions of his groups and then open fire. Sandino interfered with his plans and required him to take up a position on the North side of the River.
As the Marine patrol appeared down the river, Col. Juan G. Colindres became excited and showed himself. Whereupon the Marines immediately opened fire, drew their boats to shore and pushed home their attack. For some reason unknown to Jiron, Sandino, who according to plan was to support the defensive position, ran. Jiron found him that night in Wamblan where he had returned to his mistress, Teresa Villatoro.
Jiron heard firing on his left flank, but thought it was Altamirano, knowing that he had been stationed in that direction. He was amazed to find that Marines were closing on his flank and rear. His command was shot to pieces and he narrowly escaped capture, finally reaching Wamblan that night with one man. Jiron lost seven known killed and twelve missing. Three of the missing have been located, but were wounded.
Sandino had not properly reconnoitered the ground, and did not know that the trail on which he stationed Altamirano was nearly four miles from the river at that point. This blunder dispersed his forces, removed Altamirano from the scene of action at the critical moment and gave Jiron a false sense of security on his flank. There was a bitter quarrel as a result — Jiron and Sandino blaming each other for the defeat. After this was patched up, Jiron was made Chief-of-Staff. / p. 10 /
MISCELLANEOUS
(1) Sandino keeps a mistress near his camp, Teresa Villatoro, whom he first met at San Albino. She was a mistress of another man at that time, and would be rather good-looking except that she now has no front teeth and bears a scar on the forehead from a wound received at Chipote. She is a native of La Union, San Salvador. Jiron declares that Sandino had Gen. Sequiera executed because of his attentions to Teresa — the charge of disloyalty against him being a mere pretense. Because of increasing danger of capture, Sandino now plans to send her back to Salvador as soon as he can get the money.
(2) Lola Matamoros of Telpaneca was at one time a good friend of the outlaw, she visited him at Chipote at least once. Jiron is not certain that the friendship has been broken.
(3) Marshall was kept with Jiron near Llilhuas until he became ill of dysentery when he was sent to the only bandit doctor at Wamblan. He was buried beside a small creek at Wamblan, the grave being marked by a cross cut in the bark of a tree nearby. Jiron claims to know the family of Marshall’s wife in Costa Rica.
(4) A group of bandits under Sanchez disinterred the body of 1st Sgt. Bruce at Las Cruces performing acts of ghoulish vulgarity upon it.
(5) The following are members of the “group” mentioned in Sandino’s “agreement” which he is now trying to have ratified in Mexico. This agreement aims at the overthrow of the Moncada Government:
(a) Sofonias Salvatierra, who is connected with a print shop in Leon.
(b) Solomon de la Selva, Sandino’s propagandist at Leon.
(c) Dr. Salvador B. Diaz of Leon
(6) Dr. Gustavo Machado, Sandino representative in Mexico, is editor of “El Libertador,” a paper published in Mexico, D.F. This [is] the official organ of the Anti-Imperialist League, of which Machado is a member. He is also a member of the so-called “Hands-Off-Nicaragua Committee”. He collected $400.00 for Sandino by selling picture buttons of the bandit jefe in Mexico City. He visited the bandit camp at Garrobo last May where he secured the American flag stolen from the Star Mine. The flag was then photographed, which appeared later in his paper with a story of its having been captured from the Marines.
(7) Sandino received $310.00 in cash from [Froylan] Turcios of Tegucigalpa. Jiron does not know the amount of supplies furnished by this agent.
(8) A Miss Bonilla of Danli, Honduras, is an agent of Sandino. / p. 11 /
(9) When Carleton Beals, reporter of the Nation, had his interview with Sandino in San Rafael, there were between 80 and 90 bandits present in the town. In all, Sandino then had about 375 men, with two machine guns and two sub-Thompsons. Beals was anxious to get any story or complaint against the Marines. Beals told Jiron that one-half the people in the United States favors Sandino — especially the Democrats. This helped the morale of the outlaws.
(10) Gen. Sequiera participated in the Liberal revolution in Honduras in 1924. He once killed a staff officer of Gen. Chamorro. He was imprisoned in Honduras while on a mission for Sandino, but escaped. He was executed by Sandino shortly before the Edson contact, according to Jiron, on fake charges of disloyalty — his intimacy with Teresa Villatoro being the actual reason.
(11) Capt. Perez [Fulgencio Perez] and “Chico” Lopez [Francisco Lopez] are bandit intelligence officers. Perez has a finca at Oconguas while Lopez lives near Murra.
(12) A Capt. Altamirano, who lives on Chipote, is Sandino’s Quartermaster, and has about 90 rifles stored somewhere in the vicinity.
(13) Marti [Faribundo Marti] wrote all of Sandino’s propaganda for him during the election period. He also drafted the “Agreement.”
(14) Pedron Altamirano is known as a killer, having murdered 19 men before the Revolution. It was his force that murdered the election officials in Pantasma valley as well as those at San Marcos. Jiron personally heard Sandino congratulate Altamirano on his work in killing Dr. Castellon and his party at San Marcos.
(15) Lagos is a Honduran who operated with Abraham Centeno for a while, and with other groups. Is a machine gunner. Has quit Sandino and is now living in Gualistas [Gualisila], Northeast of Daraili and near the Coco River, with a former mistress of Molina, of Yali.
(16) Peralta [Crescencio or Monico Peralta] is a sub-jefe of Sandino, is living in Constancia where he owns a finca. He organized a unit of the Guardia Civica there. (He is believed to be the jefe who attacked a small Marine patrol at San Antonio, on Jan. 21st.) Mrs. Sandino sends and received mail through Peralta.
(17) Mrs. Williams of Los Encinos has been furnishing information to Sandino since he first began banditry. Her daughter married “Gen.” Echevarria [General Manuel Echevarria], the Mexican bandit who formerly served with Sandino. Williams, himself, has often led bandit patrols and furnished them with animals.
(18) Planes killed 17 mules which had been “appropriated” by Sandino at Gulke’s Camp, while many others ran away. Those left were stolen by one of the Maradiaga brothers [Coronado Maradiaga and Fernando Maradiaga] who ran them off to Honduras and pocketed the sale money.
(19) Gen. Montoya is from Alanjo, Honduras, has but little education. He left Honduras about two years ago after having killed a man in his home town. / p. 12 /
(20) Col. Carlos Aponte Hernandez is a communist from Venezuela. He left his country because of enmity against President Gomez, going to Cuba where he got into trouble. He escaped from prison and later joined Sandino.
(21) Filadelfia Gomez of Honduras, a sub-jefe of Sandino’s personal guard, is described by Jiron as a “Sponger.”
(22) Of the 160 men, who are regularly attached to the bandit forces, only about 40 are Nicaraguans. There are about 80 Hondurans and others from all parts of Central America and Mexico. The Nationality of Sandino’s generals is as follows:
(a) One Guatemalan — Jiron
(b) ” Honduran — Montoya
(c) ” San Salvadoran — Diaz
(d) Two Nicaraguans — Ortez and Salgado
Cols. Sanchez, Gomez, Gonzalez, and Montoya are Hondurans. Aponte is a Venezuelan, while others are Nicaraguans.
(23) Col. Francisco Estrada joined Sandino upon being released from Jail in Managua.
(24) Arturo Fernandez, a Guatemalan, recently joined Ortez as a machine gunner.
(25) Narciso Cruz was a bandit spy near Quilali was captured and is still held by the Marines.
(26) Eulalio Flores of Gusaneras in La Pavona near Pena Blanca furnished Sandino with two cargoes of foodstuffs about four months ago.
(27) Guadalupe Rivera of Santa Cruz was a Colonel under Sandino. His house was used as a bandit message center. About one month ago, he sent Sandino two cartons of Camel cigarettes which the latter threw in the fire thinking them poisoned.
(28) Saint Gilbert Pierre Charles, a Haitian, is now with Sandino. He was at one time sentenced to a long term of imprisonment for banditry in Haiti, by Capt. Hoadley, U.S.M.C. (12 yrs. according to memory of Capt. Geyer). He claims to have escaped, and has now resumed his “career” with Sandino as his leader.
(29) Padre Morales of Las Vegas sent Sandino 80 suits of second-hand underwear about four months ago. He also nursed Sandino for ten days during Feb. 1928, when the jefe was ill of malaria in Las Vegas.
L. B. REAGAN
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps,
R – 2
MCRC/Smith, Julian C./Box 7
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