SHOT Show 2025 – Smith & Wesson introduces the No-Lock Classic Series revolvers, revamping three legendary revolver designs from its past that made history: the Model 36, Model 10 and Model 19
Smith & Wesson No-Lock Classic Series revolvers: a blast from the past
New for 2025 at SHOT Show, Smith & Wesson announces the release of three Classic Series No-Lock revolvers: the Model 36(link is external), Model 10(link is external), and Model 19(link is external), share classic features such as a traditional frame with no internal lock, a single or double action firing capability, and smooth trigger pull for reliable performance.
Displaying iconic features enhanced to meet the demands of today’s shooters, the Model 36 Classic .38 Special +P is built on a J-Frame and a 5-shot cylinder, features a 1.88-inch barrel with a fixed blade front sight, an integral slot-in-frame rear sight, and a classic checkered wood grip.
Its design also incorporates a blued carbon steel frame and cylinder, which not only enhance its visual appeal but also provides durability. MSRP in the US is set at $849.
The .38 Special +P Model 10 Classic and the .357 Magnum Model 19 Classic are both built on a K-Frame, and feature a 6-shot cylinder. The reborn Model 10 includes a 4-inch barrel with a fixed blade front sight, an integral slot-in-frame rear sight, blued carbon steel frame and cylinder, and high-grade Tyler Gun Works walnut grips; the Model 19 Classic comes with a red ramp insert front sight on a 4.¼” barrel, adjustable black blade rear sight, blued carbon steel frame and cylinder, and checkered wood grip. MSRP on the US market is set at $979 and $1,099 respectively.
A gun shot perforation in a window pane can be seen in front of a makeshift memorial for Alex Pretti in Minneapolis, Minn., January 26, 2026.(Roberto Schmidt/AFP via Getty Images)
That’s not what Alex Pretti was.
Alex Pretti wasn’t killed while “protesting.”
This is the most common description of what he was doing on that Minneapolis street last weekend when he got in a confrontation with federal immigration agents that ended in his tragic shooting.
But if Pretti was merely a protester, we need to change the definition.
A protester, as typically understood, is someone who is making a point, often as part of a gathering of other like-minded people and, usually but not always, in opposition to something.
A protester might hold a sign outside a coal-fired power plant calling for it to shut down.
He might go to Union Square Park in New York City to hear speeches from bullhorns whenever something happens that outrages the left.
He might march against the Iraq War, or the Vietnam War — or in favor of Hamas.
This kind of activity is not to everyone’s taste — personally, I hate the drums and the chants — but there is no doubt that it is a legitimate form of political advocacy.
Depending on the cause, it can even be admirable.
What we are seeing in Minneapolis, though, is often quite different. Run-of-the-mill protesters don’t seek out federal agents and harass and obstruct them. They don’t follow and block their vehicles or establish a robust communications network to deploy resources creating maximum disruption of their operations.
We all are very familiar with how clashes between protesters and police usually go: A contingent of cops faces an unruly crowd along a skirmish line, and the advance guard of the crowd gets more and more aggressive, or the cops begin to move in to disperse the crowd. One way or the other, mayhem ensues. We’ve all seen it hundreds of times.
This is different. Opponents of ICE are, in an organized effort, tracking agents and showing up at operations to stop them from doing their job or make it as difficult as possible. This is more a form of low-level, (by and large) nonviolent insurgency than conventional protest.
And Pretti was part of this effort. It’s more accurate to describe him as an agitator, or — depending on the level of his involvement in the ICE network — even as an operator, than a protester.
The point is to influence events, by direct involvement, rather than simply observe or protest them.
It is telling that, according to CNN, Pretti was injured in a prior confrontation with ICE agents a week before his death.
The fact of the matter is that if Pretti had indeed been only protesting last weekend, he’d still be alive today. He would have stayed on the sidewalk and held up a sign, or chanted “ICE go home,” and the officers might have been annoyed, but they presumably wouldn’t have interacted with him, and there wouldn’t have been any encounter with the potential to go catastrophically wrong.
The calculation in Minneapolis has been that this kind of benign activity is less effective than direct action, and unfortunately — with public opinion swinging against Operation Metro Surge and Trump apparently looking for a climb-down — this assessment looks to be accurate.
We can disagree about the desirability of the goal that Pretti was pursuing, but there’s no doubt about how he was pursuing it, and it wasn’t through conventional protest.
Frigate Type 26 for the Canadian Navy. Crucial for choosing this ship were its anti-submarine capabilities
Even before the first combat use of submarines, methods of combating them were born: ramming and artillery fire. This was due to the following factors. Firstly, very old submarines, from the times when it was more of a dangerous attraction than a combat vehicle, could not dive deeply. The second factor was the periscope – the submarine could not attack or navigate without its help.
A little later, the depth factor disappeared. Even before the First World War, submarines “learned” to plunge deeper than the draft of the largest ship or ship. However, the attack was still impossible without a periscope, and he unmasked the boat. Theoretically, artillery fire with diving shells at the detected periscope was considered an effective means and, together with high speed and tack movement (anti-submarine zigzag), was supposed to protect the ships. The ram of a boat discovered by the crew of a warship in the immediate vicinity was fatal for a submarine
The First World War immediately showed that all this is not entirely true, and the fact that the periscope of the boat was discovered does not at all make its destruction by artillery fire guaranteed. The boat could well have time to plunge at least, and then neither the ram nor the artillery could help, and the boat would have a chance for a second attack.
The need for a means to “get” the boat at a depth was obvious, and such a tool appeared – the first deep bombs became it. Depth bombs had a hydrostatic detonator with the ability to set a predetermined depth of explosion, and the attack was carried out in the likely direction of its evasion after unmasking (detecting a periscope, a boat in the water position or a torpedo shot).
Submarine attack with depth charges
The emergence of marine underwater weapons on surface ships
The advent of ASDIC sonars made the use of depth charges much more accurate and precise. However, the first sonar, as well as the method of using deep bombs by dropping them overboard, made the defeat of the submarine, although possible, but still not a simple matter.
Here’s what the American ace anti-submarine with a major combat account D. MacIntyre recalled about battles with German submarines in the Atlantic during World
War II: The Keats, arriving at the submarine’s detection site, began a search … made sonar contact and launched an attack.
Unfortunately, the boat commander outwitted the frigate commander, perhaps through the successful use of simulation cartridges … they, apparently, either clung to an underwater bubble target, or after the explosion of deep bombs lost contact due to disturbance of the water.
… the ships of the 1st division approached … we did 20 knots each – the highest speed at which sonar search is still possible.
Soon a distinct sonar contact was established. This move required quick action. First, the ship had to be turned with its nose to the contact, so that it was the smallest target for a possible torpedo attack. At this stage of the attack, it is still difficult to decide who is attacking and who is dodging, and torpedoes can already be carried under water in the hope of getting into a ship if it continues on course.
At this time, you should reduce the course – give the sonar time to understand the situation, determine the course and speed of the boat, but also in order to reduce the noise of the propellers and not attract any acoustic torpedo that could already be fired.
“Bickerton” in small speed went in the direction of contact …
“The contact is sure. It is classified as a submarine. ”
“Distance 1400 meters – the inclination increases.”
“The target is moving to the left.”
Bill Ridley, controlling the acoustics, all absorbed in listening to the echo, showed me a thumb raised up, which meant finding a real object.
… the place of the boat was marked on the tablet. She walked in a constant course, moving at the smallest speed, and did not seem to suspect our approach, then at a distance of 650 meters the echoes subsided and soon completely disappeared.
“She’s going deep, sir, I’m sure of that,” he said.
… I decided to use the creep attack method. … one of the ships usually makes contact, holding about 1000 meters behind the stern of the German boat, and after that takes the other ship into the wake of the submarine to approach it in such a small speed that would be sufficient only to catch up with it.
Then, as soon as the attacking ship is over an unsuspecting boat, twenty-six depth charges are dropped from the control ship on command …
Walking at the slowest speed and being guided by my commands transmitted by radiotelephone, the Bly passed us and entered the wake of the boat. The voltage increased to the limit when the distance to the Bly, measured by a portable range finder, gradually began to approach the distance indicated by the sonar. But both distances coincided, and I gave the Tovs command to Cooper.
I had to skip the Bly a little further than the target in order to adjust for the time that the depth bombs were plunged to the designated depth. … at 45 meters, the right moment has arrived. My throat was dry with excitement, and I only managed to wheeze the command “Fire!” … I saw how the first deep bomb plopped into the water from the stern of the Bly. The first bomb exploded with terrible force near the boat, plunging it into total darkness. Cracks appeared in the hull of the boat through which water was pumping inward … explosions were heard throughout the ship inside the hull of the boat, which was located at great depths. I realized that it was all over ….
Of course, everyone was delighted, especially me, since again, like during my first trip to the Walker, the new group “blew the enemy’s blood” upon their first outing to sea.
Dents aboard a sunken German U-534 submarine from near explosions of depth charges
It is noteworthy how difficult it was to attack the submarine using ASDIC and deep bombs dropped overboard. Once again, we look at the diagram of the sonar field of view given in the previous material: it is clear that under the ship itself there is a “blind (although, generally speaking,“ deaf ”) zone” in which the submarine is not detected.
At the same time, the ship can be heard from the submarine and the boat can really evade dropped deep bombs. D. MacIntyre resolved this issue by distributing targeting equipment and weapons, and dropping depth bombs by external target designation from another ship that held contact with the enemy submarine.
This method, however, was not a panacea. Sometimes the situation did not allow to lose time. Sometimes the PLO ship could not count on the help of other ships. New means of application required weapons. And they appeared.
Bombing
In fairness, we note that the understanding that simply dropping deep bombs behind the stern is not enough appeared even during the First World War. The combat experience said that the affected area with deep bombs dropped from the stern was not wide enough and gave the submarine a good chance of survival. It was logical to expand the affected area, but for this, the deep bombs did not have to be dropped overboard, but launched, thrown at a great distance. So the first bombers appeared.
The very first such device was the Mark I Depth charge projector, also known as the Y-gun, so named because of the design similar to the letter Y. It was first adopted by the Royal Navy of Great Britain in 1918.
Y-gun
Ground tests of a bomb with mass-size models of depth charges
The new weapons made the tactics more perfect, now the width of the bombing zone from one ship turned out to be at least three times greater than before.
Schemes for the use of depth bombs using the Y-gun and the affected area
Y-gun had a drawback – it could be placed only in the center, on the so-called diametrical axis of the ship, in fact on the bow and stern. Given that there were guns on the bow, it was usually only aft. Later, “halves” of such a bomb appeared, received the slang name K-gun. They could be put on board.
First British K-gun
By the start of World War II, these bombs became the de facto standard for anti-submarine ships, and were used in conjunction with dropping depth charges from the stern. The use of such weapons significantly increased the chances of destroying the submarine, especially with sonar.
At the beginning of World War II, the “first swallows” of future weapons control systems appeared – controlling the launching of bombs from bombs from the ship’s bridge.
Features of bombing from the destroyer of the US Navy: the simultaneous use of depth bombs from aft bomb spreaders and airborne bombers to increase the “destruction band” of the submarine
K-gun of an American destroyer and a shot from it
But the problem that caused MacIntyre to work on several ships did not disappear: it was necessary to get the submarine right on the course, while the sonar “saw” it.
Such means were bombers firing directly at the rate. The first of them was Hedgehog in 1942 (“Hedgehog”, pronounced “Hedgehog” in English). It was a 24-charge bomb with small RSL, triggered only when hit in the body. To increase the likelihood of hitting a target, a salvo of deep bombs was used.
RBU Hedgehog
To increase the likelihood of defeat in 1943, the first “heavy” British RBMs of the Squid type appeared, having powerful RSL with a large explosive charge and providing guidance for their volley according to the GAS (ie, the integration of the GAS with counting devices RBU).
RBU Squid. Manual reload, semi-automatic control
Depth bombs and bombs are the main weapons of anti-submarine ships of the Western Allies during World War II. After the war, the British created a “Limbo” bomb (Mark 10 Limbo) based on Squid, which was distinguished by a control system integrated into the ship’s sonar system and automatic reloading. “Limbo” embarked on warships in 1955 and served until the end of the 80s.
RBU Limbo
It should be noted that depth bombs are still in service, including the US and British Navy (like helicopter ammunition), and on ships in several countries (for example, Sweden) also use classic depth bombs dropped from the stern of the ship.
The reason for this is the ability to effectively hit targets lying on the ground and underwater sabotage assets (ultra-small submarines, divers’ transporters, etc.).
In the USSR, based on the experience of the war, they first reproduced Hedzhehog (which became our MBU-200), and subsequently a line of domestic RBUs with high performance characteristics was created. The most massive of them were the long-range RBU-6000 (with the RSL-60) and the RBU-1000 with the powerful RSL-10, which had guidance and stabilization drives, a complex of mechanized feeding and reloading RBU from the cellar, and “Storm” bomb control devices (PUSB) .
RBU-6000 (with the feed system of the RSL from the cellar KMP-60) and RBU-1000
PUSB “Storm” had the means to develop the parameters of the target (submarine) motion according to the SAS and did it very accurately. From the experience of combat training of the Navy, repeated cases of direct hit of single practical RSL (training, without explosives) in submarines are known.
From the memories of cap. 1 rank of V. Dugints “Ship fanagoria”:
– RBU charge with a practical bomb! – gave the command to Zheleznov after instructing the commander of the submarine. – Now the boat will be loaded, we will get in touch with it, and immediately we will shoot.
… the miners fiddled with the muzzle covers for a long time, which were covered with ice crust and, turning into stone, did not want to tear themselves away from the guides of the installation. Muzzle covers are canvas covers, worn directly on six trunks in front and behind the installation guides.
And if there were no covers on the trunks? Inside them there would have been ice caps or ice hummocks for a long time. Then try to charge the installation with at least one bomb, you would have to blow the trunks with superheated steam and remove this ice.
“Cut the covers between the 11th and 12th barrels and strip it off only with the 12th rail,” I gave a desperate order and sacrificed my covers to just stuff the bomb in one barrel.
The unit screeched in the cold and tipped over at a loading angle of -90 °.
… there really was something to consider in the cellar.
Frozen through the freeboard iron, which limited the space of the bomb storage, was dull silver with a real snow cover. The lanterns themselves emitted light, as if in some kind of foggy ball due to the fog standing in the room. The green sides below the waterline were covered with large drops of dew, which glittered with gold in the light of light bulbs and, straying into continuous streams, accumulated smudges of water in the recesses of the ship’s bottom.
Graceful bombs, frozen in the strict rack of their mounts, glistened with paint washed by the dampness of the mist and drops of water falling from the ceiling, which at the moment served as an excellent condenser for the fog formed.
– How much is it now? I looked questioningly at the mineral.
“Plus two and a humidity of 98%,” said Meshkauskas, glancing at the instruments.
The bomb lift door slammed, and it thundered with its hinges, carrying the bomb up.
“Meshkauskas, turn on the ventilation,” I demanded, dejected by the abnormal storage conditions of the ammunition.
“Dragging the lieutenant, it will be even worse.” Everything will thaw and there will be even more water, ”the experienced miner reasonedly contradicted my instructions.
…
Simplifying to the limit all the intricacies of the attack, adjusted for severe frost, right at the foot of the ship and, without choosing an acoustic station on board, we aimed RBU at an invisible enemy.
In the frosty silence, the roll of the jet bomb shot, muffled by the cold of frosty air, thundered unnaturally quietly and the bomb, glowing with a yellow flame from the nozzle of its engine, flew away towards an underwater target.
“In such a cold weather, even a bomb rumbles somehow in a special way,” said Zheleznov. “I was still thinking – maybe it won’t work at all in such a frost.”
“What will happen to her … Gunpowder, it is gunpowder in the cold,” I reassured the commander who doubts the reliability of our weapons. …
The boat surfaced in the southwestern corner of the landfill and immediately got in touch with an alarm message:
“Some white horseradish sticking out about 2 meters long sticks out in our fencing. It’s yours? What to do with her? ” – the alarmed submariners asked, when they first saw a practical bomb on board. “She is not dangerous, throw her overboard,” Zheleznov gave to the submariners through communication.
“Wow!” Caught right in the wheelhouse. It’s good that the fuse in this bomb is not military, otherwise it would plunge all 600 grams of its charge into the submariners in the hull, they would be there in complete ecstasy.
In the 80s, a new direction for the development of RBUs emerged in the USSR – equipping their RSBs with controlled gravity underwater projectiles (GPS), which had a simple high-frequency homing system (SSN). Tests showed their very high efficiency, reaching 11 hits on the submarine hull out of a total of 12 rocket RBU-6000 salvo. Moreover, the most valuable thing about GPS in the 80s was their very high (almost absolute) noise immunity. The USSR Navy had a very acute problem of noise immunity of torpedo homing systems against enemy hydroacoustic countermeasures (HCCM). At the same time, the high efficiency of HCCM against torpedoes was “nullified” against GPS due to different frequency ranges and “mutually perpendicular” orientations of their antenna patterns.
However, there were problems with GPS, for example, low ability to hit targets at shallow depths of their immersion (GPS just “slipped” in the cavitation cavity, or did not have time to work out “up” guidance).
RGB-60 launch with RBU-6000, 90R rocket and its gravity underwater projectile
Today, RBUs with GPS have ships of Project 11356 (RPK-8 “West”). However, what was good in the 80s today looks like an anachronism, because at the modern technical level, GPS could and should have been equipped with small propulsion systems that dramatically increased their performance characteristics and capabilities of such weapons.
In addition, the PKK “West” has a completely insufficient range for today.
In the USSR, the main purpose of RBU was to “close” the “dead zone” of torpedoes (which, in turn, closed the “dead zone” of anti-submarine missile systems). However, now the dead zone of anti-submarine missile systems (RPK) has decreased to 1,5 km or less, and is actually absent.
At the same time, the task of hitting targets at ultra-shallow depths of a place lying on the ground, underwater sabotage means (to which combat AUVs have been added today) remains relevant. And for solving such problems, the “classic RBU” with the usual high-explosive RSL (or, in some cases, “light” cumulative) turns out to be very appropriate.
For this reason, RBUs are still used in a number of fleets (Sweden, Türkiye, India, China), including on the newest ships. And this makes a lot of sense.
RBU on ships of new projects: FR project 054 (Chinese Navy) and patrol boat Tuzla (Turkey)
Once, RBU was the main weapon against submarines, but today it is a “niche” tool, but in its niche it is difficult to replace it. The fact that modern warships of the Russian Navy have no bombings at all is wrong. At the same time, it would be optimal if the “new RBUs” were universal multi-purpose launchers capable of solving a wide range of tasks (for example, not only defeating underwater targets, but also effectively setting interference in the “upper hemisphere”).
There is another possible use of bombing, which few people think about. The possibility of creating a shell-explosive sound source, which, if launched from the RBU, would provide an instant low-frequency “backlight” for the shipboard GAS, is theoretically substantiated. For some ships, such an opportunity would be very valuable.
The evolution of anti-submarine torpedoes
The “pushing” of the bombing from the position of the main anti-submarine weapon began immediately after the Second World War.
The first anti-submarine torpedoes were used aviation Allies in 1943 and had very limited performance characteristics. Given this factor. and the presence of sufficiently effective ASGs that provided target designation for deep bombs and RBUs, the first experiments on the use of anti-submarine torpedoes from ships did not become any mass during the Second World War, however, immediately after its completion, the prospects for new weapons were fully appreciated in all countries and began its intensive development.
The first ship anti-submarine torpedo Mk32 and a dropping device
At the same time, two main problems of their application were immediately identified:
– often complex hydrology of the environment (sound propagation conditions);
– sonar countermeasures (SGPD) of the enemy.
With GPA means (both mine – towed Foxer devices, and the enemy – imitation Bold cartridges), the Allies gained the first, but serious experience during World War II. This was fully appreciated, and during the 50s a series of large-scale exercises took place in the United States with the widespread involvement of anti-submarine ships, submarines, with the massive use of anti-submarine weapons (including torpedoes) and GPA.
It was found that at the existing technical level it was impossible to provide any reliable protection of autonomous torpedoes from SRS, therefore, for the submarine torpedoes it was established that telecontrol was mandatory (that is, the decision was whether the operator took aim or interference), and for ships where it was difficult – the need for a large ammunition of torpedoes (providing the ability to perform a large number of attacks).
An interesting point in the tests of the US Navy of the 50s is that often torpedo firing was carried out “on a direct hit” in the submarine’s hull, apart from “accidental” such hits during combat training.
In the summer of 1959, “Albacore” made the transition to Key West to participate in the tests of an electric torpedo for destroyers. We had to go to sea every morning and be there a target for a torpedo (for 6-7 torpedoes), and returned by night.
When a torpedo captured a target, it attacked – usually in a propeller. When hitting a screw, she bent one of the blades. We had two spare screws mounted on top of the submarine’s hull. We returned from the exercises, moored and divers changed the screw.
The damaged screw was delivered to the workshop where the blade ruled or all three blades were grinded. When we first arrived, all of our screws had a diameter of 15 feet, and when we went home, it was about 12 feet.
The low efficiency and reliability of American torpedoes at the beginning of World War II became the subject of a “big torpedo scandal” in the USA with hard conclusions for the future: large shooting statistics, conditions as close to real as possible, widespread use of countermeasures.
SS-490 with the Mk44 torpedo in the wheelhouse.
It was impossible to influence the second factor – hydrology (vertical distribution of the speed of sound, VSWR). It only remained to accurately measure and take it into account.
As an example of the complexity of this problem, one can cite the calculation of the “illumination” zone (target detection) of a modern torpedo in real conditions of one of the seas adjacent to the Russian Federation: depending on conditions (depth of the torpedo and target submarine), the detection range may differ by more than ten ( !) times.
The torpedo sonar lighting zone of a modern torpedo in difficult hydrological conditions
Moreover, with the competent actions of the submarine in its disguise (in the shadow zone), the response radius of the SSN does not exceed several hundred meters. And this is for one of the best modern torpedoes (!), And the question here is not “technology”, but physics, which is the same for everyone. For anyone, including the newest western torpedo will be the same.
Given the requirements of a large ammunition load of anti-submarine torpedoes, in the west there was a refusal to use 53-cm torpedoes on ships, with an almost complete transition to a small 32-cm caliber. This made it possible to sharply increase the ammunition load of torpedoes on board (more than 20 – frigates, about 40 – cruisers, and this is not counting the ammunition load of anti-submarine missile systems).
Small-sized torpedoes (electric Mk44 and thermal (with a piston power plant using unitary fuel) Mk46), compact and light pneumatic TA Mk32 and ammunition storage facilities (taking into account the unification of ammunition for torpedo tubes and helicopters – in the form of a “universal ship anti-submarine arsenal”) were developed
Mk.32 torpedo launcher on the upgraded Allen Sammner EM and arsenal on the Italian Navy frigate
Transport trolley for small-sized torpedo Mk.46 (a crane is required for our “Package”).
Charging a 324-mm SLT on the Lefthvich destroyer, type Springs, 1986
An example of real combat use of torpedoes is the Falkland War (1982). Detailed data from English ships is still classified, but there are quite detailed descriptions from the Argentine side. From the memoirs of the officer from the submarine “San Luis” of the frigate-lieutenant Alejandro Maegli:
At half-past seven I was about to go to bed, when suddenly the acoustics of the submarine said something that made the words in my tongue stand still: “Lord, I have sonar contact.”
At that moment, he could only suspect what might happen next – twenty-three hours of fear, tension, pursuit and explosions.
On one side, they heard explosions of depth charges and the noise of helicopter propellers. We were approached by three helicopters with lowered sonars and random bombs dropping depth bombs, as soon as the analysis of sounds showed that all the helicopters had flown and started to carry out the attack (ships).
When the goal was 9000 yards, I told the commander, “Sir, data entered.” The commander shouted “Start.” The torpedo carried a wire through which control was carried out, but after a few minutes the operator said that the wire was broken.
The torpedo began to work independently and rise to the surface. The trouble was that it was discovered. Five minutes later, noises from absolutely all English ships and torpedoes disappeared from the acoustics.
It was not difficult for the English helicopters to calculate the location of the San Luis, and they attacked.
The commander ordered the most complete move, and at that very moment the acoustics said “a torpedo burst into the water”, I heard high-frequency sounds made by an approaching English torpedo. The commander ordered to sink and set false goals.
We began to set false goals, large pills that, when entering with water, produced a large number of bubbles and confused the torpedo. We called them Alka Zeltser. After the release of 2 LCs, the acoustics reported that “a torpedo near the stern.” I thought: “We are dead.” Then the acoustics said: “The torpedo goes aft.”
Ten seconds seemed like a year, and the acoustics in his metallic voice said, “The torpedo has crossed over.” Silent joy and a sense of relief swept the boat. An English torpedo passed by and disappeared into the sea. She walked a stone’s throw from us.
The arriving Sea King lowered the antenna and began to search for the boat. He had not yet figured out the exact position, and the San Luis went deeper and deeper. Helicopters dropped torpedoes and bombs nearby, but could not find the boat.
The submarine lay on the sandy bottom. Every twenty minutes, the helicopters changed and dropped their depth charges and torpedoes into the water. And so, replacing each other, they searched for the boat hour after hour.
For the submarine lying at a depth, torpedoes and depth charges were not dangerous, lack of oxygen was dangerous.
The boat could not float under the RPD and carbon dioxide increased. The commander ordered the entire crew to leave the fighting posts, lie down in bunks and connect to regeneration in order to spend as little oxygen as possible.
Soviet experience
Unfortunately, the factor of SRS in the USSR has not been adequately assessed. The situation with our “torpedo science” back in the mid-60s, the head of the Directorate of Antisubmarine Arms (UPV) of the Navy Kostygov aptly characterized as follows:
“There are a lot of registered doctors at the institute, but for some reason there are few good torpedoes.”
The first anti-submarine torpedo was the 53-cm SET-53 torpedo with a passive SSN (based on German times of World War II). Its main drawback was absolutely analogous to German TV (with a similar in design CCH) – low noise immunity (any source of interference in the CCH range led the torpedo away). However, in general, for its time, the torpedo turned out to be successful, was very reliable (within its performance characteristics).
From the memories of the deputy. Head of the Navy Anti-Submarine Arms Directorate R. Gusev:
Kolya Afonin with Slava Zaporozhenko, the dashing gunsmiths, decided in the early sixties to “take a chance” and did not turn off the vertical path near the SET-53 torpedo. It was a naval base in the city of Poti. They fired a torpedo twice, but there was no guidance. Mariners expressed their “fe” to specialists who were preparing a torpedo. It was a shame for the lieutenants, and the next time they did not turn off the vertical path as an act of despair.
As always in such cases, there were no other errors. Thank God, the strike at the stern of the boat was a sliding one. A torpedo surfaced. A boat with a frightened crew surfaced. Such firing was then rare: a torpedo had just been put into service. A special officer showed up to Kolya. Kolya got scared, began to broadcast to him about a strong signal, burnout of the fuse-link and other things at the level of household electrical equipment. It has passed. Mariners no longer complained.
Considering the small response radius of the SSN (and, accordingly, the narrow “search strip” of one torpedo), a volley firing of several torpedoes with their parallel course appeared.
At the same time, the only means of protection against interference (SGPD) was the ability to set the distance to turn on the SSN (ie, “shooting through interference”).
For SET-53, it was significant that the target, evading it by reducing the course, very effectively hit the RBU, and vice versa, when the target submarine avoided the RBU attack in high speed, the efficiency of the torpedoes sharply increased. Those. torpedoes and RBUs on our ships complemented each other effectively.
Small ships received 40 cm torpedoes with active-passive SSN, in the early 60s – SET-40, and in the mid-70s – SET-72. Domestic small-sized torpedoes had a weight three times that of foreign 32 cm, but they allowed to significantly increase the ammunition load on ships that had them (Project 159A – 10 torpedoes against 4 torpedoes 53 cm on a project close to displacement 1124).
The main anti-submarine torpedo of the Navy’s ships was the electric SET-65, adopted in 1965, and “formally” surpassing the American “peer” Mk37 in terms of performance characteristics.
Formally … for the considerable weight and dimensions sharply limited the ammunition of the ships, and the lack of a small-sized torpedo of 32 cm caliber, the negative attitude to the domestic copy of the Mk46 – MPT “Hummingbird”, required “pulling range” (and excluded the mass replacement of 53-cm torpedoes by at least 40 cm).
For example, in the book of Kuzin and Nikolsky “Navy of the USSR 1945-1995.” there is a comparison of the armament of the ships with Asrok and SET-65 in their range (10 and 15 km), on the basis of which a “wild” and absolutely incompetent conclusion is made about the “superiority” of the SET-65. Those. The “scientific doctors” of the 1st Central Research Institute of the Navy were not aware of the concepts of “effective firing range”, “time to hit a target”, “ammunition,” etc. for which Asrok had a clear and significant advantage.
Torpedoes SET-65, left SET-64III (with SSN Sapphire), certificate SET-65K (SSN Keramika – reproduced on the domestic SSN base of the American Mk46 mod.1 (1961))
At the same time, during the combat training of the USSR Navy, the fleets learned to use the capabilities of the available weapons to the maximum. Retired Captain 1st Rank A.E. Soldatenkov recalled:
In the broad concept of anti-submarine defense, torpedo boats with hydrofoils were also taken into account. They themselves had sonar stations, but with a small range of detection of underwater targets, and therefore did not pose a direct threat to submarines.
But there were options. Indeed, on each boat you can carry four anti-submarine torpedoes! Such boats were built by one of the Vladivostok shipyards. The receiving equipment of the group attack system was provided for them. Thus, torpedo boats could, according to data from the IPC group attacks system of pr.1124, launch an attack on a submarine! That is, the IPC could be the leader of a very serious tactical anti-submarine group. Characteristically, when moving on a wing, boats were not reachable for torpedoes from submarines of a potential enemy.
Torpedo shot from the project 206M TKA
But the problem was not in torpedo boats, but in the presence of torpedoes (anti-submarine) for them.
A little-known fact, the bet on electric torpedoes, coupled with significant restrictions on silver (loss in the 60s as a supplier of the PRC, and Chile in 1975) did not provide the necessary ammunition for anti-submarine torpedoes for the Soviet Navy. For this reason, the Navy was forced to “drag out” the obsolete SET-53 into operation and actually “halve” the already small 53cm anti-submarine torpedo ammunition load.
Loading of the torpedo SET-53M on the project 1135 TFR
Formally, the “half ammunition load” of 53-65K and SET-65 was for solving the tasks of military service and “direct tracking” of large surface ships of the US and NATO Navy (“hitting them with 53-65K torpedoes”).
In fact, the real reason was precisely the lack of anti-submarine “electric torpedoes with silver.”
And all the more surprising, the fact that the practice of “half ammunition” is still present on our ships, for example, on the photo of the Admiral Levchenko BPC in combat service in the “southern seas” in the open torpedo tubes are visible two SET-65 and two anti-ship oxygen 53 -65K (which is good to carry today is dangerous).
TA BPK “Admiral Levchenko” with torpedoes SET-65 and 53-65K. Right – 53-65K torpedo shot
As the main torpedo armament of our modern ships, the “Package” complex was developed with an anti-torpedo and a small torpedo with high performance characteristics. Of course, the unique characteristic of the “Package” is the possibility of hitting attacking torpedoes with high probability.
Here it is also necessary to note the high noise immunity of the new small-sized torpedo, both for the conditions of the application environment (for example, shallow depths) and in relation to the enemy’s GPA.
However, there are also problematic issues:
– lack of unification between torpedo and anti-torpedo ammunition (anti-torpedo capabilities can and must be incorporated into a single small-sized torpedo of the complex);
– effective range is much less than the range of weapons of submarines;
– significant restrictions on the possibility of placement on various media;
– the absence of the HHPD as a part of the complex (the anti-torpedo task alone cannot be solved by the PTZ, similarly the GHP cannot be solved by the same way, for a reliable and effective PTZ the complex and combined use of both AT and SGPD is required);
– the use of TPK (instead of the classic torpedo tubes) sharply limits the ammunition load, makes it difficult to reload and obtain the necessary statistics of firing during the combat training of the fleet;
– restrictions on the use at shallow depths of the place (for example, when leaving the base).
Shot of a small-sized torpedo of the package complex
However, the “Package” is in the series. At the same time, the 53 cm caliber (frigates of project 11356, BOD of project 1155, including the modernized Marshal Shaposhnikov) is surprisingly perplexing in our ships. SET-65 looked very “pale” in the ammunition of our ships back in the 80s of the last century, and even today it’s just a museum exhibit (especially considering its “American brains” from 1961). However, the attitude of the fleet to marine underwater weapons today is no secret to anyone.
53-cm torpedo tubes on the project 1155 BOD. We pay attention to their size and the space required for placement. Their reloading at sea is excluded
Particular attention should be paid to the problem of shallow depths.
Most of the project 20380 corvettes with the Package complex are part of the Baltic Fleet and are based in Baltiysk (we will omit the fact that Baltiysk is within the reach of Polish artillery). Given the restrictions on the depth of the place when shooting, before going to great depths, these corvettes will be virtually defenseless and can be shot with impunity by enemy submarines, not being able to use their torpedoes and anti-torpedoes.
The reason is the “big bag”, to reduce which (almost to zero) small parachutes are used on small-sized western torpedoes. We have such a solution is impossible because of the TPK’s gas firing system.
In fact, most of the problems of the complex would be solved by abandoning the SM-588 launcher with TPK and switching to normal 324-mm torpedo tubes with pneumatic launch (see article “Light torpedo tubes. We need these weapons, but we don’t have them.”) But neither the Navy nor industry raises such a question.
Shot of a small-sized torpedo “Stingray” from a ship (parachute to reduce the “starting bag”)
Another interesting solution, especially for shallow depths, can be the use of telecontrol.
For the first time on ships, it was implemented on our IPC Project 1124M (TEST-71M torpedoes – a telecontrolled version of the SET-65 torpedo).
In the West, there was also a limited use of 53-cm torpedoes from TUs from ships.
Frigate “Maestrale” with 2 single-tube TA 53cm for A184 torpedoes (in addition to two 32cm torpedo tubes)
Of great interest is the Swedish PLO complex for shallow depths – the Elma RBU, remote-controlled small-sized torpedoes optimized for shallow depths and special high-frequency HAS with high resolution.
Swedish anti-submarine complex for shallow depths
The small caliber of Elma RBU does not provide reliable destruction of submarines, it is rather a “warning weapon for peacetime”, however, specialized small-sized remote-controlled torpedoes of its own design (concern SAAB) provide defeat, including lying on the ground targets.
Start SAAB Torped 45 with remote control from the ship. At the moment, the production line of the concern has more modern torpedoes.
The most theoretical possibilities of small-sized torpedoes with remote control are reflected in the presentation of the SAAB lightweight torpedo.
In addition to the technical features of the new weapon (albeit somewhat idealized), the video shows some tactical methods of anti-aircraft defense by surface ships.
Anti-submarine missiles and their impact on tactics
In the 50s in the United States began the development of a fundamentally new weapon – ASROC anti-submarine rocket (Anti-Submarine Rocket). It was a heavy rocket, which instead of the warhead had an anti-submarine torpedo and immediately threw it over a long distance. In 1961, this complex with the RUR-5 PLUR was adopted by the U.S. Navy. In addition to the usual torpedo, there was also a variant with a nuclear charge.
RUR-5 ASROC anti-submarine missile launch
The range of its application was in good agreement with the ranges of the new low-frequency sonars (SQS-23, SQS-26), and exceeded the effective range of 53 cm submarine torpedoes of the USSR Navy. Those. under favorable hydrological conditions, launching a torpedo attack, and before reaching the salvo point, our submarine received Asroka with a club in the “face”.
She had chances to evade, but Asrok’s ammunition reached 24 anti-submarine missiles (PLR), respectively, by successive attacks the enemy almost guaranteed shot our submarines (the main torpedoes of which, 53-65K and SAET-60M, were significantly inferior to Asrok’s effective range “).
Photo launcher and its scheme with a recharge system
The first such domestic system was the RPK-1 “Whirlwind” system, which was installed on heavy ships — anti-submarine cruisers of project 1123 and the first aircraft-carrying cruisers of project 1143. Alas, the system did not have a non-nuclear version of equipment — they could not put anti-submarine torpedoes on the missile in the USSR then, those. in non-nuclear conflict RPK-1 could not be applied.
Launcher RPK-1 “Whirlwind”
The “main anti-submarine caliber” of our ships was the Metel missile launcher (in modernized form, the “Bell”), which was put into service in 1973 (BOD of projects 1134A, 1134B, 1155, TFR of project 1135 and at the lead TARKR “Kirov” of project 1144) . The problem of large dimensions and the mass of the torpedo was decided by hanging it under a cruise missile delivery. As a warhead, an electric torpedo was used (first, in the Blizzard, 53 cm AT-2U (PLUR 85r), and in the “Bell” – 40 cm UMGT-1 (PLUR 85ru)).
PLRK “Metel” / “Bell”, on the right – PU KT-100 BPK (mixed ammunition PLUR 85RU and 85R)
Formally, the complex “surpassed all” (in range). In fact, before the appearance of SJSC Polynom, this range not only could not be realized, but moreover, the real detection ranges of the submarine GAS Titan-2, ships of project 1134A (B) and 1135, were often located in the dead zone of the complex (i.e. That is, chasing the range, they got a large dead zone).
For this reason, the TFR project 1135 received the nickname “blind with a club” in the navy, ie. the weapon “seems to be”, and powerful, but it is difficult to use it.
Attempts to resolve this situation – interaction with helicopters and the IPC with the OGAS, were made, but it was a palliative.
Obviously, when creating our submarines, major conceptual errors were made, and primarily from the side of the Navy and its weapons institute (28 research institutes, now part of the 1 Central Research Institute of VK).
An attempt to create a lightweight and compact missile launcher with a small “dead zone” was the Medvedka missile launcher, but once again carried away by the distance they missed the fact that the effectiveness of an unguided missile sharply decreases there. Unfortunately, the necessity of installing an inertial control system on the Medvedka missile launcher reached the developers too late when the question arose of stopping this development.
PLR complex “Medvedka” with IPC “A. Kunakhovich “, the end of the 90s.
From the standpoint of today, this was a mistake, it was quite possible to bring the Medrelka-2 missile defense system (and most likely the Response earlier), but the weakness (suffice it to say that the observer of this development about the existence (!) Of Asrok VLA »Learned only in 2012, that is, they did not show the slightest interest in other people’s experience) scientific support from the 28th research institute (and one central research institute) did not allow this to be done.
The Medvedka was closed, and instead it began the development of another PLRK – a modification of the Response submarine for surface ships.
Launch presumably PLUR “Answer” from the frigate of project 22350
According to recent media reports, as a result of long and hard work, the Response successfully flew, but in the process the possibility of its use from inclined launchers was lost, which left the main new anti-submarine ships of the Navy – Project 20380 corvettes without long-range anti-submarine weapons (with an effective range of application of a commensurate with a range of submarine torpedo weapons).
The impact on the tactics of the GAS PLO with the GPAA and the further evolution of the weapons and tactical techniques of surface PLO ships. The role of ship helicopters
From the late 70s – early 80s, there was a massive entry into the western fleets of flexible extended towed antennas (GPBA). Detection ranges increased sharply, but there were problems not only in classifying the contact (and is this target exactly on the GPAA-PL?) But also in determining the exact position of the target for its attack (up to “what is the target’s remote sensing target”, ie, error in range at the level of tens of kilometers). The problem was the big errors in determining the area of the possible target position (HFCS) of the GPAA (especially at sharp angles to the antenna).
Accordingly, there was a problem of additional examination of these large HCVFs, for which they began to use helicopters. Given the fact that the primary detection of the unit was beyond the GPAA, it made sense to integrate the search and targeting system of the helicopter into ship systems in terms of processing sonar information (as far as communication facilities of that time allowed). Since the task of contact classification was now often solved by helicopter, it became logical to strike at the submarine with it.
Naval helicopters today perform the most important tasks in the fight against submarines
The classic ship of this concept was the frigates Oliver Hazard Perry (more – “Frigate” Perry as a lesson for Russia. Designed by the machine, massive and cheap. “).
The Perry had a towed gas engine and two helicopters, which made it possible to have a very high search performance of one ship. At the same time, the ship did not have anti-submarine missiles in service, but the use of helicopters as a striking means reduced the significance of this fact. In addition, “Perry” could be used as part of the search and strike groups with ships having such missiles.
The scheme had both advantages (a sharp increase in search performance) and disadvantages. The most serious is the sensitivity of the GPBA to extraneous noise, and, accordingly, the need for a separate location of their carriers from detachments of warships and convoys (i.e. a kind of destroyer “Sheffield” as an “DRLO ship”, with the corresponding “potential consequences”).
For surface ships of the Navy of the USSR, which did not have a GPBA, helicopters had another, but also important. The most effective joint action is heterogeneous anti-submarine forces. At the same time, enemy submarines, evading the detection of ships, often “came across” on the intercepting barriers of the RSLA aviation. However, it was very difficult to navigate the ships according to the RSLB data, since when approaching the field of buoys they “illuminated” it with their noises. In this situation, helicopters played a large role in receiving and transmitting contact (or ensuring the use of the Metel air defense missile system).
Today, Western helicopters play a very large role in the search for submarines, especially taking into account equipping them with low-frequency OGAS, capable of “highlighting” both the field of buoys and the GAS (including GPBA) of the ship. The situation became real and probable when the ship operates secretly and has a significant lead in detecting submarines (unfortunately, this is the practice of the US Navy and NATO, helicopters of the Russian Navy do not provide this).
Given the effect of helicopters at a considerable distance from the ship, the question arises of the appropriateness of PLRK. Here you need to very clearly understand the difference between peacetime and wartime conditions: “In baseball, one team does not kill the other” (film “Pentagon Wars”). Yes, in peacetime, you can “calmly and safely” call a helicopter to produce “training attacks” on the detected submarine.
However, in a combat situation, delaying an attack by a submarine is fraught not only with the fact that it can slip away, but also with the fact that it will have time to strike first (anti-ship missiles or torpedoes, which most likely are already approaching the ships). The possibility of delivering an immediate strike on a detected submarine is a decisive advantage of a missile defense system over a helicopter.
Conclusions
The full-fledged anti-submarine weapons complex of modern ships should include modern RBUs (multi-purpose guided launchers), torpedoes and anti-torpedoes, anti-submarine missiles and aircraft (ship’s helicopter).
The presence of any one means (usually torpedoes) dramatically reduces the capabilities of the ship against the submarine, essentially turning it into a target.
As for tactics, the key to success is the close interaction between the ships in the group on the one hand and the ship’s helicopters on the other.
World War II dragged on, and Japan refused to surrender even when threatened with prompt and utter destruction. Germany had given up more than two months before, and the Japanese stood alone in their opposition to the Allies.
An unconditional surrender ultimatum contained in the July 26, 1945, Potsdam Declaration promised prompt and utter destruction, yet it brought no response from the Japanese.
A dense column of smoke rises more than 60,000 feet into the air over the Japanese port of Nagasaki, the result of an atomic bomb. Image: NARA
Japan had, for the most part, lost control of the airspace above the home islands. Tokyo was firebombed into ashes, and many other cities were badly damaged. The sea lanes in and out of Japan were closed, food supplies were nearly exhausted, and there was little industrial capacity left to continue the fight.
American forces had taken Okinawa and were massing on the doorstep of the Empire. Despite this, the Japanese government was prepared to fight on, even if it meant sacrificing most of its population.
The Nagasaki bomb was readied at Tinian. Two additional “Fat Man” bombs were scheduled to be available by August 14, 1945. Image: NARA
While all signs pointed to a massive, bloody invasion of the home islands, the Allies held a card the Japanese warlords did not expect. In 1945, terms like “uranium-enriched” and “plutonium implosion” were not household words anywhere on Earth.
But they soon would be. On July 25, Acting Chief of Staff General Thomas T. Handy sent a letter to U.S.A.A.F. General Carl Spaatz authorizing the first use of the atomic bomb.
From: General Thomas T. Handy
To: General Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Air Forces
The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Nagasaki. To carry military and scientific personnel from the War Department to observe and record the effects of the explosion of the bomb, additional aircraft will accompany the airplane carrying the bomb. The observing planes will stay several miles distant from the point of impact of the bomb.
Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff. Further instructions will be issued concerning targets other than those listed above.
Dissemination of any and all information concerning the use of the weapon against Japan is reserved to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States. No communiqués on the subject or releases of information will be issued by Commanders in the field without specific prior authority. Any news stories will be sent to the War Department for special clearance.
The foregoing directive is issued to you by direction and with the approval of the Secretary of War and of the Chief of Staff, USA. It is desired that you personally deliver one copy of this directive to General MacArthur and one copy to Admiral Nimitz for their information.
Signed
Thos. T. Handy, General G.S.C. Acting Chief of Staff
The two atomic bomb attacks that followed have been the only use of nuclear weapons in mankind’s violent history.
The power unleashed to end the war was the culmination of years of work by many of the greatest scientific minds of the age, and their deadly technological breakthrough was delivered by some of the most highly trained and brave airmen ever to fly.
I searched through a mountain of official U.S. reports and commentary from 1945 to offer The Armory Life readers an accurate overview of the attitudes of the time, and the two fateful missions that changed the course of humanity.
The Jumbo device at Alamogordo. This was designed to contain “Gadget” and prevent the loss of plutonium if the nuclear test explosion failed. Image: NARA
The U.S.A.A.F. magazine “Impact” looked at a wide range of factors in the air assault on Japan, even beyond the atomic bomb missions. The September-October 1945 issue of Impact was appropriately stamped “Final Issue.”
“Trinity” explodes at Alamogordo, July 16, 1945. As with any new weapon, testing was required. Image: NARA
The following testimony tells with stunning emphasis that Japan was utterly finished as a war-making nation before the first atom bomb was dropped. The most interesting and complete statement comes from Prince Higashi-Kuni, speaking before the Japanese Diet on 5 September:
“Following the withdrawal from Guadalcanal, the war situation began to develop not always in our favor. Especially after the loss of the Marianas islands the advance of the Allied forces became progressively rapid while the enemy’s air raids on Japan proper were intensified, causing disastrous damage that mounted daily.”
“Production of military supplies, which had been seriously affected by curtailment of our marine transportation facilities, was dealt a severe blow by this turn of the war situation, and almost insuperable difficulties began to multiply, beginning with the spring of this year.
With the loss of Okinawa and the consequent increase in the striking power of the enemy’s air forces, even communications with the China continent were rendered extremely hazardous.
As regards railway transport, frequent air raids, together with depreciation of rolling stock and equipment, brought about a steady lowering of its capacity and a tendency to lose unified control.
Moreover, various industries suffered directly from air raids which caused huge damage to plants and lowered the efficiency of workmen. Finally, the country’s production dwindled to such a point that any swift restoration of it came to be considered beyond hope.”
On 14 September, Higashi-Kuni further said, “The Japanese people are now completely exhausted.” He estimated that there were 15,000,000 unemployed in the home islands, and called the Superfortress attacks the turning point in the war.
Prior to being loaded into a B-29 for use, the Fat Man bomb is placed on the specialized bomb trolley at Tinian. Image: NARA
Rear Admiral Toshitane Takata, ex-Deputy Chief of Staff of the Japanese Combined Fleet, also saluted the B-29:
“Superfortresses were the greatest single factor in forcing Japan’s surrender. These planes burned out Japan’s principal cities, reduced military production by fully 50 percent and affected the general livelihood of the Japanese people.”
On March 9, 1945, more than 280 B-29 bombers struck Tokyo in a low-level night firebomb raid dubbed Operation Meetinghouse.
The attack caught the Japanese by surprise, and the napalm incendiaries fueled the deadliest air raid of the war, with more than 100,000 people killed and nearly 16 square miles of Tokyo burned out.
The raid was a terrible blow to Tokyo’s labor force and cottage industry, and even more devastating to Japanese morale. One of Tokyo’s district fire marshals, when interviewed by an IMPACT editor, stated: “After the first big incendiary attack I realized that our system of fire prevention was utterly helpless in stemming attacks of such magnitude.”
The U.S.A.A.F.’s Strategic Bombing Survey determined that B-29s caused 330,000 fatalities and 806,000 injuries, and while the B-29 raids were crushing Japan’s industry and burning out her cities, Nippon’s militarists would still not relent.
Duality of Bombing Concepts
The 1996 U.S.A.F. publication “Piercing the Fog: Intelligence and Army Air Forces Operations in World War II” described the difficulty in balancing the B-29’s conventional bombings and the awesome potential of the atomic bomb:
Sometime between the first and sixth of June 1945, President Truman and Secretary Stimson reaffirmed the intent to use the atomic weapons on Japanese targets, based mostly on the view of Stimson and a number of others that the weapon was necessary to avoid American casualties that would be sustained in the invasion of Japan.
Stimson was, by this time, amid a conflicting duality of thinking. On the one hand, he had lectured Arnold on the problems associated with urban-area attacks, and he did not want the United States to gain, as he said, the “reputation of outdoing Hitler in atrocities.”
On the other hand, he was concerned that the airmen might bomb Japan so well that “there would be no good background on which to use the weapon,” thus losing the opportunity of convincing the Japanese that further resistance was futile.
The Deadly Decision
I must admit, this portion of the research was difficult for me. Selecting a city to be destroyed must have been terrifying, soul-crushing work for thinking, feeling men tasked with serving their country in the direst circumstances.
In preparing the atomic bomb for use, the right targets had to be selected. If the bomb was used at the wrong place, at the wrong time, its awesome impact would be compromised, and the war would go on.
Even so, the target selection process seems quite clinical, theoretical, and scientific, with adjustments made on brutal human calculations. Yet, regardless of the emotions, then or now, the work had to be done.
A photographic portrait of J. Robert Oppenheimer, the theoretical physicist credited as the father of the atomic bomb. Image: NARA
This excerpt from the 1945 “Report from the Manhattan Engineer District” describes the target selection process:
The work on the selection of targets for the atomic bomb was begun in the spring of 1945. This was done in close cooperation with the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, and his Headquarters.
Several experts in various fields assisted in the study. These included mathematicians, theoretical physicists, experts on the blast effects of bombs, weather consultants, and various other specialists. Some of the important considerations were:
A. The range of the aircraft which would carry the bomb.
B. The desirability of visual bombing in order to ensure the most effective use of the bomb.
C. Probable weather conditions in the target areas.
D. Importance of having one primary and two secondary targets for each mission, so that if weather conditions prohibited bombing the target there would be at least two alternates.
E. Selection of targets to produce the greatest military effect on the Japanese people and thereby most effectively shorten the war.
F. The morale effect upon the enemy.
These led in turn to the following:
A. Since the atomic bomb was expected to produce its greatest amount of damage by primary blast effect, and next greatest by fires, the targets should contain a large percentage of closely built frame buildings and other construction that would be most susceptible to damage by blast and fire.
B. The maximum blast effect of the bomb was calculated to extend over an area of approximately 1 mile in radius; therefore, the selected targets should contain a densely built-up area of at least this size.
C. The selected targets should have a high military strategic value.
D. The first target should be relatively untouched by previous bombing, in order that the effect of a single atomic bomb could be determined.
Shown is some of the devastating damage caused by the atomic bomb at Hiroshima, Japan. Image: NARA
The weather records showed that for five years there had never been two successive good visual bombing days over Tokyo, indicating what might be expected over other targets in the home islands.
The worst month of the year for visual bombing was believed to be June, after which the weather should improve slightly during July and August and then become worse again during September.
Since good bombing conditions would occur rarely, the most intense plans and preparations were necessary to secure accurate weather forecasts and to arrange for full utilization of whatever good weather might occur. It was also very desirable to start the raids before September.
The Stage Was Set for the World to Change
The U.S.A.F. publication “Air Intel and the A-bomb” describes the specific cities targeted, along with the subterfuge used to disguise the selection process:
“To begin the target selection process, Major General Lauris Norstad (Chief of Staff of the 20th Air Force) sent a memorandum to General Samford at the JTG requesting specific data, phrasing his request to conceal both the bomb’s existence and the planning process then underway.
Norstad’s memo gave a plausible reason for the inquiry, telling Samford to have his people assess several targets suitable for a 12,000-pound British Tallboy high-explosive bomb to be detonated at an altitude of 200 feet.
In general terms, Norstad said that he wanted Samford’s people to select reasonably large urban areas, at least three miles in diameter, having high strategic value on the Japanese main islands between Nagasaki and Tokyo.
Norstad added to his request a list of possible sites, including Tokyo Bay, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Nagoya, Kokura, Sasebo, Yokohama, Kobe, Yawata, Shimonoseki, Yamaguchi, Kawasaki, Fukuoka, and Orabe.
The JTG was to eliminate cities previously destroyed by bombardment from consideration. Notably absent from Norstad’s request was the need for any information on defenses.
Japanese aerial defenses were not one of the committee’s primary concerns, and those considerations it left almost entirely to LeMay and the operational mission planners in the Pacific.
There was, throughout the selection process from the earliest date of the target committee’s meetings, the desire to strike a city yet undamaged.
The reasons were twofold: to destroy a major military-related area in a single attempt that dealt the Japanese Army a heavy blow and then to give the Manhattan District’s engineers and physicists the chance to use the damage to compute the effects of the bomb’s detonation with more precision than previously possible. What the committee sought as much as a wartime target was a laboratory setting for an operational bombing raid of unprecedented proportions.
Once the target material had been collected by the JTG, three members of the committee, acting under cover of Norstad’s Tallboy request, visited the A-2’s offices to review the data and prepare a final list.
Kyoto, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Niigata, and Kokura emerged as the best candidates. Kyoto gained the most prominence because of its size, its industry, its location as a center of transportation, and the fact that many government and industrial leaders had evacuated there from other damaged cities.
Kyoto was also attractive because of its topography. Lying in a bowl formed by mountains, the committee believed that the bomb’s energy would be better focused there than anywhere else. Hiroshima (est. pop. 350,000) was an “Army” city, the committee believed, as well as a major port.
From the target information, the men concluded that the city contained large quartermaster supply depots, had considerable industry, and was the location of several small shipyards. Nagasaki (est. pop. 210,000) was the major shipping and industrial center of Kyushu.
Kokura (est. pop. 178,000) had one of the largest Army arsenals and ordnance works and the largest railway shops on Kyushu, with large munitions storage areas to the south. Niigata (est. pop. 150,000) was an important industrial city, making machine tools, diesel engines, and heavy equipment; it was also a key port for shipping to and from the mainland.”
A Silverplate Group
As the Manhattan Project closed in on producing an atomic bomb, the U.S.A.A.F. already had a long-range strategic bomber to deliver it: The Boeing B-29 Superfortress.
To prepare for the ultra-secretive mission, a special, self-sufficient B-29 group was created, the 509th Composite Group. Activated on December 17, 1944, at Wendover Field in Utah, the 509th was equipped with C-47 and C-54 transport aircraft, as well as special “Silverplate” B-29 bombers, uniquely modified to carry atomic bombs.
The Boeing B-29 Superfortress gave the U.S.A.A.F. the ability to deliver the atomic bomb from long range. Image: Dutch National Archives
The 509th was commanded by 29-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Paul W. Tibbets Jr., most recently a B-29 test pilot. Tibbets was tasked with taking the 509th Group to a level of performance well beyond normal U.S.A.A.F. expectations.
Bombing accuracy was of paramount importance. Radar operators and flight engineers were trained to rigid standards. Meanwhile, the pilots practiced nearly 180-degree turns after dropping dummy bombs, an aggressive new maneuver for Superfortress pilots.
Because the Silverplate B-29’s were stripped down for higher performance, the 509th Superfortresses defensive armament was limited to their twin .50 caliber tail guns.
To maintain operational secrecy, the group had its own Troop Carrier Squadron, Ordnance section, and Technical Service Detachment. Arriving on Tinian in June 1945, the 509th had about 50 military and civilian personnel of “Project Alberta” (a section of the Manhattan Project) attached to the group.
Bockscar and a replica Fat Man bomb at the U.S.A.F. Museum in Dayton, Ohio. Image: U.S.A.F. Museum
Throughout July and early August, the thirteen Silverplate B-29s of the “393rd Bombardment Squadron” flew an intense series of A-bomb mission rehearsals, including 37 sorties with conventional “pumpkin bomb” replicas of the “Fat Man” ordnance, and four sorties with “Little Boy” replicas.
The missions were flown by three-plane groups at 30,000 feet — to stay above effective Japanese anti-aircraft fire and to convince the Home Defense squadrons that the small formations were not worth intercepting. Only one B-29 took minor damage during these test raids. Bombing accuracy was good, with 27 drops made visually and 10 made by radar.
Enola Gay returns to Tinian after the Hiroshima mission. Six planes of the 509th Composite Group participated in this mission. Image: NARA
After the Japanese government ignored the Allies’ July 26 call for unconditional surrender, the U.S. government moved quickly to deliver the atomic bomb.
In compliance with the Quebec Agreement, America obtained the consent of the United Kingdom for the bombings, and General Thomas T. Handy, the acting chief of staff of the U.S. Army, ordered that atomic bombs be dropped on Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, and Nagasaki.
The Manhattan Engineer District report described the attacks:
Hiroshima, August 6, 1945: “A withering blast…”
Hiroshima was the primary target of the first atomic bomb mission. The mission went smoothly in every respect. The weather was good, and the crew and equipment functioned perfectly. In every detail, the attack was carried out exactly as planned, and the bomb performed exactly as expected.
The bomb exploded over Hiroshima at 8:15 on the morning of August 6, about an hour previously, the Japanese early warning radar net had detected the approach of some American aircraft headed for the southern part of Japan. The alert had been given and radio broadcasting stopped in many cities, among them Hiroshima.
The planes approached the coast at a very high altitude. At nearly 8:00 A.M., the radar operator in Hiroshima determined that the number of planes coming in was very small — probably not more than three — and the air raid alert was lifted.
The normal radio broadcast warning was given to the people that it might be advisable to go to shelter if B-29’s were sighted, but no raid was expected beyond some sort of reconnaissance.
At 8:15 A.M., the bomb exploded with a blinding flash in the sky, and a great rush of air and a loud rumble of noise extended for many miles around the city; the first blast was soon followed by the sounds of falling buildings and of growing fires, and a great cloud of dust and smoke began to cast a pall of dark ness over the city.
At 8:16 A.M., the Tokyo control operator of the Japanese Broadcasting Corporation noticed that the Hiroshima station had gone off the air. He tried to use another telephone line to reestablish his program, but it too had failed.
About twenty minutes later the Tokyo railroad telegraph center realized that the main line telegraph had stopped working just north of Hiroshima. From some small railway stops within ten miles of the city there came unofficial and confused reports of a terrible explosion in Hiroshima.
All these reports were transmitted to the Headquarters of the Japanese General Staff. Military headquarters repeatedly tried to call the Army Control Station in Hiroshima.
The complete silence from that city puzzled the men at Headquarters; they knew that no large enemy raid could have occurred, and they knew that no sizeable store of explosives was in Hiroshima at that time.
A young officer of the Japanese General Staff was instructed to fly immediately to Hiroshima, to land, survey the damage, and return to Tokyo with reliable information for the staff. It was generally felt at Headquarters that nothing serious had taken place, that it was all a terrible rumor starting from a few sparks of truth.
The staff officer went to the airport and took off for the southwest. After flying for about three hours, while still nearly 100 miles from Hiroshima, he and his pilot saw a great cloud of smoke from the bomb. In the bright afternoon, the remains of Hiroshima were burning. Their plane soon reached the city, around which they circled in disbelief.
A great scar on the land, still burning, and covered by a heavy cloud of smoke, was all that was left of a great city. They landed south of the city, and the staff officer immediately began to organize relief measures, after reporting to Tokyo.
Tokyo’s first knowledge of what had really caused the disaster came from the White House public announcement in Washington sixteen hours after Hiroshima had been hit by the atomic bomb.
Nagasaki, August 9, 1945: “Only for the last few seconds was the target clear…”
Nagasaki had never been subjected to large scale bombing prior to the explosion of the atomic bomb there. On August 1st, 1945, however, several high explosive bombs were dropped on the city.
A few of these bombs hit the shipyards and dock areas in the southwest portion of the city. Several of the bombs hit the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works and six bombs landed at the Nagasaki Medical School and Hospital, with three direct hits on buildings there.
While the damage from these few bombs was relatively small, it created considerable concern in Nagasaki and some people, principally school children, were evacuated to rural areas for safety, thus reducing the population in the city at the time of the atomic attack.
On the morning of August 9th, 1945, at about 7:50 A.M., Japanese time, an air raid alert was sounded in Nagasaki, but the “All clear” signal was given at 8:30. When only two B-29 Superfortresses were sighted at 10:53 the Japanese apparently assumed that the planes were only on reconnaissance, and no further alarm was given.
A few moments later, at 11:00 o’clock, the observation B-29 dropped instruments attached to three parachutes and at 11:02 the other plane released the atomic bomb. The bomb exploded high over the industrial valley of Nagasaki, almost midway between the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works, in the south, and the Mitsubishi-Urakami Ordnance Works (Torpedo Works), in the north, the two principal targets of the city.
Despite its extreme Importance, the first bombing mission on Hiroshima had been almost routine. The second mission was not so uneventful. Again, the crew was specially trained and selected; but bad weather introduced some momentous complications. These complications are best described in the brief account of the mission’s weaponeer, Commander (now Captain), F. L. Ashworth, U.S.N., who was in technical command of the bomb and was charged with the responsibility of insuring that the bomb was successfully dropped at the proper time and on the designated target.
His narrative runs as follows: “The night of our take-off was one of tropical rain squalls, and flashes of lightning stabbed into the darkness with disconcerting regularity. The weather forecast told us of storms all the way from the Marianas to the Empire. Our rendezvous was to be off the southeast coast of Kyushu, some 1500 miles away. There we were to join with our two companion-observation B-29’s that took off a few minutes behind us. Skillful piloting and expert navigation brought us to the rendezvous without incident.
“About five minutes after our arrival, we were joined by the first of our B-29s. The second, however, failed to arrive, having apparently been thrown off its course by storms during the night.
We waited 30 minutes and then proceeded without the second plane toward the target area. “During the approach to the target the special instruments installed in the plane told us that the bomb was ready to function.
We were prepared to drop the second atomic bomb on Japan. But fate was against us, for the target was completely obscured by smoke and haze. Three times we attempted bombing runs, but without success. Then with anti-aircraft fire bursting around us and several enemy fighters coming up after us, we headed for our secondary target, Nagasaki.”
“The bomb burst with a blinding flash and a huge column of black smoke swirled up toward us. Out of this column of smoke there boiled a great swirling mushroom of gray smoke, luminous with red, flashing flame, that reached 10,000 feet in less than 8 minutes.
Below through the clouds we could see the pall of black smoke that was ringed with fire and covering what had been the industrial area of Nagasaki. By this time our fuel supply was dangerously low, so after one quick circle of Nagasaki, we headed direct for Okinawa for an emergency landing and refueling.”
A Surprisingly Slow Ending
The death toll at Hiroshima was staggering. The city was destroyed, and estimates projected up to 160,000 deaths, most of them civilians. And still Japan did not surrender. The Nagasaki blast killed up to 80,000, again mostly civilians.
Even so, some members of the Japanese Cabinet wanted to fight on. Mercifully, the Emperor gave his “sacred decision” on August 10th that Japan would accept the Allies’ surrender terms on one condition — that the surrender “does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign ruler.”
Hirohito would remain on the throne until January 1989, but World War II would finally end at that moment. Japan formally signed the instrument of surrender on September 2, 1945.
Bockscar carried the second atomic bomb to Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. Image: Author’s collection
America’s leaders were amazed and horrified at the power they had unleashed. Despite this, there were plans for additional atomic attacks on Japan. Another “Fat Man” (plutonium) atomic bomb was prepared for use on August 19th, with three more of this bomb type being made available by September. President Truman pumped the brakes on an atomic rain of ruin.
When it was determined that another strike could be readied on or about August 18th, General Marshall made it clear to all involved: “It is not to be released over Japan without express authority from the President.” The war itself was finally over, and the atomic bomb attacks played a decisive role.
