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All About Guns This great Nation & Its People War

The Guns of the American Revolution Contrary to popular perception, the American Revolution wasn’t all muskets, bayonets and Mel Gibson running around with a tomahawk. by Evan Brune, Executive Editor

Guns of the American Revolution Illustration
Illustration by Don Troiani

I have a love-hate relationship with Mel Gibson’s film, “The Patriot.” On the one hand, it’s a highly entertaining movie about a topic virtually untouched by Hollywood. On the other, the movie is so replete with historical inaccuracies that one viewing is enough to send even the moderately educated history enthusiast into violent, mouth-frothing convulsions.

But, the simple fact is that “The Patriot” is likely representative of the general view of the American Revolution. Though Americans live, work and play in a nation that directly resulted from the events of 1776 and beyond, 250 years removed, the actual details of who fought, how they fought and the guns with which they armed themselves are generally lost to all but a few die-hard historians. For most Americans, their view of the fighting in North America is largely an abstraction, even a caricature of real events.

American militiamen

American militiamen, from the beginning of the Revolution, were armed with a hodge-podge of firearms. Illustrations courtesy Don Troiani

Like the ideals that underpinned the revolution, the fighting between the British army and the nascent American military was the result of an ongoing evolution. But beyond the ideas about liberty and self- determination, this was an evolution in the kinds of arms being employed on the battlefield, as well as the tactics that governed their use. As we recognize and celebrate the men who fought and died to build this country, it’s important to understand exactly how they fought and the arms they used as they forged a new nation.

The Old World: By Musket and Push of Bayonet
One of the most memorable scenes in “The Patriot” shows Benjamin Martin, the lead character played by Mel Gibson, staring out the window of a plantation house and observing a set-piece battle between the British and Continental armies in an adjoining field. Predictably, the automaton-like mass of British infantry marches in perfect lockstep toward the poor bastards in blue. Finally, they halt at a suicidally close distance and, after absorbing hilariously ineffective scattered fire from the amateurish Americans, proceed to unleash volleys and clumsy bayonet charges to sweep away the upstart colonials. Martin states the obvious: “Going muzzle-to-muzzle with Redcoats in an open field. It’s madness.”

Yeah, it didn’t really happen like that, and if it did, it would be madness. While it is true that linear tactics generally governed 18th-century warfare, the reality of what many engagements looked like is a lot different than you might imagine, and it certainly didn’t look like the scene in “The Patriot.” Recent research indicates that combat in the 18th century occurred at much longer ranges than “muzzle-to-muzzle.” During the Seven Years War, combat usually occurred between 100 to 200 yards, with many firefights breaking out at longer distances, particularly when inexperienced troops were involved. Historian Alex Burns notes that, to military men of the age, the phrase “within musket shot” was generally understood to be a distance of about 300 yards.

Battle of Long Island in 1776

During the Battle of Long Island in 1776, Capt. Samuel Smith led his Maryland riflemen away from disaster as the British overwhelmed American troops.

The typical military firearm used in these conflicts was a smoothbore, flintlock musket with a barrel length roughly 3.5 feet long and a bore size ranging from .69 to .80 caliber. Muzzles were exposed and outfitted with a lug to mount a long, tapered, triangular bayonet that remained a singularly important tool on the 18th-century battlefield, particularly for the British army. Paper-wrapped cartridges containing powder and ball were issued to soldiers, usually with a single round ball of significantly smaller diameter than the bore to accommodate for the variance in bore sizes, as well as the buildup of black-powder fouling that would inevitably arise from repeated firing. This is a phenomenon known to black-powder shooters as “windage,” defined as the space between the outside of the musket ball and the interior of a musket bore. The greater the windage, the more inaccurate the musket shot.

In terms of the practical accuracy of such arms, one could not reasonably expect to hit a man-sized target at distances of more than 80 to 100 yards with any certainty. Given this, you might wonder how 18th-century armies expected their soldiers to hit anyone if they ordered their troops to open fire at distances far greater than the practical accuracy of their military longarms. The answer is that, until the mid-18th century, individual marksmanship in a military context was generally considered superfluous. In a modern analogy, the infantry regiment of the 18th century functioned, essentially, as a large, single-shot shotgun. A musket ball fired by one soldier toward a host of other troops was likely to find its mark somewhere, even if that mark wasn’t the aim of the soldier who fired the ball.

For these sorts of tactics, a certain style of military longarm began to emerge, first standardized in the 1720s. For the British army, this was the King’s Land Pattern musket, more commonly known as the Brown Bess. The earliest of these guns were behemoths, with bore sizes approaching .80 caliber, 46-inch barrels and thick stocks that made them the Mack trucks of 18th-century muskets. But, by the time of the revolution, a new pattern of British military longarm emerged to serve a new kind of infantryman.

The Short Land Pattern musket, sometimes referred to as the Pattern 1769, was equipped with a shortened 42-inch, .75-caliber barrel compared with the longer, heavier service muskets that had existed for decades, known henceforth as the Long Land Pattern. These guns were handier while still having enough length to fire in ranks.

The shortened length made them useful for a new class of light infantry, a development of British military doctrine directly influenced by its experience in North American warfare. Instead of fighting and firing in rigid ranks, light infantrymen were more mobile, flexible and expected to operate on their own initiative.

Men in light infantry units were chosen specifically for their intelligence and their resourcefulness, and they would fight singly, using cover and concealment while taking carefully aimed shots and maximizing the limited capabilities of their smoothbore infantry muskets.

It is these men that American militiamen would encounter on the fields outside Boston as the cold war between Britain and her colonies turned hot in April of 1775, and they would continue to encounter flexible, enterprising infantrymen as the conflict in North America churned into full-scale war.

Arming for the American Cause
While Great Britain standardized its arms in the 1720s, across the English Channel, the French army was similarly situated in the early part of the 18th century and embarked on a similar movement of standardization designed to improve its military readiness. Early patterns of muskets emerged in 1717 and 1728, but, by the end of the Seven Years War, a new design materialized that would become a de facto standard not just for the French military, but also for the nascent American nation.

For the French, it was the fusil d’infanterie modele 1763, later updated in 1766 and now known to collectors as the Model 1763/66. But for American troops who would later be equipped with thousands of such arms, it became simply the “Charleville” musket, so named for the Charleville-Mézières armory in the Ardennes, where many were produced. By 1777, France would begin sending tens of thousands of older-pattern Charleville muskets from its stores to equip the fledgling Continental Army, and by war’s end, the Charleville musket would become the standard longarm for the American military.

unique firearms, ranging from smoothbore flintlock fowlers

The American Revolution saw the use of a number of unique firearms, ranging from smoothbore flintlock fowlers (1) to the quintessential American longrifle (2). Continental troops would eventually be equipped with Charleville muskets (3), while select British and Hessian troops experimented with designs like the Ferguson breechloader (4), the Pattern 1776 (5) and the German Jäger (6).

But, at the beginning of the conflict, American armament was far from standard. Much of what equipped the militia and the first Continental troops were the disparate civilian smoothbores of the day. One such arm commonly found in New England and the coastal mid-Atlantic colonies was the fowler, a smoothbore, flintlock longarm typified by what was often an extraordinarily long barrel, in some cases exceeding 50 inches, with a bore size ranging from .62 to .80 caliber, or in shotgunning parlance, from about 20 gauge to 10 gauge.

Named for its primary application as a hunting arm, the larger bore size accommodated birdshot, as well as larger buckshot, buck-and-ball and solitary musket ball loads. Its larger bore size and smoothbore construction also meant these guns were capable of accepting the paper cartridges often employed with infantry muskets. A lack of rifling meant fowlers could be loaded with the same rapidity as a military musket, making them suitable for militia use.

private of the 5th Foot

This private of the 5th Foot illustrates the movement and initiative expected of the British light infantry, who fought individually.

However, as versatile as the American fowler was, it wasn’t without drawbacks. Logistically, the need to keep thousands of men supplied with ammunition was greatly complicated by the fact that these guns often had differently sized bores and locks, requiring different sized musket balls, paper cartridges and flints.

The need for a somewhat standardized longarm for a prolonged conflict gave rise to a new class of arm that we still struggle to understand: the “Committee of Safety” musket.

In the run-up to the American Revolution, Committees of Safety directed the stockpiling of arms, ammunition and accessories that would become necessary in the event of a shooting war. These groups often directed local gunsmiths to produce military-style longarms, patterned after then-issued British military muskets, that could be used to equip militia units. This was easier said than done.

Many civilian leaders in the American colonies still earnestly hoped that a peaceful resolution could be reached with Great Britain. In this tenuous period, those who produced masses of arms for the ultimate purpose of equipping rebels in a future conflict were, in effect, committing active treason. Given that fact, such activities were so clandestine that little evidence survives detailing who produced such guns and in what quantities.

Today, few verifiable Committee of Safety muskets survive with any sort of rock-solid provenance. However, many longarms exist with the kinds of features that suggest they could have been produced in such circumstances and remain a testament not only to the resolve of American colonists determined to forge their own destinies, but also to the capabilities of domestic gunsmiths across the colonies, thousands of whom would play a role in building and servicing small arms throughout the course of the American Revolution.

Hessian troops

At the outset of the American Revolution, King George III called for 30,000 Hessian troops, and several thousand were equipped with accurate, handy Jäger carbines. Illustrations courtesy Don Troiani

Rifles of the Revolution
Often imbued with downright mythological capabilities, the vaunted American longrifle had several notable features born of the needs of settlers and frontiersmen who lived and worked for long periods away from any supply source. Its distinctive long barrel served two purposes: It provided enough room to maximize the slow burn of black powder, allowing riflemen to make the most of a meager charge of what was likely lower-quality powder, and it offered a lengthened sight radius for longer, more precise shots. Instead of the .60- to .70-caliber bore sizes often seen on the German Jägers that inspired their creation, American rifles generally had bores of .50 caliber or smaller. This allowed riflemen to carry more ammunition for the same given weight. A smaller projectile also required less powder, further maximizing their powder supply.

Despite these advantages, longrifles had one significant drawback compared to smoothbore guns of the era: reloading time. To ensure an accurate, precise shot, longrifles had to be slowly and methodically loaded with a tightly patched ball that would be pressed into the rifling as it traveled down the bore. Consequently, rates of fire for longrifles averaged about one shot per minute, compared with the three shots a minute for a contemporary military musket loaded with paper cartridges. For a frontiersman taking a solitary shot on game, reloading time was not a significant consideration. On the 18th-century battlefield, this drawback would have serious ramifications.

Gen. Israel Putnam

Gen. Israel Putnam led a company of Maryland riflemen into battle at Harlem Heights in 1776, including the famous “Maryland 400” clad in purple hunting shirts.

The American longrifle design was largely derived from the German Jäger rifle, which also appeared in the American Revolution. Barrel rifling as a practice likely emerged in what is now modern Germany in the early 16th century, and by the mid-to-late 17th century, a style of short hunting rifle had materialized that was closely associated with those who employed them, so much so that the German word for “hunter” has been inextricably linked with this particular pattern of longarm.

King George III called for 30,000 Hessian mercenaries to quell the American rebellion, and several thousand of those troops were elite marksmen who employed the Jägerbüchse to great effect. In the disastrous August 1776 battles fought on Long Island, rifle-equipped Hessians swept away American troops from several positions, illustrating the impact that well-aimed fire could have on the battlefield.

In the same year that German Jäger units illustrated their prowess outside New York City, the British military, fearful that longrifle-wielding Americans might have an outsized impact on the course of the conflict, began issuing its first-ever military rifle: the Pattern 1776.

Patrick Ferguson’s company

Patrick Ferguson’s company of riflemen employed their novel breechloaders for only a short time.

Ultimately, 1,000 Pattern 1776 rifles, 200 of which were Hanoverian designs produced in Germany, were taken into British service during the American Revolution. Of .62 caliber and having a 28-inch swamped barrel, the Pattern 1776 was an incredibly handy firearm for the era, weighing a relatively svelte 8.5 pounds compared with the 10-pound infantry musket employed by most troops. One of only two rifles in British military history designed for simultaneous use by both infantry and mounted units, the rifle employed a captured ramrod that was affixed to the gun by two opposing swivels, ensuring that cavalrymen couldn’t lose their ramrod when reloading on horseback.

Concurrently, British Army Maj. Patrick Ferguson successfully lobbied for the British military to employ his novel rifle design on a trial basis, following a successful demonstration for senior officers on April 27, 1776, during which he fired “five good shots into a target in the space of a minute.” His rapid, accurate fire was aided by the fact that Ferguson’s rifle did not require muzzleloading.

Instead, the trigger guard formed a handle for a large, vertically oriented screw that served as the breech of the gun, and it could be opened and closed with a single revolution of the trigger guard. When opened, a rifleman simply inserted a projectile and the requisite amount of powder, then turned the breech closed, primed and fired. It offered the rapid fire of a musket with the accuracy of a rifle and was a truly revolutionary design for the British military, albeit inspired by advancements from earlier gunmakers.

Pattern 1776 rifle

The 4th division of Ferguson’s American Volunteers operated in pairs, one firing a Pattern 1776 rifle and the other using a Brown Bess musket.

Ferguson was given command of a company of riflemen, each equipped with his breechloading rifle, and they set sail for America in March 1777. By June, they were engaged in battle, acting as scouts and skirmishers for Gen. Wilhelm von Knyphausen during the fight for Philadelphia. At the Battle of Brandywine in September 1777, Ferguson was badly wounded in the arm and required a year to recover. During this time, his experimental company was disbanded, with the men returning to their original units.

Ferguson himself returned to combat in 1778, but was soon killed in South Carolina at the Battle of King’s Mountain, ironically by longrifle-wielding Americans. Any hopes of resurrecting a British rifle corps during the American Revolution expired with him. Of the 100 Ferguson rifles that came to North America, only two survive today. But Ferguson’s rifle, along with the Pattern 1776 and the employment of German Jägers, provided a proof of concept that would inspire a new generation of riflemen and military leaders.

While the outcome of the American Revolution was governed more by politics than it was by American feats of arms, the battlefields of North America from 1775 to 1783 nonetheless served as a proving ground for several new styles of military longarms. Over the coming decades, these lessons would coalesce into greater concepts, resulting in the development and employment of rifles on a wider basis. For the field of military small arms, as well as the future of human liberty, the rebellion in the New World was a revolution in more ways than one.

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The ‘Band of Brothers’ That Wasn’t Though the 52 men inducted with Company I in 1940 rendered excellent service, their “band of brothers” did not endure much past their first months in combat.

Top Photo: American soldiers execute SS camp guards who have been lined up against a wall during the liberation of the Dachau concentration camp. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration, College Park

Commemorations of victory celebrations in World War II, including V-E Day on May 8 and V-J Day on August 15, usually begin with the public jubilation that erupted in the cities of the victors, but they quickly turn to reflections on the tremendous sacrifices the effort required to defeat the Axis powers.

In the popular memory of the war, a misperception has emerged—in part due to the extraordinary efforts of esteemed scholars such as Stephen Ambrose to effectively capture the experiences of the war—of soldiers training together, enduring the crucible of combat together, then returning home with the same group of “buddies” to resume their lives and, in later years, reminisce about their experiences.

While this may have been true for some units, most famously the Company E, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, of the US Army’s 101st Airborne Division, or US Marine units in the Pacific, it was not the case for most ground combat units in the war. Men who mobilized in existing National Guard units, for instance, were often scattered to the wind as experienced or overage men transferred out and new “selectees” transferred in.

And the sustained combat typical of the European theater often inflicted severe casualties on units, especially those in the Mediterranean who battled for years without relief, to the point that units would be “flushed out” with new personnel several times over.

As Alex Kershaw has argued, “celebrated units such as the 101st Airborne” dominated both headlines and the popular memory of the war with their victories in Normandy and the Bulge, but “the disasters and bloody attrition of Italy and the Vosges did not square with the more reassuring narrative of inevitable victory.”1

This was the case for Company I of the 157th Infantry, in the famed 45th Infantry “Thunderbird” Division. Originally a National Guard unit from Burlington, a small farming community on the plains of eastern Colorado, Company I mobilized at roughly half strength, lost many of its original members to transfers to other branches, including airborne units and the US Army Air Corps, and then endured almost two years of continuous combat, from initial commitment in the invasion of Sicily in 1943 to being the first company-sized unit to reach the horrific concentration camp at Dachau in April 1945.

When the company came ashore in Sicily in July 1943, most of the platoon sergeants were still original members of the company, but by February 1944, after the unit’s virtual destruction repelling a German counterattack against the beachhead at Anzio, the company had to be rebuilt almost from scratch. In January 1945, during the German Nordwind offensive in Alsace, the company was again cut off and destroyed near Reipertswiller, with only two men in the entire 3rd Battalion surviving the battle, necessitating another rebuild.

Few of the men who entered Dachau in April had been with the company for more than three months, and only a handful of the men who mobilized with the company in 1940 were still in uniform when the war ended. It is a testament to the Army’s WWII-era training and replacement policies that the unit survived the war and continued to perform as effectively as it did, but any narrative of the company would suffer from a lack of primary group cohesion within the original cohort, making for a less interesting, albeit more accurate, story.

Roots in Burlington, Colorado

In the mid-1930s, the high plains were in the midst of a global economic depression that left many farm boys eager to supplement their earnings by any available means. The National Guard company in Burlington attracted men from both the town and the surrounding communities in eastern Colorado and western Kansas.

Once a month, they gathered at the “new” armory, built in 1924, to practice close order drill, attend classes on weapons familiarization, and conduct training on a variety of topics. On August 31, 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt mobilized four National Guard divisions, including the 45th, into federal service for 12 months.2

The division, comprised of units from Oklahoma, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona, spent a year training, gaining valuable experience for the existing members, and providing an organizational framework for men mobilized under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.

On September 16, the men reported to their local armories where they received equipment, much of it of World War I vintage, completed administrative tasks, and suffered through medical examinations, which included immunizations updates.3

In Burlington, Company I inducted 52 men into federal service. The normal strength of an infantry company was 187 men, so even if all 52 men remained, the Guardsmen would have comprised only 28 percent of a full-strength company.

Provisions were already in place for men below the rank of captain with dependents to resign, and for the discharge of all men under 18, which further depleted this number.4  As the division moved by rail—first to Fort Sill, near Lawton, Oklahoma, then, in February 1941, to Camp Barkeley, outside of Abilene, Texas—more men left the company, either because they were overage (initially defined as over 28) or through transfer to other branches, with the Army Air Corps among the more popular.

Men who earned promotion to noncommissioned officer rank, but for whom there were no vacancies in Company I, found themselves reassigned to other companies in the division. Men selected for Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia, usually reported to other units after graduation.5

During 1941, the unit remained near half strength but participated in the grueling Louisiana Maneuvers, where it generally gave a good account of itself.6  By the end of December 1941, only 22 of the original 52 inductees remained in the company, and they now comprised less than 25 percent of the unit.

However, 14 of the 18 noncommissioned officers in the company were from the initial group, including several who had advanced from the rank of private, preserving the ties to the prewar unit and strengthening unit cohesion.

The division then transferred to Fort Devens, Massachusetts, and conducted amphibious training at Camp Edwards on Cape Cod while receiving an infusion of new men, mostly from the eastern seaboard.7 The shift to Fort Devens marked the beginning of a period of rapid transfers for the 45th that included moves to Pine Camp (now Fort Drum), New York, in November 1942; Camp Pickett, Virginia, in January 1943; and finally Camp Patrick Henry, near Norfolk, in May.

At these stops, the division trained in both amphibious and mountain warfare.8  On June 10, 1943, the 45th embarked for the Mediterranean theater and a final period of workups in North Africa in preparation for Operation Husky, the amphibious invasion of Sicily. By the end of June, only 10 of 52 original members remained, and they now comprised less than 5 percent of the full-strength unit. Still, seven of 22 noncommissioned officers were prewar men.

Destruction in Italy

On July 10, the company landed on Sicily and soon suffered its first casualties. On July 14, near Licodia, Corporal William Hogate was the first original member of the company to be killed in action. Hogate had transferred to the 82nd Airborne Division during training, but now fate placed his unit and the 45th in the same sector on Sicily.

The units were so close that William’s brother George, still in Company I, was able to participate in the retrieval of his body.9 On August 14, the front page of the Burlington Call announced his death, and today, the Veterans of Foreign Wars post in Burlington is named for William Hogate.10

From Sicily, the company moved to the mainland, backstopping the landings at Salerno and fighting its way inland towards the German winter line. On September 13, near Salerno, Germans captured Lieutenant Gene Senti, an original member of the company, and held him for 27 days before he was able to escape.

Senti’s National Guard experience was undoubtedly a factor in his career—he joined Company I when he was only 15.11 Two other original members were not as lucky as Senti. On November 12, near Venafro, a single German shell killed Sergeant George Kenefake and wounded Sergeant Wilbur Youtsey, both original members of the company.

After recovering from his wounds, Youtsey returned to his unit, only to be killed in the breakout from Anzio on May 30, 1944. The Burlington Call eulogized both men on the front page.12

Defending the Anzio beachhead resulted in the first destruction of Company I but also proved to be its finest moment. On February 15, 1944, German forces launched a counterattack designed to split the Allied-controlled area in two and drive the attackers into the sea.

The Germans aimed their counterattack at one of the few significant landmarks on the almost featureless beachhead—a bridge over an intersecting road and railway that became known to veterans as simply “The Overpass.”

On the night of February 16, division headquarters ordered Company I to defend this vital feature. For five days, the defenders endured ceaseless barrages and numerous combined infantry and armored force assaults with minimal resupply but held their ground.

For his efforts, First Sergeant Willard Cody, who mobilized with Company I as a private in 1940 and later led a platoon in Germany as a First Lieutenant, received one of two Legion of Merit awards presented to men from Company I, and the survivors earned the highest unit honor, the Distinguished Unit Citation.

On October 5, the Burlington Record reproduced the full text of the citation under a large headline in for the proud folks back home.13  The citation read, in part:

Despite heavy enemy fire and constant enemy-pressure, exposure to inclement weather, and, at times, insufficient water, rations and ammunition, the officers and men of Company I held their positions to eliminate a threat to the solidarity of the beachhead.

After the battle, Company I needed over 150 replacements to bring it back up to its full strength of 187 men.14

Units on either flank of Company I also had a rough time. In Company E, only two men of an original strength of over 100 survived the battle uninjured. One was Technical Sergeant Leon Siehr, an original member of the company.

After becoming separated from his unit, Siehr fought on for several days alongside a British unit sent to relieve the 157th before returning to his unit in a bivouac area.15  Siehr’s good fortune ran out several months later when he too died during the breakout from the beachhead on May 28, the fourth original member of Company I to lose his life in combat.

Siehr’s obituary listed him as one of only six of the original men remaining with the company at the time, two of whom were still in Italy, two others who had been evacuated to the States, and Siehr and Youtsey, who had been killed.16

If the information is accurate, after almost one year of combat, the few remaining original members of the company would have all been either transferred, wounded, or killed in combat, severing the ties between the unit and its roots. In the last surviving company roster, for December 1943, only nine of the original 52 members were still with Company I.17

Sgt. Leon M. Siehr’s Grave at Fairview Cemetery.

Liberation of Dachau

The numbers of original men in Company I continued to decline, especially after Germans surrounded and virtually annihilated the unit in a counterattack near the Alsatian village of Reipertswiller in January 1945.

In the entire battalion, only two soldiers, both from Company I, returned safely to American lines.18  Again the entire company had to be rebuilt from replacements and transfers from other units.

Only a handful of the original members who had been home on furlough rejoined the 45th for its final drive into Germany. In late April, as German resistance collapsed, division headquarters assigned the 3rd Battalion of the 157th Infantry to a sector containing the concentration camp at Dachau.

Initially, Companies K and L took the lead, but when they encountered resistance in the village of Dachau, Company I moved to the front and entered the camp. The sights and smells encountered there made a lasting impression on the men and contributed to a brief breakdown of discipline, when soldiers opened fire on a group of captured SS guards.

The men killed at least 17 before officers could restore order.19  When the war in Europe finally ended the following week, the 45th Division prepared for movement to the Pacific but was still in France when news of the Japanese surrender arrived. Instead of going to fight the Japanese, the Thunderbirds were instead finally headed home.

Upon reaching Boston, the men received furloughs while the headquarters reported to Camp Bowie, Texas. When the War Department officially inactivated the unit at Camp Bowie on December 3, 1945, the regimental adjutant, Lieutenant Joe Meis, an original member of Company I from Burlington, delivered the final inactivation papers.

Lt. Gen. Alexander M. Patch, C.G., 7th Army, inspecting 1st Platoon, Co I, (157) Infantry. September 28, 1944. Behind Gen. Patch is Lt. Van T. Barfoot, holder of the Congressional Medal of Honor, and Maj. Gen. William W. Eagles, C.G., 45th Division.” 45th Division Command Post. Photo by Katz, 163rd Signal Photo Company. National Archives. 45thdivision.org

 

The experiences of the original members of Company I demonstrate that a stable corps of personnel was a rarity in most Army infantry units during World War II. Promotion, transfers, and especially attrition wore units down, and new men arrived and had to be quickly integrated before the next operation.

These new levies formed their own bonds and effectively battled the Nazis to the final liberation of Europe, but the prewar bonds established in peacetime and early mobilization training did not endure, at least not in Company I.

Though the 52 men inducted with Company I in 1940 rendered excellent service, their “band of brothers” did not endure much past their first months in combat. Today, the largest gathering of Company I veterans is in Fairview Cemetery, outside of Burlington, where 12 of the original members are buried.

Over the course of the war, 90 percent of the men who went overseas with the 45th Division were killed, wounded, or captured, and the division received replacements that numbered seven times its initial strength.20  It was this steady flow of trained volunteers and selectees who filled the empty places and sustained the unit, enabling it to help achieve the final victory in Europe.

Alex Kershaw, The Liberator: One World War II Soldier’s 500-Day Odyssey from the Beaches of Sicily to the Gates of Dachau. (New York: Crown, 2012), 329.

Leo V. Bishop, Frank J. Glasgow and George A. Fisher, editors, The Fighting Forty-Fifth: The Combat Report of an Infantry Division. (Baton Rouge, LA: Army and Navy Publishing Co., 1946), 6.

Denver Post, Sep. 16, 1940, pp. 1, 6.

Denver Post, Sep. 16, 1940, 6.

Emajean Buechner, Sparks: The Combat Diary of a Battalion Commander (Rifle) WWII. (Metairie, LA: Thunderbird Press, 1991) 59.

Flint Whitlock, The Rock of Anzio from Sicily to Dachau: A History of the U.S. 45th Infantry Division. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998) 24.

Buechner, Sparks, 61; Whitlock, The Rock of Anzio, 26.

Buechner, Sparks, 60.

Robert Franklin, Medic!: How I Fought World War II with Morphine, Sulfa and Iodine Swabs, (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 2006) 56. “Doc” Franklin was a medic assigned to I Company just before the invasion of Sicily. His memoir is the definitive history of Company I’s time in combat.

The Burlington Call, Aug. 19, 1943; https://www.facebook.com/people/VFW-Post-6491/100083366145272/ accessed on Apr. 17, 2025.

The Burlington Call, Nov. 4, 1943

The Burlington Record, Jun. 22, 1944.

The 157th Infantry Regiment, History of the 157th Infantry Regiment (Rifle): 4 June ’43 – 8 May’45 (Baton Rouge: Army and Navy Publishing Company, 1946) 182-3; The Burlington Record, Oct. 5, 1944.

Franklin, Medic!, 101.

Bishop, et al., The Fighting Forty-Fifth, 77. The other man was the company commander, Capt. Felix Sparks, the subject of Kershaw’s The Liberator.

The Burlington Record, Jun. 29, 1944.

Pay Roll of Company I, 157th Infantry for Month of December, 1943. National Personnel Records Center. Records from 1944 and 45 were destroyed in a fire at the NPRC on 12 July 1973.

Buechner, Sparks, 108; “The 157th Infantry Regiment,” 135-6.

Kershaw, The Liberator, 288.

Kershaw, The Liberator, 329.

Suggested Readings:

Contributor

Chris Rein, PhD

Dr. Chris Rein is the senior historian at Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces Europe/Air Forces Africa at Ramstein Air Base, Germany.

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‘We Fight, Get Beat, Rise, and Fight Again’: The Story of How Americans Won Our Freedom by David Stewart

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Throughout our history, Americans have repeatedly beaten long odds, inspiring generations by accomplishing the impossible.

American military history in particular offers countless examples of men standing firm against overwhelming enemies, triumphing when all logic tells us they should fail. We as a nation have largely forgotten too many of our heroes—most of us know nothing of Nicholas Biddle, Dan Daly, Littleton Waller, or Philip Kulbes, among many others.

These great men deserve to be remembered, and foremost among them stands Major-General Nathanael Greene, a little-remembered leader of the American Revolution.

Greene, always outnumbered and continually out of supply, spent a year fighting General Cornwallis and lost every battle. But every American loss, carefully planned and managed, drained the British of irreplaceable men and materiel—a strategy Greene summarized as “We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again”—and ultimately forced Cornwallis to retreat to Yorktown.

By the summer of 1780, the Americans faced a very bleak military situation. The British held New York, Savannah, and Charleston. Major-General Sir Henry Clinton had just invaded South Carolina, quickly capturing Georgetown, Cheraw, Camden, Ninety-Six, and Augusta, and defeating the Continentals at Waxhaws. And in the three years since Saratoga, the American army had not defeated British Regulars in any major battles.

In mid-August 1780, Major-General Charles Cornwallis sealed British dominance in the South with his crushing victory at the Battle of Camden. In this battle, 1,500 British Regulars and 600 Loyalist militia defeated a 4,000 man Continental army commanded by Major-General Horatio Gates, the hero of Saratoga.

The Americans lost at least 240 killed, another 700 seriously wounded, hundreds of deserters, and lost a further thousand as prisoners, as well losing all their artillery, wagons, baggage, and horses. Washington relieved Gates of command, appointing Major-General Nathanael Greene to command the remnants of the American army in the Southern theater.

Engraving of a scene from the Battle of Camden, during the Revolutionary War, inAugust 1780. From a painting by Alonzo Chappel. (PhotoQuest/Getty Images)

Washington had reinforcements marching to join Greene and the latter, recognizing he could not supply the few men he had, much less a larger body, made a bold move—he dispatched one-third of his army, commanded by Brigadier-General Daniel Morgan, to the southwest while Greene led the rest of the army to the southeast.
Most of his contemporaries, both British and American, saw this decision as a major blunder—conventional military thinking warns never to divide your forces in the face of a numerically superior enemy.

Greene made this decision in part to relieve his own supply crisis. Though supplies might be on the way, it would be weeks before relief would arrive in meaningful volume, and the Americans had already exhausted all the locally available resources—they had to move on.

By separating his force and keeping them in motion, Greene believed his two smaller forces might find enough food to sustain them day-by-day because they’d be making much smaller demands on the areas through which they marched.

Painting of Nathanael Greene (August 7, 1742 – June 19, 1786) by Charles Willson Peale. (Bildagentur-online/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)

But Greene chose to divide his army not simply to alleviate his own supply problems, but to exacerbate supply problems for Cornwallis. By dividing his command into two very small forces, Greene believed each could move far more quickly than the larger British army, and thus both of his small groups could stay ahead of any pursuing British force.

If Cornwallis over-confidently divided his own army to chase both American forces, Greene would have the two elements of his army draw the British units ever further apart, extending Cornwallis’ supply lines through the hostile Carolina backcountry, where Patriot militias could continually harass British supply convoys, and Greene’s own forces would clear the area of all local supplies.

If Cornwallis moved his entire force after either element of Greene’s divided army, the pursued wing would simply out-run the British while the other wing would devastate the long British supply lines.

Greene’s plan worked to perfection. On December 21, 1780, Morgan left Greene’s army at Charlotte, moving 6,000 men to the southwest. Two weeks later, on January 2, 1781, Cornwallis divided his command, dispatching Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton to pursue Morgan while he shadowed Greene.

Over the next two weeks, Morgan repeatedly withdrew, always keeping rivers between his men and the pursuing British and drawing Tarleton ever further from Cornwallis. On January 17, Morgan decided to engage the British at Hannah’s Cowpens and destroyed Tarleton’s command.

An engraving depicting American military officer William Washington and British military officer Banastre Tarleton engaged in a sword fight, both on horseback, on the Green River Road during the Battle of Cowpens, in the American Revolutionary War, at Cowpens, South Carolina, January 17, 1781. (Kean Collection/Archive Photos/Getty Images)

An engraving depicting the Battle of Cowpens on January 17, 1781, during the American Revolutionary War. (Prisma/UIG/Getty Images)

Cornwallis turned what remained of his command west, racing to catch and destroy Morgan before Greene could intervene. The British burned their own wagons to speed their movement, but to no avail. Greene and Morgan re-united and withdrew into North Carolina, drawing Cornwallis ever further from his base of supplies.

When Cornwallis followed the Americans into North Carolina, Greene once again divided his force, sending Colonel Otho Williams to harass the British, who now suffered from ever-increasing logistical problems. On February 22, facing critical supply problems, Cornwallis abandoned his pursuit and began again marching south towards British-controlled territories.

Greene responded by also marching south, drawing close enough to tempt Cornwallis into battle. On March 15, 1781, Cornwallis rose to the challenge, attacking the Americans at Guilford Courthouse.

The British won a tactical victory, but lost men and supplies they could not replace. For the next few weeks, Greene shadowed Cornwallis’ army at a safe distance, threatening the fragile British supply lines.

He lost more than a dozen battles as he drew the British out of the Carolinas, but weakened his enemies with every encounter, a strategy Greene summarized when we wrote, “We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again.”

By late April 1781, Cornwallis led his army out of the Carolinas on an urgent march north towards Yorktown, where he hoped finally to re-supply his battered army. And, as I suspect you know, Washington and de la Fayette trapped Cornwallis at Yorktown, where his lack of supplies finally compelled Cornwallis to surrender his army.

“Surrender of Lord Cornwallis” painting by John Trumbull depicting the surrender of the British army Cornwallis’ command at Yorktown, Virginia, on October 19, 1781, to the American and French forces under the command of George Washington.

American armies actually lost most of the major engagements of the Revolutionary War—Bunker Hill, Quebec, Brooklyn, Kip’s Bay, White Plains, Germantown, Brandywine, Savannah, Charleston, and more.

But men like Nathanael Greene illustrate why the Americans ultimately succeeded, despite repeated failures. He recognized his central weakness—he commanded a small army constantly struggling to supply itself—and turned that weakness into a decisive strength.

Greene’s dogged resilience typified the men who won the Revolution, in the process forging the new nation.

David Stewart currently serves as a Faculty Fellow at the Center for Military History and Strategy at Hillsdale College, where he has taught since 1993. He received his Ph.D. from Ohio State and has published on a variety of topics relating to eighteenth-century military history.