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The Rifleman In The Atomic Age

In this day of giant tanks, supersonic airplanes, devastating atomic explosions, does the Army value the man with a rifle?
by AMERICAN RIFLEMAN STAFF

This article appeared originally in the March 1952 issue of American Rifleman

The other evening I heard General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, say on the radio that atomic weapons for the U.S. Infantry would be ready ‘in the not too distant future.’ A few days earlier in Texas he had told a reporter that these newfangled weapons for the battlefield would be available ‘very soon.’ Gen. Collins

If what General Collins has said is true, what is to happen to the doughboy who lugs his M-1 Garand into battle?

I had first asked the question several years earlier at the Fort Benning, Georgia, Infantry School, at an orientation conference for reporters held by the Defense Department.

All during that day at Fort Benning our ears and eyes had been filled with the thunder and flash of mock battle, of rumbling tanks, of big mortars that made the earth shake, of ear-splitting artillery, of flamethrowers searing ‘enemy’ pill boxes.

In that smoke and dust, the rifleman seemed to have shrunk to an insignificant figure walking behind the thunder with his Garand. Where was the foot-soldier with his rifle?

Sitting in a big classroom later that day, with the Infantry School’s top brass in front of us, we reporters were supposed to ask questions about the day’s demonstrations of infantry weapons and tactics we had witnessed. I asked officers at the Infantry School the following questions:

What good is the rifle in modern warfare?

How many of the enemy does the rifle really kill?

Would it not be cheaper and just as effective to hand our men a lightweight machine gun that makes lots of noise and gives them a psychological lift?

What is the use of wasting money on expensive rifles and ammunition when the stuff is just sprayed around anyway and does not do much harm to the enemy?

I did not get satisfactory answers to these questions. It was apparent that little attention was being paid to the role of the rifle; the emphasis was on noisier weapons.

Upon my return to Washington, still seeking the answers to those questions, I started on a personal hunt in the Pentagon. No one in Army G-3 (Operations) seemed to care to analyze what the rifleman does in combat, what part he plays and whether he is still needed in the Infantry.

I searched through Army publications for articles about the rifle and the rifleman but found little to answer the question: What about the rifleman in the atomic age?

I was beginning to realize that I was looking for the forgotten man in the Army. I decided to see the Army’s top infantryman, General Collins himself.

General Collins is all soldier—erect in bearing; pressed, polished, and neat; remote and businesslike. He likes to get down to business at hand and get it over with in the time allotted on his daily calendar. he is cautious and restrained in his talk.

I started off by telling him of my bewilderment in this talk of fantastic weapons, atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, guided missiles. I told him that I had read of the clamor for atomic bombs to replace infantrymen, of atomic bombs for the battlefield, of atomic bombs that make wars cheaper. I mentioned the air-power theorists who suggest that future wars can be won without men and their rifles.

“Are the rifleman really foredoomed as a military force?” I asked General Collins.

Grinning broadly at my gloomy forecast, General Collins leaned back in his leather chair thoughtfully.

“I don’t foresee the period where there will be no riflemen,” he said slowly. “It is possible that the need for riflemen may be reduced by new weapons in the dim distant future, but I feel strongly that we will always need men armed with shoulder weapons.”

“It was amply demonstrated in Korea that the basic tools of the infantry—the rifle, machine gun, and mortar—will continue to be necessary for warfare in the foreseeable future,” General Collins said. “You have to have rifleman as an integral part of the armed forces. You can’t stop an enemy by air alone. You can’t replace the rifleman by atomic weapons.”

General Collins conceded that new weapons like guided missiles or atomic bombs may be needed, particularly at the outset of war, to offset the ‘relative inferiority’ in forces in being. He said the chances are that we would be outnumbered in the beginning and we would use any weapon to overcome the enemy’s advantage in troop strength.

But, he emphasized, these new weapons, useful though they may be, cannot do away with the rifle or with the man on the ground. He noted that the history of warfare demonstrates this fact, despite innovations over the centuries. He observed that even an old-fashioned weapon like the bayonet, which appeared headed for a museum, made a dramatic comeback in hand-to-hand fighting in Korea.

General Collins stressed the importance of the rifleman in holding ground and taking ground from the enemy. He said Korea presents a graphic illustration of this classical axiom of warfare. He cited the vital role of the rifleman by recalling that more and more men are involved in warfare over the centuries, despite the development of new weapons and the technology of war. He said there may not be more troops at the front lines than in the past, but the complicated weapons have added more men in the rear to supply the men at the front.

The General broke in here with a little story. He recalled that when he visited the Korean battlefronts in July 1950, he talked with Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, missing commander of the hard-hit 24th Infantry Division, near Taegu. General Dean’s last words to him were, “I need more rifleman.” About a week later, Dean vanished in the fierce fighting at Taejon and just recently turned up as a prisoner of the Chinese communists.General Dean

By coincidence, the man who followed General Dean as commander of the 24th Infantry Division in Korea was leathery Maj. Gen. John H. Church, now commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning. As would be expected of a combat veteran of three wars, General Church is not ready to write off the infantryman or the rifle in favor of atomic weapons.General Church

I had talked with General Church in the Pentagon and I had written him in my search for answers to the questions that had been troubling me. In his first comprehensive policy statement as the new commandant of the Infantry School, General Church emphasized the point that the rifle is not a ‘has-been’ in warfare.

General Church noted that the infantry is a balanced team consisting not only of the rifleman but of mutually supporting elements with tanks, machine guns, mortars, recoilless rifles, as well as supply, signal, engineer, ordnance, medical and other units.

He said that of the 18,804 men in each infantry division, slightly more than 7,000 are armed with rifles. Of these, only 1,944 are rifleman in rifle squads. He emphasized that this ratio of riflemen to the whole division is often used erroneously to support arguments seeking to detract from the importance of the rifleman.

“The incontrovertible fact remains that the rifleman is the heart and soul of the infantry team, and, in fact, of the combined ground arms team,” he said. “All of the other elements have but one mission—to support and assist the rifleman to move forward and seize and hold his assigned objective.

“The very weight of this support serves to emphasize the basic fundamental remains that it is the rifleman who, in the final analysis, carries the fight to the enemy and clinches the decision…None of this in any way minimizes the importance of the rifleman. Those who support him behind the lines and on the battlefield itself help to soften up the enemy, but it still remains for him to deliver the knockout blow.

“Remember, too, that in the fluid type of warfare being fought today there is no fixed front line,” General Church cautioned. “Infiltrating attacks in the rear areas require that cooks, supply and administrative personnel, and command post personnel take precautions for their own security, and they are frequently forced to fight as riflemen for their own defense. Infantrymen who make up the gun screws for mortars and machine guns and recoilless rifles defend themselves and their gun positions as riflemen if an attacking enemy reaches them.”

After all the kudos to the rifleman as the ‘heart and soul’ of the infantry, the question still remains: Is accurately aimed rifle fire and marksmanship training still important in warfare? Perhaps, it might be suggested, the rifleman can be just as effective by shooting helter-skelter with a ‘burp’ gun. Why bother with rifle marksmanship?

Both Generals Church and Collins, who have seen war closeup, are not ready to surrender the traditional American concept of rifle marksmanship.

“It cannot be denied,” said General Church, “that there are those who advocate a de-emphasis on training in rifle marksmanship. It is our unequivocal conviction that such thinking is wrong. The Infantry School, which is responsible for the formulation of Infantry doctrine throughout our Army, has not reduced the time or the emphasis given to this type of training.”

General Collins stressed in his talk with me that he has always been concerned with the waste of ammunition in warfare and in the tremendous cost of moving ammunition supplies to the front. He believes in frugality of ammunition use, of making ammunition count.

That’s why General Collins is adamant in his opposition to what he considers is the European tendency toward automatic weapons to replace the rifle. General Collins said that he favors switching, when conditions permit, to a lightweight version of the Garand rifle, with certain improvements, but his is solidly against suggestions that the Garand be made ‘solely’ a fully automatic rifle.

“My personal view,” General Collins told me, “is that we need a lightweight rifle that can be used for semiautomatic fire or, when required, full automatic fire. I am personally quite skeptical about making all weapons fully automatic. Automatic shoulder weapons waste too much ammunition. Of course, we need a Browning automatic rifle with each squad, but to arm every man with a fully automatic rifle would be foolhardy.

“From my experience in combat and from years as a weapons instructor, I would say that you can get more hits with a semiautomatic rifle than with a full automatic. I am confident that the automatic wastes ammunition. And it’s difficult enough to get ammunition to the front without wasting it.”

General Collins conceded that there is a special need for the ‘burp’ gun but he stressed that every soldier should not be armed with one. He said ‘there’s not use spraying the woods’ when aimed, accurate fire at a clump of bushes concealing the enemy would do the trick.

He said that the soldiers he has talked with in combat areas want the M-1 Garand rifle. They must have more striking power, not less, he said. They would lose hitting capability with an automatic rifle, he added.

The adoption of a rifle that can be fired fully automatically appears to contradict General Collins’ attitude favoring the more accurate fire of the semiautomatic Garand. If the semiautomatic rifle has greater hitting effectiveness and saves ammunition, the question arises, why have it turned into an automatic? It’s obvious that troops with a rifle that can be fired semiautomatically or fully automatically will have a great tendency to switch the selector to full automatic—turning it into a ‘burp’ gun, the very thing General Collins deplores.

From my personal observation in the Pentagon, I have decided that General Collins still objects to an automatic rifle for the foot solider but has been influenced to keep the door open for such a development in the future. It should be evident that if the Army turns to a shoulder weapon which can be fired automatically, accurate marksmanship will have to yield to the natural tendency with such weapons for helter-skelter spraying and a high waste of ammunition.

I also talked with General Collins about the values of civilian marksmanship and the part that could be played by civilian rifle clubs in supplying the Army with ready-trained marksmen. He replied that the Army likes to get well-trained rifle marksmen. He said youths coming from rifle clubs who already know how to shoot accurately could be used more readily as coaches in the Army training system.

“What I am afraid of is that people may get the idea that rifle clubs could be a substitute for universal military training,” General Collins commented when it was suggested that the rifle clubs in the United States could be tied into a system of marksmanship training for youths before they go into the Army, or for reservists on inactive status.

“What we need most is a system of universal military training,” General Collins declared. “When young men pass into UMT, that’s where we will teach them to shoot. We can do that in a relatively short time. The whole method of instruction in marksmanship has been worked out to perfection over a period of years. We can teach marksmanship effectively through UMT.”

General Collins make it clear that rifle marksmanship is merely one of many courses of instruction that the UMT trainee must learn and that marksmanship cannot be emphasized at the sacrifice of other vital training.

“Very frankly,” he said, “we are not going to spent too much money on this one aspect of training. We must weight our expenses carefully. We can’t spend as much as we have in the past.”

General Collins said he favored continuance of the civilian marksmanship program, and that the Army, to a limited extent, help finance this program. He conceded that early training in rifle marksmanship would help youths preparing for the Army. He emphasized, however, that the Army feels it can take a youth who has never fired a rifle before and train him quickly to become an effective rifleman.

He indicated that pre-introductory training in a civilian rifle club for youths entering the Army would not materially reduce the basic training course of the Army, or result in any appreciable saving of money.

General Collins said the Army has little need for rifle specialists ‘who can hit a gnat’s eye’ although he favored competitive shooting both in and out of the Army. Competitions, he said, create a healthy and widespread interest in rifle marksmanship, and frequently produce statistical and technical information of value to the services.

It was clear to me from what General Collins said, and from what he implied, that the Army continues its traditional jealousy of other agencies that might help it get its job done. The Army attitude appears to be that civilian marksmanship training is sort of a luxury which, although worthwhile, cannot do the Army’s job of training soldiers to shoot and handle firearms. But if it is true that the Army still needs rifles and riflemen, it seems to me as a military reporter and plain citizen that the Army should welcome every bit of help it can get.

And there may be some real money in the economy in training young men in civilian rifle clubs—thus saving time and money when they get into the Army. General Collins rejected this idea, saying that the saving would not be ‘appreciable.’ There is some question whether the Army is not taking a partisan view on this point.

In this atomic age, it is evident that the Army will need its riflemen, and perhaps because this is the atomic age the nation will need its civilian riflemen more than ever.

—Lloyd Norman

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.45 ACP History: ‘The Lord’s Caliber’ & John Browning’s Legacy by Paul Peterson

Few firearms have captured a nation’s spirit quite like John Moses Browning’s vaunted M1911. Rugged, reliable, cleverly engineered, and utterly lethal, this homegrown handgun is as American as baseball and blue jeans.

Yet, what would the legendary 1911 be without the potent and equally loved .45 ACP cartridge that Browning designed to go with it?

Even though it’s dubbed “the Lord’s caliber” thanks to its widespread popularity – and dare I say, righteous stopping power – I feel we’ve come to take the .45 ACP a bit for granted these days. Here’s a closer look at the story behind a pistol cartridge that helped define American small arms for over a century.

Table of Contents

.45 ACP History
Basic Ballistics & Specs
Pros & Cons 
Final Thoughts

.45 ACP History

Historic 1911 Pictures
The Browning-designed Colt M1911 and its later variants stand as America’s longest-serving military pistol. (Photos: Library of Congress)

Developed in 1904, the story behind the .45 Automatic Colt Pistol (commonly .45 Auto and .45 ACP) is tied directly to America’s rise to prominence on the world stage. While the genius of the cartridge came squarely from the mind of Browning, it was actually the U.S. Army that determined the need for a .45-caliber bullet.

This owed much to two factors. First, America’s cavalry at the turn of the 19th century was on the hunt for something to replace the aging Colt Single Action Army revolvers chambered for the rimmed .45 Long Colt.

Browning Pistol Patent
The original John M. Browning design for what became the Colt M1911 included a 15-page patent application with 38 points of claim and three sheets of drawings. (Image: U.S. Patent Number 984,519)
.45 ACP Ammo
The .45 Long Colt on the left is taller and has an exposed rim at its base. This was fine for revolvers but problematic in semi-auto pistol actions. Hence, the shorter, rimless .45 ACP on the right. (Photo: Paul Peterson/Guns.com)

Meanwhile, a pressing second factor emerged from battlefield experiences during the Philippine-American War (1899-1902) and the Moro Rebellion (1902-1913) in the Philippines. American troops reported poor performance from their smaller .38-caliber revolvers during the campaign.

Frontline reports rolled in, describing harrowing hand-to-hand encounters with enemy fighters who simply shrugged off multiple hits from the U.S. Army’s rimmed .38 Long Colt, which was only recently adopted in 1892. This kicked off a hunt for something new and more powerful.

Ammunition of various calibers
The .45 Long Colt is on the far left. The .45 ACP is the fat and short one two spots over. On the scale of common handgun calibers going all the way down to .22 LR on the far right, the thick .45s stand out. (Photo: Paul Peterson/Guns.com)

From the extensive Thompson-La Garde ballistic report in 1904, the army concluded its findings with the following determination: “After mature deliberation, the Board finds that a bullet which will have the shock effect and stopping power at short ranges necessary for a military pistol or revolver should have a caliber not less than 0.45.”

So, the stage was set, and the U.S. Army wanted a .45 caliber projectile similar to the .45 Long Colt already in use with the cavalry. It did not, however, want to return to a slow single-action-only revolver after its intense close-combat experiences in the Philippines.

LA GARDE STUDY
The caliber issue spawned a vibrant academic and practical debate across the U.S. military that pushed medical tech and know-how for the time. Col. Louis A. La Garde continued to publish works on terminal ballistics even beyond the adoption of the .45 ACP and into his retirement. Testing included live-tissue experiments on cattle and even well-seasoned oak. Similarly, early skiagram (X-ray) technology provided insightful glimpses into internal gunshot trauma. (Gunshot Injuries: How They Are Inflicted, Their Complications, and Treatment – 1916)
Gunshot Study Pics
Beyond the battlefield, reports of handgun calibers failing in the field included the case of Antonio Caspi, who survived multiple shots from .38 Colts while attempting a prison escape in 1905. (Gunshot Injuries: How They Are Inflicted, Their Complications, and Treatment – 1916)

At the time, Browning and Colt were already working on a .41-caliber prototype cartridge to go with a new semi-automatic pistol design from Browning. They responded to the new request for a .45-caliber cartridge by essentially redeveloping Browning’s handgun design and .41-caliber cartridge. This led to the Colt 1905, which was the first handgun chambered for the new .45 ACP.

Retro Colt 1911 Ads
Colt tapped deep into the 1911’s battlefield prowess for its ads. (Vintage Colt Advertisements)

Later U.S. Army trials led to the adoption of both Browning’s .45 ACP cartridge and 1911 pistol. Thus, one of the world’s most iconic caliber-gun duos of all time was born. The M1911 chambered for .45 ACP went on to become America’s longest-serving military handgun.

Its military record from 1911 until the mid-1980s made it a household name. But its performance on and off the battlefield made it a legend.

 Basic Ballistics & Specs

 

.45 ACP Ammo
First and foremost, the U.S. military wanted something that could pack a powerful punch at close ranges when it asked for a .45-caliber projectile. Tellingly, the British had already come to a similar conclusion several years earlier with the standardization of the .455 Webley in 1887. (Photo: Paul Peterson/Guns.com)

Like the British .455 Webley, the .45 ACP was a straight-wall design that leaned heavily on the sheer mass of the bullet over velocity to do much of the downrange damage. Unlike the rimmed Webley casing and Browning’s earlier semi-rimmed .32 ACP, the new .45 ACP was a truly rimless cartridge.

Both the straight wall and rimless profile were meant to help the .45 ACP function specifically inside semi-auto firearms that fed from magazines instead of cylinders. At first, the Colt 1905 was tested with 200-grain bullets, but this was increased to 230 grains for what became the standard .45 ACP.

Before we dig into muzzle velocities and other data points, it’s worth highlighting that the U.S. military was very, very interested in terminal performance over simply specs. To that end, the Thompson-La Garde Tests from 1904 took a rather gruesome turn with testing on live animals.

9mm and .45 ACP
The 115-grain 9mm Luger on the left is half the weight of the 230-grain .45 ACP on the right. (Photo: Paul Peterson/Guns.com)
Bullets
The .45 ACP on the left gets its effectiveness from its large 230-grain mass. The lighter 124-grain 9mm on the right relies more on its velocity. (Photo: Paul Peterson/Guns.com)

This included a head-to-head comparison of the effects of close-range fire on living cattle with a .45-caliber projectile and a rising star in the 9mm Luger. Here are two brief but graphic excerpts of the results:

Blunt .45 Caliber: “9:46:30 A.M. Animal shot through lungs from left to right; fell to the floor at the sixth shot. Hemorrhage was free from one of the perforations in the right side. The animal was very much excited and kept jumping from side to side until she fell to the floor. Death occurred at 9:49 A.M.”

9mm Luger: “10:15 A.M. Animal was shot from left to right. There was an interval of one minute between the second and third shots, due to a hitch in the working of the pistol.

At 10:18:15 A.M., when the animal had been shot eight times, there was a short interval on account of reloading the magazine. Two shots were fired through the abdomen; at this time the animal was bleeding from the mouth.

After twelve shots had been fired the cow was still standing and had to be killed by the hammer. Ten shots were fired through the lungs and two through the abdomen in this experiment.”

As gruesome as the testing was, the clear impression left on the U.S. military was that the hefty .45 delivered with its heavy weight what the 9mm couldn’t with higher velocities. That terminal performance is still largely represented in the basic ballistics of modern 9mm and .45 ACP ammunition.

Here’s a quick comparison of basic, 124-grain 9mm FMJ and 230-grain .45 ACP FMJ.

9mm versus .45ACP Ballistics
While this is only the most basic of ballistic comparisons, it still highlights some shining qualities of the .45 ACP. First, we see its superior foot-pounds of energy over the faster 9mm out to 50 yards. But we can also see that it maintains its energy remarkably well. This only partly explains what the U.S. Army observed in its live-tissue testing. Regardless, it’s indicative of the mythical “stopping power” all militaries have pursued since the introduction of firearms to the battlefield. (Image: Federal Premium Ballistic Calculator) 
Federal .45 ACP Ammo
Another bonus for the .45 ACP is that it’s a standby round for America’s manufacturers. That means there is a lot of quality ammo and plenty of guns to shoot it. (Photo: Paul Peterson/Guns.com)

You can also compare the .45 ACP stats from above to the rather anemic black-powder 150-grain .38 Long Colt, which offered velocities ranging from 650 to 750 fps. That put it at a mere 140 to 187 foot-pounds of energy. Even the switch to modern smokeless powder only bumped velocities to 750-800 fps. That left it at a relatively low 187-213 foot-pounds of energy.

For the modern shooter, there’s another benefit to the .45 ACP’s slower velocity. The increasing popularity of suppressors benefits from the subsonic speeds generated by the .45 ACP. Normal muzzle velocities for the .45 ACP generally fall between 800 and 900 fps, staying well below the speed of sound (1,125 fps at sea level in 68 degrees Fahrenheit).

Since this slow-flying bullet has enough mass to make up for its velocity, there’s a good reason .45 ACP is a popular suppressor round for handguns and pistol-caliber carbines. This quality was well known to gun designers in the 20th century, with firearms like the integrally suppressed British De Lisle commando carbine using the slow-moving .45 ACP as a quiet sentry killer in World War II.

Pros & Cons

Here are my top five pros and cons for the iconic .45 ACP. Keep in mind that modern specialty loads can vary greatly, so these are only based on the most general characteristics of the cartridge.

Pros: 

  • Strong terminal ballistics due to heavy weight
  • Suppressor-friendly velocities
  • Reliable semi-auto design
  • Common and easily found caliber
  • Over 100 years of proven performance

Cons:

  • Large size lowers magazine capacities
  • More expensive than 9mm
  • Low velocities for longer ranges
  • Usually more recoil than calibers like 9mm
  • Heavier overall weights for carrying

Final Thoughts

 

There’s something to be said about the authority that comes with slinging 230-grain freedom pellets. (Photo: Paul Peterson/Guns.com)

The sheer number of 1911-type firearms still in production, with new variants arriving every year, is a solid testament to just how much America is still in love with Browning’s design. The .45 ACP remains a part of that legacy.

I have no doubt the caliber debate will continue to rage well beyond even the modern era’s “9mm vs. everyone else” trend. As for the classic .45 ACP, I can’t imagine it leaving the American marketplace in my lifetime. Anything is possible, but I think there are too many shooters who love the round for its history and performance to let it just fade away.

In fact, it’s still well-respected for its terminal performance and suppressor-friendly qualities. That has kept it as a go-to option for many law enforcement groups and private citizens. It’s also still a common feature inside Special Operations arsenals, even if its general military use has largely waned.

The “Lord’s caliber” gets the job done.

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The Battle of Caloocan


The Battle of Caloocan was one of the opening engagements of the Philippine–American War, and was fought between an American force under the command of Arthur MacArthur Jr. and Filipino defenders led by Antonio Luna in February 1899.

American troops launched a successful attack on the Filipino-held settlement of Caloocan on February 10, which was part of an offensive planned by MacArthur Jr. Occurring a few days after an American victory near Manila on February 4–5, the engagement once again demonstrated the military superiority that American forces held over the Philippine Revolutionary Army.

However, it was not the decisive strike that MacArthur had hoped for, and the war continued for another three years.